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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Introduction
In this dissertation I estimate the effect of integration between generalist and specialist
physicians on physician behavior, health care outcomes, and medical care spending. Esti-
mates of these effects are important to health economics and health care policy.
First, physicians are arguably the most influential actors in the US health care system.
In the hierarchy of health providers they rank highest, and lesser-credentialed providers
such as nurses, nurse practicioners, and physician assistants, are expected to defer to their
judgment. Due to massive differences in human capital, information asymmetry between
physicians and patients causes patients to depend greatly on physician choices. Therefore,
physician behavior is a first-order scholarly concern.
Second, there is great interest among health care policymakers in altering how physicians, as
well as other providers, self organize. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (ACA) provides significant financial incentives for provider integration
through programs such as the Medicare Shared Savings Program.1 Such interest exists
due to the belief that integration, particularly of generalist and specialist physicians, solves
important clinical coordination problems.
Lack of data has historically prevented researchers from empirically characterizing the effect
of generalist-specialist integration. The appearance of new data on physician behavior and
physician organizations, however, has made research like this dissertation possible.
1See https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/.
1
The case for scope economies in medical practice
Clinical rationale
Proponents of provider integration argue that greater economies of scope in medical prac-
tices may increase the quality of “care coordination.” Though the term has no precise
definition, it generally refers to problems in health care production when there is more than
one provider.2
Historically speaking, greater of economies of scope in medical practice can be traced back
to the late 19th century, to the early history of the Mayo Clinic.3 The Mayo Clinic was
founded by William Worrall Mayo and his sons William James and Charles Horace. By the
end of the late 1800s, their practice had become successful enough to warrant expansion.
Instead of hiring more surgeons, which would strictly be an increase in scale, they hired
more generalists. The Mayos tasked them with a filtering problem, to identify patients
coming through the practice who would benefit from surgery.4
In the present day, concerns about care coordination are often raised for patients with
chronic illnesses like diabetes and hypertension. These patients often require treatment
from more than one provider, specifically a generalist as well as one or more specialists, and
in this setting it can be difficult to ensure that a coherent medical care plan is implemented.5
Low-quality care coordination is claimed to cause a wide-variety of adverse outcomes: lower
quality care, higher health care costs, preventable hospital admissions and readmissions,
unnecessary emergency room visits, medical errors, repeated or unnecessary tests, and poor
outcomes.6
2See Chapter 2, McDonald et al. (2014).
3The information in this section is drawn from Starr (1982), an authoritative history.
4In today’s terms we might call this activity “gatekeeping,” e.g. see http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/10359396.
5See Audet and Sinha (2012) and the cites therein.
6See https://ruralhealth.und.edu/projects/hwic/pdf/care-coordination.pdf.
2
Economic rationale
Arm’s length dealing might also create significant financial disincentives to coordination.
Consider a young female with Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) who reports her chronic
diarrhea and abdominal pain to her generalist. The generalist may obtain stool studies to
rule out an infection and a blood test to rule out Celiac disease. He may also recommend
dietary changes. If the patient’s symptoms persist and the tests are negative for Celiac, the
generalist may at that point diagnose her with IBS – if he has not already – and focus on
relieving her symptoms with Immodium and anti-spasmodic drugs.
At any point during this process the generalist could refer the patient to a gastroenterologist.
He may refer for clinical reasons. He may also retain the patient for financial reasons. If
the generalist practices alone and performs tests, he expends some effort and the insurer
pays him for his work. If he refers he expends no effort and is paid nothing. But if the
generalist practices with a specialist and revenues are shared, the generalist’s opportunity
cost is lower. Prior research has shown that some health care providers integrate to change
referral patterns.7
Integrating to change referral patterns also induces two moral hazard problems (see Holm-
strom, 1982). Because the generalist in an integrated practice is paid whether he treats
or not, he may refer too many patients to the specialist. For example, he may refer a
patient with only mild symptoms. He may also shirk by providing insufficient effort, e.g.
not ordering stool and blood studies before referring her to a specialist.
The prevalence of multispecialty practice
In Table 1 I show that multispecialty practice is economically significant and its prevalence
has increased slightly during my sampling frame. In 2009, 1.8 percent of firms containing a
generalist also contained a cardiologist, 0.9 percent contained an endocrinologist, and 13.7
7There is a collection of laws and regulations restricting physician self-referral, i.e. referral of a patient
to certain entities in which the referring physician or a member of his or her family has a financial stake.
These laws and regulations are commonly known as the “Stark law” or “Stark regulations.”
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percent contained any specialist. By 2012, integration rates increased to 2.1 percent for
cardiology, 1.1 percent for endocrinology, and 15.6 percent for any specialty.
Table 1: Trends in physician organizations, 2009-2012
Panel A: Physician organizations
2009 2010 2011 2012
Firms containing a generalist 73,440 69,411 76,111 76,860
Firms also containing a cardiologists 1,285 1,405 1,557 1,620
Firms also containing an endocrinologist 668 760 821 842
Firms also containing a specialist 10,042 10,617 11,524 12,003
Integration % for hypertension 1.75 2.02 2.05 2.11
Integration % for diabetes mellitus 0.91 1.09 1.08 1.10
Integration % for any disease 13.67 15.30 15.14 15.62
Panel B: Physicians
2009 2010 2011 2012
Generalists 170,527 171,621 184,147 185,793
Integrated with cardiologists (count) 22,015 28,748 31,853 31,876
Integrated with endocrinologists (count) 18,857 26,350 29,256 28,845
Integrated with any specialist (count) 58,095 69,164 75,959 76,044
Integrated with cardiologists (percent) 12.91 16.75 17.30 17.16
Integrated with endocrinologists (percent) 11.06 15.35 15.89 15.53
Integrated with any specialist (percent) 34.07 40.30 41.25 40.93
Physician-level measures track these organizational trends. In 2009, 12.9 percent of gen-
eralists practiced with a cardiologist, 11.1 percent practiced with an endocrinologist, and
34.1 percent practiced with any specialist. These percentages increased to 17.2, 15.5, and
40.9 percent, respectively, by 2012.8
Literature review
Organizational form in medicine is tied to deep questions in organizational and health
economics. In this section I describe what we currently know about the determinants
of organizational form in medicine as well as the effects organizational form may have.
Consistent with findings from an earlier review by Rebitzer and Votruba (2011), I find that
8The increases in integration rates from 2009 to 2010 are much sharper than increases later in the sample.
And while the number of generalists increaes consistently from year to year, this is not true for the number
of firms containing a generalist. The number of firms increases over the entire period, but there is a marked
decrease between 2009 and 2010. It is difficult to know if this is a data quality issue or if these numbers
actually reflect the truth, such as a strategic response to the ACA. However, these diverging trends do not
drive my estimates, as patients in 2009 comprise only 6 percent of my diabetes mellitus sample and less than
1 percent of my hypertension sample.
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the effects of integration among generalists and specialists are not well understood.
The determinants of organizational form in medicine
Organizational diversity is driven by technology and coordination
Rosen (1983) shows how economies of scope arising from skill complementarities can de-
termine generalist-specialist integration. Suppose skill in completing tasks associated with
generalist medicine reduces the cost of acquiring skills associated with specialist medicine.
The stronger the spillover effect, the lesser the incentive for generalists to integrate with
specialists, especially if tasks in specialist medicine are reimbursed at higher levels. How-
ever, it is unclear whether, if at all, these spillovers exist. Still, in the limiting case with
no spillovers, David and Helmchen (2011) show that the cost of skill acquisition may still
determine integration patterns. In their model they account for the fact that treatment of
many diseases is treated according to a hierarchy of tasks, e.g. treatment algorithms taught
in medical school or residency and fellowship, or embodied in standards and guidelines.
For a given physician, the integration decision boils down to a choice about where in the
task hierarchy he cedes control to another provider. He cedes control earlier in the task
hierarchy when skill in the downstream task is more difficult to acquire or when the cost of
coordination is lower.
Becker and Murphy (1992) demonstrate how coordination costs can limit organizational
complexity. If coordination costs increase with firm size, firms cannot grow without limit.
These coordination costs seem important in medicine. Newhouse (1973), Gaynor and Pauly
(1990), Gaynor and Gertler (1995), and Rosenman and Friesner (2004) indicate that medical
practices are subject to substantial diseconomies of scale.9 These diseconomies arise due
to revenue-sharing. Such sharing rules introduce free-riding incentives and are common in
multi-physician medical practices.
9Though Reinhardt et al. (1979) and DeFelice and Bradford (1997), estimate increasing and constant
returns to scale, respectively, in medical practices, these papers are not influential.
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Hierarchies may be limited due to physician preferences
Garicano and Hubbard (2007) explain why hierarchies may arise in organizations. Situating
high-human capital individuals above low-human capital individuals can increase productiv-
ity by shielding high-human capital individuals from menial tasks. Analysis of confidential
firm-level data from the Census supports their claims.10
The emergence of postgraduate training programs (e.g. internal medicine residency, cardiol-
ogy fellowship) seems to fit this theory. However, hierarchies among non-trainee physicians
are hardly common. One reason may be that most firms are too small to accomodate
hierarchies. Another reason is that physicians have been known to fiercely guard their
independence. Analyzing data from the 1997, 1998, and 2000 waves of the Community
Tracking Study (CTS) Casalino et al. (2003) report that lack of physician cooperation and
lack of physician leadership are two of most frequently cited barriers to large medical group
practices (p. 1961). CTS Interview responses include:
“Physicians don’t think that administrative work is worth much” (p. 1961)
and
“It’s impossible to deal with doctors. I tried to put together a quality improve-
ment program in our group, but it never happened. No physician was paid to
run the organization. Meetings were a nightmare. I did so much for free, and
all I got for it was a lot of flack” (pp. 1961-1962).11
10Another theory posits that “up-or-out” tournaments, implicitly defining another form of hierarchy, allows
firms to control relationship-specific human capital amassed by its employees (Rebitzer and Taylor, 2007).
This behavior is less relevant in my context.
11Notably, physicians – particularly younger ones – are increasingly joining larger groups. Liebhaber and
Grossman (2007) report that the share of physicians in solo- or two-physician practice has declined steadily
from 40.7 percent in the 1996-1997 wave of the Community Tracking Study to 32.5 percent in the 2004-2005
wave (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the percent of physicians with an ownership stake in their practice has
declined from 61.6 percent in 1996-1997 to 54.4 percent in 2004-2005 (see Table 2).
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Firms adjust boundaries to internalize referrals
Burns and Pauly (2002) ask hospital administrators their motives for acquiring generalist
practices. A desire to retain and control referrals is commonly cited.
Several econometric studies document how referrals respond to organizational form. David
and Neuman (2011) study gastroenterologists. In their data, gastroenterologists can per-
form procedures in either an ambulatory surgery center (ASC) or a hospital outpatient
department (HOPD). More severe patients fare better in HOPDs. Some gastroenterolo-
gists have access to ASCs only while others may choose between ASCs and HOPDs. The
authors find that higher-severity patients are more likely to be treated at a HOPD when
their gastroenterologists have access to one. Gastroenterologists with access to ASCs alone
refer only the highest-severity patients to HOPDs. Nakamura et al. (2007) document how
referrals respond to changes in hospital firm boundaries. These authors look for changes in
referral patterns after community hospitals are acquired by large tertiary care hospitals.12
In their data, thirty percent of acquisitions lead to a significant increase in referrals from
community hospitals to the acquirer. Patients with more generous insurance were referred
to the acquiring tertiary care hospital at higher rates. Patients undergoing more profitable
procedures were also referred at higher rates. Hillman et al. (1990) and Mitchell and Sass
(1995) are two examples from a sizable literature showing that physician ownership of an
auxiliary facility (e.g. physical therapy) is associated with a greater propensity to refer to
that facility.13 Similarly, in an analysis of Medicare data, Barro et al. (2006) find evidence
supporting the idea that cardiac specialty hospital formation is driven by the desire to
capture referrals. David et al. (2011) study how integration of hospitals with home health
12In general, large tertiary care hospital is equipped for any condition a community hospital can treat as
well as more severe conditions.
13This literature is generally referred to as the literature on “supplier-induced demand” (SID), a topic
which shares considerable overlap with referral-motivated integration. The canonical reference on SID is
Evans (1974). McGuire (2000) defines SID among physicians as “when the physician influences a patient’s
demand for care against the physician’s interpretation of the best interests of the patient” (p. 504). Mitchell
and Sass (1995) describe how SID may be tied to referrals. Consider a patient does not need but (probably)
will not be hurt by an auxiliary service like such as physical therapy or lab work. A physician who owns an
auxiliary facility that provides these services has a greater incentive to refer the patient for auxiliary services
than a physician who does not.
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agencies (HHAs) and skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) affects the site of patient recovery.14
Hospital-based recovery is more costly than SNF- or HHA-based recovery. The authors
show that patients in integrated hospitals recover more often in SNFs or with HHAs.
There are very few studies on referral-motivated integration outside of health care. The
rare exception is Garicano and Hubbard (2009), who find that lawyers specializing in fields
where referrals are more prevalent are more likely to integrate with other lawyers in that
field.
Bargaining power
Bargaining is a central feature of health care markets and the extent to which firms in this
market do so distinguishes health care as an industry. The prevalence of Health Manage-
ment Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) as well as the
increase of insurer market power in a growing number of geographic markets have provided
a strong incentive for providers to bolster their bargaining power,15 and the strength of
these incentives has been clearly demonstrated in recent years (Dafny, 2010).16
There is an extremely small literature on the effect of hospital-physician integration on
bargaining power. Gal-Or (1999) models these interactions and generates an extremely rich
set of results. In short, the effect depends on the comparative degrees of competitiveness
among hospitals and physician firms, respectively. Interestingly, exclusive dealing between
integrated parties may increase barganing power among excluded parties. The empirical lit-
erature consists of two papers. Ciliberto and Dranove (2006) study hospital-physician merg-
14As above, hospitals specialize in acute care while HHAs and SNFs specialize in post-treatment recovery.
15For examplle, Town and Vistnes (2001) finds that that “hospital mergers, even in urban areas with many
nearby hospitals, can lead to significant price increases” (p. 733).
16Blair and Herndon (2004) notes that physicians “have pursued numerous legislative initiatives at both
the federal and state levels to grant self-employed physicians, who are currently prohibited from unionizing,
an antitrust exemption to bargain collectively with health plans” (p. 989). Bordonaro (2013) provides a
recent example. In the 2000-2001 round of the Community Tracking Study (CTS), bargaining leverage with
health plans was the most frequently cited benefit (81 percent of interviewees) of practicing in a large medical
group. In comparison, only 20 percent cited better lifestyle and 15 percent cited improved quality (Casalino
et al., 2003, p. 1961). The American Medical Association provides a substantial guide to evaluating and
negotiating contracts with insurers (American Medical Association, 2012).
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ers in California from 1994 through 2001. In most markets they study, vertical integration
does not affect hospital prices. In rural areas, prices decline. Cuellar and Gertler (2006)
study hospital-physician mergers in Arizona, Florida, and Wisconsin from 1994 through
1998. They find that integration increases prices without improving efficiency.
Foreclosure
Foreclosure occurs when access by a party in a vertical relation is restricted to the other
(upstream or downstream) party. It may have strong effects in referral-intensive indus-
tries. Personal conversations and the trade literature strongly indicate that many medical
specialists highly value referral sources. Consider a cardiology practice that acquires a pri-
mary care practice and internalizes its referrals. Clearly, the other practices are worse off.
Patients may also be worse off due to the restriction of choice, potentially reduced match
quality between patients and physicians, and price increases due to increased bargaining
power. I am not aware of studies on foreclosure in health care, particularly on foreclosure
of referrals. Evidence from non-medical contexts is mixed (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007, see
p. 672).
Quality
Quality (perceived or actual) is an extremely salient concern in health care (see the compre-
hensive survey of Kolstad and Chernew, 2009). The premium paid by insurers to “superstar”
hospitals is well-documented (Ho, 2009). It is possible that physician firms may expand firm
boundaries if doing so generates a prestige-driven premium. Firms may also try to exploit
their prestige by acquiring other firms and rebranding them. Physician firms may also at-
tempt to generate or exploit a prestige-driven premium by strategically integrating. I am
unaware of an empirical literature on this topic.17
17Physicians also self-regulate referrals on a quality basis. Both Navathe and David (2009) and Johnson
(2011) show that physicians divert referrals from worse to better performers.
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The effects of organizational form in health care
Integration, generally speaking, does not seem to increase welfare
The evidence is mixed at best, negative at worst.
David and Neuman (2011), David et al. (2011), and Afendulis and Kessler (2011) find that
integration is welfare-improving. Nakamura et al. (2007) as well as Hillman et al. (1990),
Mitchell and Sass (1995), and other papers in the SID literature find that integration is
welfare-reducing. The results from Barro et al. (2006) are mixed. Huckman (2006) estimates
economically small effects.
In two exhaustive reviews, both Burns and Pauly (2002) and Burns and Muller (2008)
conclude that integration reduces welfare. Burns and Pauly (2002) write,
“During the 1990s many hospitals pursued twin strategies of vertical and hori-
zontal integration.... While the forms of integration varied across hospitals and
markets, their economic performance, after a decade of experience, was generally
uniform: Nothing worked” (p. 128).
Burns and Muller (2008) do not find evidence that hospital-physician integration reduces
costs, increases quality, increases access to care, or increases clinical integration. Madison
(2004) analyzes data on Medicare heart attack patients and does not find that integration
improves treatment choices, expenditures, or outcomes.
However, integration encouraging greater specialization improves welfare
In a very careful study of obstetricians, Epstein et al. (2010) document how larger practices
encourage physicians to develop expertise in treating certain types of high-risk pregnancies.
The authors argue that this specialization leads to better matching between patients and
physicians. They estimate that such specialization averted almost 11,000 hospital days and
5,500 complications for women in Florida and New York during their sample period.
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The link between firm size, specialization, and productivity is potentially very important. I
am unaware of other empirical studies that estimate the effect of firm size on labor special-
ization, at least for extremely high-skilled labor. However, one hopes the effect is positive.
Donohoe (1998) reviews papers from 1966 through 1997 that compare generalist and spe-
cialist care, concluding,
“Evidence is strongest that the knowledge base and quality of care provided by
specialists exceeds those of generalists for certain conditions such as myocardial
infarction, depression, and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.” (p. 1596).
In a similarly-themed review, Harrold et al. (1999) report,
“specialists were reported to be more knowledgeable about conditions encom-
passed within their specialty.... [S]pecialists practicing in their area of expertise
were more likely to use medications associated with improved survival and to
comply with routine health maintenance screening guideliens; they used more
resources including diagnostic tests, procedures, and longer hospital stays” (p.
499).
Afendulis and Kessler (2007) find that anti-specialization among cardiac physicians increases
costs without improving outcomes.18 Prior to the invention of percutaneous transluminal
coronary angioplasty (PTCA), cardiologists provided only medical services while cardiac
surgeons provided only surgical services. In the 1970s, the emergence of PTCA led to
the creation of a new medical specialty, interventional cardiology, whose practitioners were
trained in both medical and surgical (i.e. specifically PTCA) services. The authors show
that these anti-specialized physicians provided care at higher cost without a discernable
improvement in outcomes.
18The authors frame their paper as a study of integration. I interpret their work as a study of anti-
specialization. In the authors’ terminology, an “integrated” physician provides both medical and surgical
services. However, integration of physicians in the authors’ sense is not analogous to integration among
generalists and specialists. Consider a firm that contains only cardiologists. If the firm integrates by adding
cardiac surgeons, the firm’s endowment of man-hours increases. Yet a physician’s endowment of man-hours
is fixed. Therefore the authors’ definition of “integration” corresponds to the case in which all the physicians
11
That said, the gains from specialization depend on the condition. In another review, Harrold
et al. (1999) find that specialists outperformed generalists in the treatment of myocardial
infarction, stroke, and asthma but generalists outperformed specialists when treating hy-
pertension, diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, unstable angina, and low back
pain.
New evidence is needed
There are very few settled questions in the broader literature on health care organizations.
The most convincing result is that scope economies are limited by coordination costs, partic-
ularly the free-riding problem. It also appears that integration cannot generally be expected
to increase welfare, though the case of specialization-increasing welfare is one very important
exception.
The effect of generalist-specialist integration is unknown. This is unfortunate given the
central role physicians play in the health care system and the demonstrated interest poli-
cymakers have in changing patterns of organization. In the remainder of this document I
present new contributions from this project.
in a practice learn new skills, e.g. cardiologists learn PTCA or become interventional cardiologists.
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CHAPTER 2 : Data
Sources of data
The first source of data for this project is a health insurance claims database from the
Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI). The HCCI is an independent non-profit that warehouses
health insurance claims from large, private market insurers such as Aetna, Humana, and
UnitedHealthcare.1 My data set contains 3.5 billion rows detailing 3.1 billion claims.
These claims are associated with over 1 million providers.2 In each year over 36 million
unique beneficieries appear in the data. Each claim contains billing (e.g. allowed amount,
coinsurance, copay, and deductible), care (e.g. diagnosis codes, procedure codes, NPI, place
of service code), product (e.g. market segment, product segment such as HMO and PPO),
and demographic (e.g. age band, gender, and state) data. My extract spans the years
2008-2012.
My second data set is an annual survey of physician firms conducted by SK&A, a health
care marketing research firm. The unit of observation is the office. For each office, SK&A
records street address, other contact information (e.g. phone numbers), and affiliations (e.g.
firm identifier aggregating offices into firms, hospital affiliation, health system membership).
For each physician observed in the office, SK&A reports his or her name, degree (MD or
DO), medical specialty or specialties, and NPI. While these data are rich, physician and
firm identifiers require substantial imputation. I describe the imputation in Chapter F of
the Supplementary Material. After imputation my extract spans 2009-2012.
My third source of data is generated by a severity scorer developed by health services
researchers at Johns Hopkins University. The ACG R© System software computes a severity
score for any patient with a year’s worth of claims.3 Higher scores indicate higher severity.
I use the software to address a missing data problem, that physicians observe patient health
status but I do not. I choose to generate severity scores with the ACG R© System software
1See http://www.healthcostinstitute.org/data-contributors. Page last accessed February 18, 2016.
2Both physician and non-physician providers are identified.
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so that I may avoid ad hoc procedures in defining my own severity measures. In work on
referrals preceding mine, health services researchers have also relied on the ACG R© System
software to address this same missing data problem. (see Forrest et al., 2002, 2006).
I use the data in the following way. I observe the specialty composition of each firm in the
SK&A data. Since I observe NPIs in both the HCCI and SK&A data, I can link physician
behavior to firm composition.4 My sampling frame is determined by the overlap of my
data extracts: 2009-2012.
Data set construction
Patient data
Patient sampling
I analyze two groups of patients: those with a primary care physician claim for hypertension
and those with a primary care physician claim for diabetes mellitus. An individual may
appear in both groups. These conditions have high rates of incidence and prevalence, lead
to potentially severe complications, and both generalists and specialists may treat them.
To generate my samples, I begin by searching the physician claims data for any claim I can
link to a generalist in the SK&A data. This results in lists of patients who received service
for hypertension or diabetes mellitus from a generalist. Because treatment of non-adults
likely differs from treatment of adults, I exclude individuals less than 18 years old. I also
exclude individuals 65 and older due to the possibility of multiple insurance providers. I then
randomly sample patient identifiers within each list and draw claims for those individuals.
The sampling rate for hypertension patients is 25 percent. For diabetes mellitus patients it
is 40 percent. I sample to reduce computational burden. There are millions of individuals
3See The Johns Hopkins ACG System (2016) for further technical details.
4In order to protect patient confidentiality, patient and provider identifiers in the HCCI data are en-
crypted. HCCI also coordinates encryption of the SK&A identifiers so that I may link observations across
data sets without compromising patient confidentiality. While this is an important practical matter, the
details of this procedure are unimportant for understanding my results.
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on each list.
Severity scores and treatment windows
After random sampling there is still sample attrition. First, I need to generate a severity
score for each patient. The severity scorer requires one year’s worth of claims. For example,
if the first generalist encounter for hypertension is January 1, 2011, that individual must be
in the data starting January 1, 2010.5 Second, I need to observe the patient throughout
what I call the treatment window, the number of days after the first generalist encounter
for hypertension or diabetes for which I study behavior and outcomes. For example, if the
first generalist encounter for hypertension is January 1, 2011 and the window is 360 days,
then that individual must be in the data in December 2011. The length of the treatment
window is arbitrary. As a practical matter, longer windows induce more attrition but give
more time for effects to appear. Since I study two chronic illnesses, I set relatively long
windows of 360 and 720 days. For some acute conditions, shorter windows would have been
more appropriate.
Sample attrition is severe – more than half of the sample is lost due to scoring and coverage
cessation – perhaps leading me to oversample individuals with longer periods of continuous
coverage. However, the coverage of the HCCI data set is very broad, covering tens of
millions of individuals across the United States. This suggests a minimal role for sample
selection bias.
It is also important to note that I do not observe patient age in years in the HCCI data.
Instead I observe patient age in 5-year bins. Because the scorer requires age, I randomly
assign patient age within the bin and retain that age for regression analysis.
5Since I only observe month and year of membership, I set a conservative requirement of thirteen months
of continuous coverage.
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Severity score computation
I generate severity scores with medical claims and a severity scorer, the ACG R© System
Software. The software maps claims and demographics to a single index of severity. Ideally
I would score all individuals simultaneously, but since my data set is so large I implement
a modified procedure. For each condition I draw 1,000 random samples of 50,000 patients
and score the patients in each sample. I then compute the modal score for each patient
across all samples in which he or she appears and set that as the patient’s severity score.6
The scorer generates several risk measures. I utilize the total cost risk score as it is forward
looking and generates wide variation in the severity measure.
Claims extraction
Each of my outcomes is computed from an extract of physician services, outpatient services,
inpatient services, or pharmacy claims.7 Due to the size of the underlying data and the
subtleties of medical coding, filtering these claims is non-trivial.
For physician services claims, I search for claims with primary diagnosis code (ICD-9)
indicating hypertension or diabetes mellitus alone, or one of these conditions with its com-
plications. Hypertension claims have primary diagnosis codes beginning with 401, 402, 403,
and 404. Diabetes mellitus claims have primary diagnosis codes beginning with 250.8 My
filters are consistent with several medical coding sources.9
It is possible providers code differently in practice. For example, instead of coding a
5See http://acg.jhsph.org/ for more information.
6I experimented with computing means, but in practice this made little difference. It also may not have
been necessary to score random samples, but without knowing the internals of the scorer this seemed to be
the most reasonable approach.
7The claims were provided by HCCI in separate files according to this classification.
8To illustrate, codes beginning with 402 denotes hypertensive heart disease, i.e. heart disease with
presumed causal link to hypertension. Codes for diabetes mellitus without complications begin with 2500,
while a code beginning with 2504 denotes an opthalmic condition with presumed causal link to diabetes. I
argue these filters are conservative, but reasonable.
9See, for example HMSA Provider Resource Center (2014), http://www.aafp.org/fpm/2008/0600/p35.
html, and http://www.fortherecordmag.com/archives/042312p28.shtml.
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diabetes-caused retinopathy as 2504X, where X is either empty or another digit, they might
choose a diagnosis code in the 360XX-379XX range. However, there is strong guidance
from payers and a small industry of consultants, educators, and publications that con-
cern themselves with optimized medical claims coding. This further suggests my filters are
reasonable.
For inpatient and outpatient services I extract claims more aggressively. Especially for
inpatient claims, providers are much less likely to have documentation that a given condition
is caused by hypertension or diabetes mellitus. I certainly introduce error in that I am
collecting too many claims, but it is unlikely that this error varies with integration status.
For pharmacy claims, I only collect claims for hypertension patients. Ideally I would have
claims for both. I am able to collect claims for hypertension patients because HCCI provides
a variable that allows me to filter claims for medications plausibly linked to hypertension,
i.e. those designated as “Cardiovascular Drugs.” In contrast, while there is a designation
for “Hormones and Synthetic Substitutes,” conversations with clinicians indicate that drugs
outside this class might also be used in treating diabetes mellitus or its complications.10
Physician, firm, and area data
Physician specialty and firm integration status
Physician specialty is observed directly in the SK&A data.11 With physician specialties
and firm identifiers I can compute integration status at the firm-year level. For example, in
my diabetes analysis the primary specialist of relevance is the endocrinologist. Therefore,
finding firms integrated for diabetes mellitus is a matter of flagging firms containing both
10I attempted to utilize all prescription drug data for diabetes mellitus patients, but the estimates are
uninformative. Also, the resulting file sizes were almost prohibitively large.
11Before computing any other variables, it was necessary to impute physician NPIs and group identifiers.
Without imputation, I cannot link physicians across years in the SK&A data due to how the data set was
constructed. The data set is effectively a repeated cross section of US physicians. Though some national
identifiers are in the data, there is no variable that links physicians across all years in my extract. There
is also potentially severe misclassifications of firms due to data collection issues. I describe my imputation
procedure in the Appendix. That said, missing NPIs do not appear to be a major concern in the most recent
years of the data, though I am not aware of the quality the firm identifiers for the newer data.
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generalists and endocrinologists. Cardiology is the relevant specialty for hypertension.
Firm and area characteristics
I compute firm and office size using reported size and my office and group identifiers. Using
physician specialty data, firm and office identifiers, and address data I compute physician
counts, the number of relevant specialists in the ZIP code, and the number of offices and
firms in the ZIP code that contain a relevant specialist.12
Finally, for each generalist in the data I compute the distance to the nearest specialist. I
geocode each office in the data based on 5-digit ZIP code, separate the offices containing
generalists from the offices containing relevant specialists, and then for each office compute
the set of specialist distances.13
Differential distances
I rely on this variable for my instrumental variables regression. For each patient I set
the differential distance equal to the distance in miles to the nearest integrated generalist
minus the distance in miles to the nearest non-integrated generalist. I begin by geocoding
patient locations.14 Patient locations are provided to me at the 5-digit ZIP code level
every month the patient is insured by one of HCCI’s data contributors. I select the ZIP
code corresponding to the month and year of the first generalist visit for the condition. I
then geocode physician locations using office ZIP codes in the SK&A data. I then compute
all great-circle distances between patient and generalist office ZIP codes, divide offices by
integration status, and compute minimums.
12ZIP codes for most locations are actually available at the 9-digit level. However, the opportunity cost
of geocoding each location at the 9-digit level instead of the 5-digit level was high, as there are substantially
more 9-digit ZIP codes than 5-digit ZIP codes and the Texas A&M geocoding service (see next footnote)
does impose rate limits. Furthermore, the loss of precision in defining local markets by 5-digit ZIP codes is
likely low. Therefore I truncate ZIP codes to 5 digits.
13I gratefully acknowledge Texas A&M Geoservices for providing me free access to their geocoding plat-
form. See http://geoservices.tamu.edu/Services/Geocode/ for more information about their service.
14I, again, gratefully acknowledge Texas A&M Geoservices.
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Subsample construction
In addition to my full-sample analysis, I re-estimate my models on two sets of subsamples.
These subsamples divide patients into groups more or less likely to be affected by integration.
Low- and high-access subsamples
The first set divides patients by geographic access to specialists. Integration should have
a greater effect in the low-access sample. I initially attempted to divide individuals among
urban and rural locations by assigning Rural-Urban Commuting Codes to ZIP codes.15
However, the rural patient samples were too small to make any inferences.16 I instead
subdivide my sample by distance to the nearest specialist. For each patient I have the
distance between his or her generalist and the nearest relevant specialist. I compute the
33rd and 67th percentile for this distance. My high-access subsample contains all individuals
with nearest specialist distance below the lower quantile (nearest specialist is closer). My
low-access subsample contains all individuals above the higher quantile (nearest specialist
is further away). There are more patients in the high-access group because the distribution
of nearest specialist distance is negatively skewed.
Hospital affiliation subsamples
The SK&A data contains a flag that indicates whether a provider has a hospital affiliation.
Integration should have a stronger effect in the no-affiliation sample. The values for this
flag are non-empty and empty.17 Providers in a firm with a non-empty value for this
variable are included in the hospital-affiliated subsample. All others are included in the
not-affiliated subsample.
15A link to the underlying data is available at United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service (2016).
16This may be an artifact of HCCI exclusion rules, as patients in rural areas face higher risk of being
identified in case of a data breach.
17Unfortunately an empty value is consistent with both no affiliation and unknown. Since this flag is
relevant only to this subgroup analysis and the cost of imputation is high, I do not attempt imputation for
this variable.
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CHAPTER 3 : Descriptive analysis
Descriptive analysis
Introduction
I first introduce notation. The notation is used throughout the rest of this document. I
then describe my basic descriptive approach and define the outcomes that will be analyzed.
I conclude with a brief discussion of the results. The estimates strongly indicate that
integration is associated with provider choices and financial outcomes.
Notation
Let i index patients and let j denote physicians, where j is i’s generalist physician. Let
c denote the patient’s condition. Let t0 be the date of the initial diagnosis. Let Ij,t0 be
an indicator that equals 1 if j’s firm is integrated at t0 for condition d. Let ∆ denote the
treatment window, the total length of time in days that I collect claims for i pertaining to
d. As specified in the previous chapter, I study outcomes at 360 and 720 days.
Then let oc,∆i,j,t0 be the outcome for patient i given all the treatment he has received in the
window ∆. For example, the outcome could be the total paid for i’s care or the number
of new prescriptions he has filled within the window. Since the values of c and ∆ will be
made clear in the text and tables, I suppress these superscripts for ease of reading.
Descriptive analysis
In my descriptive analysis I compute means for the group of patients with an integrated
generalist as well as the group of patients with a non-integrated generalist and then compare
them. In symbols the difference is
E [oi,j,t0 |Ij,t0 = 1]− E [oi,j,t0 |Ij,t0 = 0] . (3.1)
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Outcomes
My analysis studies a wide range of outcomes. They may be divided into two categories:
behavioral responses and clinical and cost measures. The behavioral responses are:
Primary specialist visit: An indicator that equals 1 if I observe a physician services
claim for the relevant specialist within the claims window
Primary specialist RVUs: For patients with a primary specialist claim, this is the sum
of primary specialist RVUs observed in the claims window1
Generalist RVUs: The sum of generalist RVUs observed in the claims window
Outpatient services visit: An indicator that equals 1 if I observe an outpatient services
claim within the claims window
Outpatient RVUs: For patients with an outpatient services claim, this is the sum of
outpatient RVUs observed in the claims window
New cardiovascular prescription, generalists: An indicator that equals 1 if I observe
a pharmacy claim for a new cardiovascular prescription if the prescribing physician is
the patient’s generalist. Hypertension patients only.2
New cardiovascular prescription, specialists: An indicator that equals 1 if I observe
a pharmacy claim for a new cardiovascular prescription if the prescribing physician is
a relevant specialist. Hypertension patients only.3
The first variable allows me to determine if firm boundaries affect referral. Though I do
not measure referral directly, it is reasonable to assume that generalists will refer primarily
to the specialists in the group. The remaining variables allow me to observe whether firm
1HCCI provides procedure codes. Using these procedure codes I merge in RVUs from the PFS Relative
Value files provided by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, available at https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/PhysicianFeeSched/PFS-Relative-Value-Files.html.
2The reasons driving the restriction are detailed in Section 2.2.1.
3Ibid.
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boundaries affect the total amount of work physicians do as well as whether firm boundaries
cause the substitution of one kind of work for another (e.g. outpatient tests versus physician
appointments). Though simple models of referrals (see Garicano and Santos, 2004) make the
reasonable assumption that effort is unidimensional, I study a large number of behavioral
measures because physicians may respond to integration along multiple margins.
The remaining regressands are used to measure clinical and financial effects of integration:
Inpatient admission: An indicator that equals 1 if I observe an inpatient admission in
the claims window
Physician cost: The sum of allowed amounts in physician services claims within the
claims window
Outpatient cost: The sum of allowed amounts in outpatient services claims within the
claims window
Pharmacy cost: The sum of allowed amounts in pharmacy claims within the claims
window. Hypertension patients only.4
Total non-inpatient cost: The sum of all costs above. This excludes pharmacy costs
for diabetes mellitus patients.
Total cost: The above measure plus the cost of inpatient care.
Estimates of the effect of integration on these outcomes, particularly inpatient admissions
and total costs, may allow us to make judgments about the integration-inducing policies.
Results
Table 2 shows that outcomes respond to the structure of the generalist’s firm. However,
these differences are quantitatively small. For example, patients of non-integrated practices
4Ibid.
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are more likely to visit a specialist than patients of non-integrated practices.5 In the
hypertension sample the differences are 3 and 4 percentage points at 360 and 720 days,
respectively. In the diabetes mellitus sample, the differences are 4 and 3 percentage points
at 360 and 720-days, respectively. Patients of non-integrated practices are very slightly less
likely to have any outpatient services utilization than their integrated counterparts. For
hypertension patients, there is no difference at 360 days and the difference is 1 percentage
point at 720 days. For diabetes patients, there is no difference in either window. Differences
in costs are also extremely small. The largest difference is in physician costs. The differences
for hypertension patients measure 26.4 dollars at 360 days and 33.2 dollars at 720 days, while
the differences for diabetes mellitus patients are larger, respectively 61.9 dollars and 96.1
dollars.
In my regression analysis I will show that this simple descriptive analysis paints a mislead-
ing picture, and that integration has large, economically significant effects along several
important margins.
5My dissertation proposal contained the opposite finding. However, in that document I defined integration
very broadly, calling a practice integrated if it contained a generalist and at least one of the top ten specialists
for the condition. Because these lists contained specialties like emergency medicine I opted for the most
conservative definition of integration.
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CHAPTER 4 : Regression analysis
Model specification
I take the following model to the data:
oi,j,t0 = β0 + Ij,t0β1 + si,t0β2 + x
′
i,t0β4 + w
′
j,t0β5 + z
′
j,t0β6 +Dl(j) +Dt0 + i,j,t0 (4.1)
In words, I regress each of my outcomes on the dummy for integration, patient severity
score (si,t0), patient sex, age, and age squared (xi,t0), firm and office characteristics (wj,t0),
area characteristics (zj,t0), and state and year fixed effects (Dl(j) and Dt0 , respectively).
The idea is to control for as many confounders as possible in my estimation.
Patient characteristics should affect physician behavior. Physicians analyze each patient’s
history and physical, notes from prior appointments, and information gleaned from the pa-
tient during the current appointment with knowledge gained in medical school, postgraduate
training (if any), external information sources like clinical guidelines, and learning-by-doing
to formulate treatment plans. Though I do not observe this patient data, for each pa-
tient I have a severity score, a forward-looking single index of severity that summarizes the
patient’s health status at the time of first diagnosis. My approach assumes more severe
patients should receive more medical care.1 Provided the severity scorer accurately mea-
sures severity differences among patients, the computed scores should provide a reasonable
substitute for the clinical information I do not observe. There are a few good reasons to
believe this strategy is credible. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 2.1, researchers in
health services have already demonstrated confidence in the severity scorer used for my
project. Second, there are significant financial incentives from providers and insurers that
likely drive the development of accurate severity scorers.2 Third, I find that the effect of
1The exception is those who would benefit from palliative care for life-ending illnesses. Because severity
is highly negatively skewed, these cases should have minimal influence on my results. For an authoritative
reference on palliative medicine, see .
2Tangentially speaking, there is a small, but growing amount of evidence from the field that large amounts
of data plus machine learning or statistical modeling can lead to large clinical gains. In recent tests, IBM’s
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severity is positive and economically significant in all my regressions, which provides some
reassurance from the data that the scorer does a reasonably good job. Because physicians
may react in a non-linear fashion to patient severity, I include both the linear and squared
terms for the severity score.3 Because I have access to only two other patient observables,
gender and age, I include them in the patient characteristics vector as well.
Firm and office characteristics include distance to the nearest relevant specialist and its
square, office size, and firm size. The most salient factor is the distance to the nearest
relevant specialist. Distance is known to strongly affect provider choice and medical care
consumption, (see McClellan et al., 1994; Kessler and McClellan, 2000, and cites therein).
Therefore the farther away is the nearest relevant specialist, the less likely it is a patient
will see him or her. The empirical literature on diseconomies of scale in physician practices
strongly indicate I should include the size measures that I have, though in practice the
coefficients on these measures are economically and statistically insignificant far more often
than not.
Area characteristics are computed at the ZIP code level. They include number of relevant
specialists, number of offices containing a relevant specialist, and number of firms containing
a relevant specialist. Because distance to the nearest specialist imperfectly captures local
specialist availability, I compute measures that account for specialist density within the ZIP
code.4
Finally, standard errors for all my regressions are clustered by state.
Watson – a computing system designed to answer open-ended questions – reportedly outperformed physicians
in diagnosing lung cancer.
3I experimented with the addition of higher-order terms. For all outcomes in my test cases, only the
linear term mattered. Only after I was able to process the pharmacy claims data did it become clear that a
cubic term would improve fit for my new prescription regressions. However, after reestimating the pharmacy
regressions, I was able to confirm that the inclusion of this term does not significantly affect the nature of
my results.
4Ideally I would also include county-level measures of specialist density. However, the ZIP-to-county
crosswalks available to me led to substantial data loss.
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Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables
Descriptive statistics for my explanatory variables are presented in 3. Panel A contains
descriptives for the hypertension sample and Panel B contains descriptives for the diabetes
mellitus sample. Within each panel I present descriptives for both the 360- and 720-day win-
dows. For each variable I compute the number of observations, mean, standard deviation,
and 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Because the 360- and 720-day statistics are highly
similar, I focus on the 360-day estimates and the differences between the hypertension and
diabetes mellitus samples.
Hypertension
After sampling and filtering, there are 183,920 patients in the 360-day sample and 114,806
patients in the 720-day sample. I lose about 1.6 percent of my samples whenever I implement
the IV estimator, due to the inability of the geocoder to assign coordinates to those patients’
ZIP codes. This loss is minimal.
Patient demographics compare favorably to nationally representive surveys. Mean values for
age and sex are broadly consistent with estimates from the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey (NHANES) for 2011-2012. In the NHANES 2011-2012, prevalence
strongly increases with age and is slightly higher among men. In my hypertension sample,
mean age is 50.0, the 25th percentile for age is 44.0, and 51.0 percent of individuals are
male.5 The histograms in Figures 1 and 2 show that the distribution of severity is highly
negatively skewed. Mean severity in the 360-day sample is 1.01 while values at the 50th
and 75th percentiles are 0.59 and 1.13, respectively.
Only twenty percent of patients are treated at integrated practices. More than fifty percent
of patients are treated in a ZIP code containing a relevant specialist. Between twenty
five and fifty percent of patients live in a ZIP code where the nearest integrated and non-
5Recall, patient age ranges from 18 to 64 in both samples.
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Figure 1: Distribution of severity in the 360-day hypertension sample
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Figure 2: Distribution of severity in the 720-day hypertension sample
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Figure 3: Distribution of severity in the 360-day diabetes sample
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Figure 4: Distribution of severity in the 720-day diabetes sample
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integrated practices are equally distant. For the rest, the nearest integrated practice is
at least 3.3 miles further than the nearest non-integrated practice. More than half of the
sample is treated in practices of five physicians or less, is treated by physicians without
a hospital affiliation, and lives in ZIP codes where there are no more than two relevant
specialists.
Diabetes mellitus
After sampling and filtering, there are 191,956 patients in the 360-day sample and 134,411
patients in the 720-day sample. Attrition is lower in this sample compared to the hyper-
tension sample. It is unlikely to be driven by health status, as severity in this sample is
comparatively greater. Similar to the hypertension sample, I lose a very similar amount
of patients for IV estimation: 1.6 percent in the 360-day window and 1.7 percent in the
720-day window.
In the diabetes mellitus sample, mean age is 51.2 and 54 percent of patients are male in the
360-day window, making this sample slightly older and more male than the corresponding
hypertension sample. Though mean age in my sample is lower than mean age at diagnosis
in the population, I have dropped all individuals aged 65 and older from my analysis,
suggesting my sample is representative of the working population. And the greater amount
of males is consistent with sex-specific diabetes prevalence rates in my sample period. The
distribution of severity for diabetes patients is also highly negatively skewed (see Figures 3
and 4).
Only seventeen percent of patients are treated in integrated practices. This is three per-
centage points less than in the hypertension sample. Less than 50 percent of patients are
treated in a ZIP code containing the relevant specialist and the median distance between
the treating generalist . The median distance from the treating generalist to the nearest
specialist is 3.1 miles. Furthermore, more than 75 percent of patients live in a ZIP code
where the nearest integrated practice is farther than the nearest non-integrated practice.
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Endocrinologists are comparatively less accessible than cardiologists, as more than fifty
percent of patients live in a ZIP code where there are no endocrinologists.
Threats to identification
There are two primary threats to identification: sorting by physicians among practices
and sorting by patients among practices. Below I describe the nature of these threats and
my strategies for dealing with them. In the case of patient sorting I argue that I have an
instrument that simulates random assignment, strongly mitigating the threat of confounding
from this source. In the case of physician sorting, I have a comparatively weaker response.
However, there are reasons to believe bias due to physician unobserved heterogeneity is
comparatively small.
Physician sorting
It is not difficult to rationalize physician sorting among integrated and non-integrated prac-
tices. A generalist might choose to work in an integrated firm because he or she values
formal connections with more specialized physicians. A generalists might also be willing to
sell his or her group in order to monetize equity or improve work-life balance. If preferences
that induce this behavior are correlated with clinically relevant characteristics like skill or
risk aversion, then OLS is confounded. The most natural response is to exploit the physician
identifiers in the data add physician fixed effects. While I am able to add these intercepts
to my original specification, estimation fails when I add fixed effects in IV regression (the
solution to my patient sorting problem) because my instrument becomes dangerously weak.
Because I lack data on physician characteristics, the next best alternative is to reason about
the bias.6
I argue that the bias can be signed with confidence for two outcomes. In the regressions for
6The obvious third-party data source that might help me is the American Medical Association
Physician Masterfile (see http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/physician-data-resources/
physician-masterfile.page). However, incorporating this data at this stage in my project is infeasible. In
future work my first task would be to purchase this data and add demographic data for the physicians in
the HCCI and SK&A data who also appear in the Masterfile.
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the probability of a primary specialist visit, the bias is positive. Generalists with greater
propensity to refer, ceteris paribus, might be more willing to join integrated practices. The
estimate for integration in the primary specialist RVUs regressions is biased downward
(toward negative infinity). If generalists with greater propensity to refer differentially sort
into integrated practices, it is likely the marginal patient for these generalists has lower
severity than the marginal patient for generalists with lesser propensity to refer. Because
the marginal patients for integrated generalists have lower severity, there is less work for
the relevant specialist to do when he or she sees them.
For the remaining outcomes, factors that should drive selection are likely to work in oppo-
sition to each other. This indeterminacy suggests, perhaps strongly, that the quantitative
impact of physician selection is not large. In the case of generalist RVUs, generalists who
select into integrated firms might do so because they can use referrals as a mechanism for
shifting work onto other providers. This would induce downard bias in the integration es-
timate. On the other hand, generalists who select into integrated firms might also do so
because they are relatively risk averse and value the “insurance” integration with a more
specialized provider can offer. Selection of this nature would induce upward bias in the
integration estimate, as risk averse physicians are more likely to overutilize. In the case of
outpatient RVUs, if the desire to shirk induces selection into integrated firms, generalists in
integrated firms might choose to refer before ordering the full set of relevant tests, biasing
the integration estimate downward. On the other hand, if risk aversion induces selection,
one might expect generalists in these firms to overutilize outpatient services, biasing the
integration upward. For the same reasons shirking and risk aversion produce countervailing
effects on my spending measures. In the case of prescription drug utilization, it is not at all
obvious why physician selection should induce bias one way or the other. And with respect
to inpatient admission, it is unclear whether integrated practices are attracting better or
worse generalists (or specialists, for that matter).7
7If demographics for generalists in integrated and non-integrated practice were available, one might
reason from those. For example, there is evidence that age is negatively correlated with physician quality
(see Choudhry et al., 2005). Knowledge of average age in integrated and non-integrated practice would allow
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Though I cannot control for physician sorting in my IV regressions, I still refer to non-IV
panel (OLS FE) estimates for heuristic purposes. The more important is physician sorting,
the further apart will be the OLS and OLS FE estimates.8 Alternatively, when OLS
and OLS FE estimates are close, I have suggestive evidence that physician sorting does
not contaminate my IV estimate. This is at best a heuristic procedure, but compared to
the alternative of not reporting OLS FE estimates at all, I argue my approach is more
transparent and conservative.9
Patient sorting
Patients may sort among integrated and non-integrated practices in ways that affect out-
comes. For example, if younger patients differentially select into integrated practices and
severity is negatively correlated with age, then patient sorting induces downward bias in
the integration estimate. Alternatively, if more severe patients differentially select into in-
tegrated practice because they believe it will be easier to secure specialist referrals, patient
sorting could induce upward bias in the integration estimate. Even though the little we
know about the nature of patient selection among generalists suggests that patients are not
sorting on clinically relevant features (see Kolstad and Chernew, 2009, especially p. 41S),
it seems extreme to assume that sorting does not affect outcomes. Therefore, because I
have an arguably powerful instrumental variable, I take a conservative approach and also
estimate model parameters with IV. In the following paragraphs I reiterate the instrument’s
definition from Chapter 2. explain how this instrument simulates random assignment, pro-
vide a preliminary test for randomization, discuss how physician sorting affects my IV
estimates, and provide some history on the use of differential distances in health economics
me to take a stand on the bias in the inpatient admission regression. However, to the best of my knowledge,
demographic information of this nature is not available.
8Though this immediately suggests a Hausman test, the test is not valid because I am still confounded by
patient selection. For completeness, I implement the test in my full-sample regressions and the test generally
rejects random effects estimation. Note that the alternative hypothesis is not differential selection among
practices, just that physicians have idiosyncratic tendencies.
9I explored the possibility that the OLS and OLS FE estimates might be used to assess the nature of
physician selection, but when the effect of patient selection is large relative to physician selection, some
distinct patterns of patient and physician selection are observationally equivalent.
34
and outcomes research.
The differential distance is defined as the distance in miles to the nearest integrated gener-
alist minus the distance in miles to the nearest non-integrated generalist. The greater the
magnitude of this distance, the greater is the patient’s inducement towards choosing the
nearer provider.
I now explain why this instrument is valid, relevant, and simulates random assignment.
First, residential choice is orthogonal to generalist locations and organizational forms. In-
trospection and anecdote suggest the desire to sort among residental locations seems much
more driven by public goods as well as residential and cultural amenities than access to
medical care. For example, commuting time and quality are probably highly salient to
working-age renters and homebuyers. Checklists for first-time homebuyers often include
the quality of the public school system. Though the extant empirical literature is small, it
would be highly surprising to find that crime does not reduce location-specific demand for
housing. In contrast, physician accessibility and the structure of their organizations seem
much less likely to affect residential choices. The cost of acquiring the information to sort
on these features seems large. To sort on integration, individuals would have to know the
locations of the generalists in their area and the specialty composition of their practices.
The time cost of collecting and organizing this data is not trivial. Consumers are already
known to have difficulties navigating the US health care system.10 It is hard to believe
that an economically significant amount of individuals in my data would have collected the
information necessary for sorting. And even if I underestimate willingness to collect this
data, individuals sorting in my sample also requires patients to be highly forward-looking.
Patients appear in my sample only if they receive a diagnosis of hypertension or diabetes
after one year of not being diagnosed with these conditions. Though information on these
conditions, their complications, the effect all these may have on quality of life and mortal-
ity, and how strongly lifestyle modifications can reduce the incidence of this disease, the
10See, for example https://www.academyhealth.org/files/issues/NavigatingHealthCare.pdf.
35
rising rate – an important risk factor for both hypertension and diabetes – provides casual
evidence that individuals are not forward-looking enough to induce sorting on physician
locations and organizations. Second, distance is a demand shifter. Distance is known to
affect hospital demand (, see). If distance affects provider choice when the stakes are high,
it must certainly affect demand when stakes are much lower. Because regular appointments
with primary care providers are relatively low-stakes, it is not hard to imagine that travel
times are highly salient to potential patients. Furthermore, there is little evidence that pa-
tients prioritize clinically relevant features when choosing a primary care physician and it is
unclear whether consumers are even good judges of quality in the first place (see, especially,
p.41S Kolstad and Chernew, 2009). Since primary care is an experience good – even for the
potentially irrelevant features like waiting room amenities – and travel times are salient, I
argue that distance is highly likely to shift demand.
Because differential distance is a demand shifter and residential choice is orthogonal to
provider locations and characteristics, these differences effectively serve as randomization
devices. In the next paragraph I discuss prior use of this randomization in outcomes re-
search and health economics. In this paragraph I discuss how randomization at the patient
level interacts with generalist sorting among integrated and non-integrated practices. For
sake of argument, consider a clinical trial designed to test the efficacy of some treatment
regimen. At Site A the treatment is provided and at Site B subjects receive a placebo. The
investigators randomize subjects between A and B. If there are no systematic differences
between the two sites, then the difference in mean outcomes between A and B is indeed
the effect of the regimen. However, if the staff at A are somehow superior to the staff at B
and staff quality impacts outcomes, then the difference in mean outcomes between A and
B reflects both the effectiveness of the regimen and the differential quality in staff. Physi-
cian selection that affects behavior or outcomes is analogous to differences in staff quality in
my example, implying that random assignment of patients to integrated and non-integrated
practices does not bypass confounding due to physician sorting. But as discussed earlier, the
bias for only two of my outcomes is determinate while selection may induce countervailing
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effects for the rest.
To my knowledge, the earliest – if not the first – paper utilizing differential distances as an
instrument is McClellan et al. (1994). In this paper, the authors attempt to estimate the
effect of treatment intensity for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) on mortality for elderly
individuals from non-experimental data. Their identification problem is similar to mine, as
patients in the data may systematically select among the available treatments. The authors
make the argument that patients who live closer to a hospital outfitted for cardiac catheter-
ization and revascularization (more intensive treatments) than hospitals not outfitted for
the procedure are disproprotionately more likely to receive cardiac catheterization if they
are admitted to the hospital after an AMI.11 This instrument is well-known in the health
economics literature and has appeared in top general-interest and health economics outlets
in the last several years (e.g. see Chandra and Staiger, 2007; Cutler, 2007).
Finally, in Table 4 I compare mean values of patient age, gender, and severity for the group
of patients with negative differential distances against the means for the group of patients
with positive differential distances. If my instrument induces random assignment, the dif-
ferences in patient observables should be small. The results are similar across windows, so
I discuss results only for the 360-day window. While differences are statistically significant,
all differences I detect are small. In the hypertension sample, the difference in mean age
between the positive and negative groups is less than a year and the proportion of males
differs by only 2 percentage points. The difference in mean severity is 0.05 which is small
compared to mean severity in the full sample (1.01). In the diabetes sample, the difference
in mean age between the two groups is also less than a year, the difference in the proportion
of males is also 2 percentage points. The difference in mean severity is 0.09 which is small
compared to mean severity in the full sample (1.21). My sample is not comparable to the
11For completeness, note that the mechanism McClellan et al. (1994) rely on is slightly different than
mine. In their setting, differential distances affect assignment through their effect on the set of ambulance
transit times among hospitals. Because AMI is a highly serious condition, ambulance drivers are more likely
to choose the hospital and they are more likely to choose closer hospitals as a clinical matter. In my setting,
choice is much more strongly driven by patient preferences.
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Medicare sample analyzed by McClellan et al. (1994), but it is worth reviewing the differ-
ences in age and gender reported in Table 4 of their paper. Those authors assign patients
into one of two groups. The low-distance group contains all patients with a differential
distance less than or equal to 2.5 miles. The high-distance group contains all the rest.
Mean age is equal between the two groups, but patients in the high-distance group are 1.8
percentage points more likely to be male. I argue the differences in age and gender I observe
in my data compare favorably to these results and suggest I should have high confidence in
the quality of my instrument.
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CHAPTER 5 : Hypertension: Evidence from the full sample
Introduction
Hypertension is a condition in which the “long-term force of the blood against [one’s] artery
walls is high enough that it may eventually cause health problems, such as heart disease.”1
Lifestyle changes such as improving diet and exercise as well as quitting smoking are
commonly recommended. It is also common to prescribe antihypertensives. These strategies
are not mutually exclusive. Common complications of uncontrolled hypertension include
heart attack; stroke; aneurysm; heart failure; weakened and narrowed blood vessels in the
kidneys; thickened, narrowed, or torn blood vessels in the eyes; metabolic syndrome; and
trouble with memory or understanding.2 Many patients can be successfully treated by
generalists, but many are unlikely to respond to treatment, making them strong candidates
for referral.3
Full-sample results
Cardiologist visit
I present regression estimates in Table 5. In each table I present estimates from the 360-day
window in the left panel and estimates from the 720-day window in the right panel. Within
each panel I present estimates from OLS, OLS FE, and IV estimation. I include coefficient
estimates for the integration dummy, severity and its square, the maledummy, age and its
square, and distance to the nearest specialist and its square. Standard errors are clustered
by state. I exclude the remaining coefficients because they much more often than not are
economically and statistically insignificant. I provide a full complement of tables at the end
of this document for interested readers.
1http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/high-blood-pressure/basics/definition/
con-20019580
2http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/high-blood-pressure/basics/complications/
con-20019580
3See http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/582072 and http://www.ash-us.org/HTN-Specialist/
Certified-HTN-Centers.aspx.
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Table 5: Effect of integration on the probability of a cardiologist visit (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.013 0.000 0.115* -0.012 0.017 0.099
-1.5578 0.0166 1.8587 -1.0207 1.0209 1.1674
Severity 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.032***
7.4166 6.4125 7.4929 9.2295 9.0450 9.3042
Severity squared -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
-1.8903 -2.4353 -1.6450 -3.0610 -4.5398 -2.8362
Male -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.006* 0.001
-0.5669 1.0745 -0.4055 0.4932 1.6732 0.5823
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
-1.1130 -0.9580 -1.0891 0.8630 0.7970 0.9325
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
1.5159 1.5007 1.4427 -0.0862 -0.0457 -0.1857
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000
-1.2506 0.1392 0.2255 -1.4083 0.7829 -0.2306
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000
-0.3386 0.6409 -1.2106 0.0109 -1.9288 -0.5674
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
OLS estimates are negative and statistically insignificant. They indicate integration de-
creases the probability of a specialist visit by 1.3 percentage points at 360 days and 1.2
percent at 720 days, respectively. The OLS FE estimates are small and positive but also
statistically insignificant, indicating no change at 360 days and a 1.7 percentage point in-
crease at 720 days.
In contrast, IV estimates are positive, and larger by an order of magnitude. The 360-day
estimate is statistically significant at the 90 percent level, indicating a 11.5 percentage
point increase in the probability of a specialist visit within this time frame. Though the
720-day estimate is not statistically significant, it is also large, indicating a 9.9 percentage
point increase within this time frame. Lack of significance in the longer window might be
explained by sample attrition, as the 720-day sample is only 61 percent of the size of the
360-day sample.
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Table 6: Effect of integration on generalist RVUs (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.516*** 0.044 1.314*** -0.620*** 0.225* 1.784***
-7.8311 0.6890 3.3685 -6.4062 1.7899 3.2531
Severity 0.059*** 0.015 0.054*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.080***
3.8077 0.9491 2.9755 3.6206 2.6296 3.0253
Severity squared -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004
-0.8323 0.3507 -0.2939 -1.6084 -1.2850 -1.2847
Male -0.015 -0.001 -0.015 0.037 0.074** 0.036
-0.9242 -0.0595 -0.9312 1.1524 2.2553 1.0701
Age -0.010* -0.003 -0.010* 0.018 0.023* 0.016
-1.7958 -0.3781 -1.8547 1.6083 1.9037 1.5259
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
1.3709 0.6776 1.3534 -0.8954 -0.8623 -0.8046
Distance to nearest specialist -0.026*** -0.006 -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.012 -0.020***
-9.9631 -0.8612 -5.2159 -7.4358 -0.7582 -3.9925
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000
5.1907 0.8308 2.7761 3.2357 -0.5231 1.4219
F – – 52.6 – – 48.3
N 183,467 183,467 180,545 114,544 114,544 112,706
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Though IV is potentially biased upward due to physician selection, the actual bias may
indeed be small. The distance between the OLS and OLS FE estimates appears small,
especially compared to the distance between the OLS and IV estimates. This suggests
the role of physician selection is smaller than the role of patient selection. Furthermore,
the effect of severity is positive, economically significant, and both terms are statistically
significant, lending further credibility to my result. The effect of the other reported observ-
ables – male, age and its square, and distance to the nearest specialist and its square – are
extremely small. In fact, these coefficients are economically insignificant in almost every
regression. Therefore in subsequent sections I will only discuss these coefficients when they
are comparable in importance to integration or severity.
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Table 7: Effect of integration on cardiologist RVUs (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.115 -0.768** 0.709 0.181 -0.715 1.862
0.8114 -2.1075 0.5028 1.4184 -1.3990 1.3508
Severity 0.446*** 0.461*** 0.430*** 0.521*** 0.435*** 0.495***
6.3418 4.4826 6.0344 6.2632 2.8906 5.8232
Severity squared -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.018 -0.023***
-4.4724 -3.4253 -3.9487 -3.4478 -0.9929 -3.0215
Male 0.217*** 0.264*** 0.221*** 0.304*** 0.377*** 0.316***
3.6843 2.6841 3.7571 5.7829 4.8433 5.8003
Age -0.092*** -0.031 -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.059 -0.076***
-4.1687 -0.8577 -4.2878 -2.8973 -1.4092 -2.8630
Age squared 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001***
4.4263 0.9720 4.6497 3.2204 1.6830 3.1856
Distance to nearest specialist -0.015 -0.058 -0.013 -0.020** -0.006 -0.014*
-1.5499 -1.4009 -1.2538 -2.1081 -0.1676 -1.9000
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.002 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000*
2.5302 1.2188 2.2715 2.1914 0.3147 1.7199
F – – 67.6 – – 51.6
N 29,297 29,297 28,914 25,291 25,291 24,945
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Physician utilization
Estimates for the generalist RVU regressions are presented in Table 6. OLS estimates
are negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent level, indicating reductions in
generalist utilization by 0.52 RVUs at 360 days and 0.62 RVUs at 720 days. In contrast,
OLS FE estimates are positive in both windows, indicating smaller increases in generalist
utilization of 0.04 RVUs at 360 days and 0.22 RVUs at 720 days. The latter estimate is
significant at the 90 percent level. The IV estimates are positive and larger still, indicating
that generalist utilization increases by 1.31 RVUs at 360 days and 1.78 RVUs at 720 days.
Both IV estimates are statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
I present estimates for the cardiologist regressions in Table 7. OLS estimates are positive,
small, and statistically insignificant, indicating an increase of 0.12 cardiologist RVUs at 360
days and 0.18 cardiologist RVUs at 720 days. In contrast, OLS FE estimates are negative
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and noticeably larger. The 360-day estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent
level, indicating a decrease of 0.77 cardiologist RVUs at 360 days. The 720-day estimate is
also negative, but smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant, indicating a decrease
of 0.72 RVUs within this time period.
I do not detect statistically significant effects when I implement the IV estimator. However,
the estimates are economically significant and positive. If the IV estimator is indeed biased
downward, as I argue in Chapter 4 Section 4.3.1, then my IV estimates provide strongly
suggestive evidence that integration induces greater cardiology utilization. Treating the IV
coefficients as lower bounds for the effect of integration, my estimates indicate increases of
at least 0.71 RVUs within 360 days and 1.86 RVUs within 720 days. And even if physician
selection biases my estimates, the effect of integration on cardiologist RVUs dominates the
effect of severity for most patients. Within 360 days, the effect of integration is greater than
the effect of severity for patients with a severity score of 1.86 or lower. Within 720 days,
the threshold value is even higher, a score of 4.86. Both values are far into the right tail of
the window-specific severity distributions.
In recent iterations of RBRVS, an office visit for an established patient can generate 0.6 to
1.2 RVUs. The former value is for a 10-minute visit, the latter value is for a 15-minute visit.4
For simplicity, let 1 RVU represent the average value of an office visit. Therefore one way to
size these results is to think of integration increasing utilization by two routine office visits
within 360 days (0.71 RVUs for cardiologists and 1.31 RVUs for generalists) and 3.5 routine
office visits within 720 days (1.86 RVUs for cardiologists and 1.78 RVUs for generalists).
These modest per-patient effects can lead to large aggregate effects. It is estimated that
about 1 in 3 adults in the United States, approximately 70 million individuals, were affected
by hypertension in 2011.5 According to 2012 data from the National Ambulatory Medical
Care Survey (NAMCS), there were 929 million physician office visits. About 80 percent
4See https://www.medicalhomeportal.org/link/301 for coding guidelines and the RVU15A Physician
Fee Schedule data file from CMS for the RVU values.
5Notably, this is higher than the 1 in 4 rate in 1999-2000. See http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/
112/11/1651.full.
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Table 8: Effect of integration on the probability of outpatient service (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.003 -0.007 -0.081*** -0.002 -0.008 -0.131***
-0.6830 -0.8194 -3.8415 -0.3023 -0.9343 -4.1249
Severity 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005***
1.8294 1.9593 1.8970 4.4204 4.8593 4.6121
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
1.0219 0.0480 0.9182 -0.0344 -1.8132 -0.2186
Male -0.002** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.003*
-2.4416 -1.2185 -2.7345 -1.6235 -0.7781 -1.7595
Age -0.001** -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
-2.0116 -0.9616 -1.9109 -1.4796 -0.2272 -1.4555
Age squared 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.7180 0.7068 1.6116 1.3623 0.1633 1.3638
Distance to nearest specialist 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001
3.5183 0.6550 1.6261 3.3481 -0.0839 1.4355
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.3998 1.2718 0.4728 -0.5513 1.2047 0.3302
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
of patients in my sample are treated in non-integrated practices. For sake of argument,
if all patients in non-integrated practices were moved to integrated practices – ignoring
factors such as behavioral responses and capacity constraints – it would induce an increase
in physician work equivalent to 13.0 million office visits, or 1.4 percent of total office visits
in 2012.
Outpatient utilization
There is strong evidence that integration reduces outpatient utilization on the extensive
margin and suggestive evidence that integration increases outpatient utilization on the
intensive margin.
I present results from the any outpatient claim regression in Table 8. Estimates from OLS,
OLS FE, and IV regressions are all negative. OLS estimates are small and statistically
insignificant, indicating a reduction of 0.3 percentage points at 360 days and 0.2 percentage
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Table 9: Effect of integration on outpatient RVUs (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.47** -5.88 3.30 -0.46** 1.29 3.62
-2.350 -0.853 1.338 -2.551 0.941 1.637
Severity 0.389*** 0.195 0.260** 0.351** 0.193 0.236*
3.0762 0.6553 1.9935 2.3561 0.5030 1.7876
Severity squared 0.000 0.040 0.022 0.006 0.031 0.027
0.0208 0.7505 1.1152 0.2562 0.4491 1.3921
Male -0.150 -0.068 -0.162 -0.050 0.025 -0.048
-1.1087 -0.2575 -1.1707 -0.3435 0.0962 -0.3225
Age -0.040 -0.176 -0.023 -0.069 -0.103 -0.072
-0.6453 -1.5062 -0.3255 -1.0135 -0.5926 -1.0021
Age squared 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.2980 1.4783 -0.0188 0.6473 0.5641 0.6121
Distance to nearest specialist -0.048*** 0.090 -0.036** -0.047*** 0.274 -0.033*
-3.0347 0.2420 -2.2132 -3.0628 0.9829 -1.9028
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000
1.4733 0.0356 0.8518 1.3824 -1.0220 0.5653
F – – 28.5 – – 27.5
N 6,048 6,048 5,874 5,539 5,539 5,373
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
points at 720 days. OLS FE estimates are not much larger and are also statistically insigi-
ficant. They indicate reductions of 0.7 percentage points and 0.8 percentage points in the
360- and 720-day windows, respectively. In contrast, IV estimates are larger by an order
of magnitude and statistically significant at the 99 percent level. They indicate reductions
in the probability of an outpatient claim by 8.1 percentage points at 360 days and 13.1
percentage points at 720 days. These extensive margin effects I estimate are quantitatively
large. In the 360-day window, only 3 percent of patients have an outpatient claim for
hypertension.
Estimates for the outpatient RVU regressions are presented in Table 8. OLS estimates are
modest, significant at the 95 percent level, and almost identical across windows. These
estimates indicate reductions of 0.47 and 0.46 RVUs within 360 and 720 days, respectively.
Estimates from fixed effect regressions are statistically insignificant and far different from
each other. The 360-day estimate is negative and large, indicating a reduction of 5.88 RVUs
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within the window. The 720-day estimate is positive and smaller in magnitude, indicating
an increase of 1.29 RVUs within the window. It is possible the observed differences are
a result of small sample sizes. Because I estimate the model only for individuals with an
outpatient claim, and outpatient service rates are small, sample sizes are merely 6, 048 at
360 days and 5, 373 at 720 days. In one sense my IV results are consistent with this fact, as
both estimates are statistically insignificant. However, in contrast to the OLS FE results,
they are same-signed. This set of estimates indicate outpatient RVU increases of 3.30 and
3.62 at 360 and 720 days, respectively.
Like the extensive margin estimates, these intensive margin estimates are quantitatively
large. Mean outpatient RVUs in the full sample are 2.24 in the 360-day window and 2.33
in the 720-day window. The effects are also large when compared to the severity effects. In
both windows the effect of severity is positive and economically significant, but less than
the effect of integration for all but the largest values of the severity score.
Prescription drug utilization
In Tables 10 and 11 I present estimates from the regression of the new cardiovascular
prescription indicators on my regressors.6 Table 10 contains the result for generalists, that
is among all patients, the regressand equals 1 for patients who obtain a new prescription from
his or her generalist and 0 otherwise. The OLS and OLS FE estimates are small, positive,
and statistically insignificant. Within the 360-day window, the estimates are identical.
Both models indicate a 0.3 percentage point increase in the probability that a generalist
issues (and the patient fills) a new cardiovascular drug prescription.7 Within the 720-day
6Though I estimated models in which the dependent variable was the count of new cardiovascular pre-
scriptions or the count of all cardiovascular prescriptions, I do not present those results. First, the estimates
for the effect of integration in those regressions statistically insignificant. More importantly, the count of
prescriptions can be a misleading measure of drug utilization. A higher count can be a result of greater
willingness to adjust prescriptions if hypertension control is not being achieved. Higher counts are also con-
sistent with prescribing activity inconsistent with more recent sets of clinical guidelines. If those guidelines
describe more effective care, then those closer to the standard might not need to adjust medications as often
as those further from the standard.
7I do not observe non-compliant patients. Therefore there is downward bias in my new prescription
indicator. However, because my instrument simulates random assignment of patients between integrated
and non-integrated practices, and mean observables in the integrated and non-integrated groups are highly
47
Table 10: Effect of integration on the probability of a new generalist prescription (full
sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.003 0.003 0.191* 0.003 0.010 0.149
0.3487 0.3037 1.9476 0.3835 0.5957 1.2263
Severity 0.250*** 0.264*** 0.250*** 0.254*** 0.277*** 0.254***
20.7245 20.1813 20.5839 29.1518 29.8085 29.0214
Severity squared -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.021***
-10.8831 -10.8842 -10.7604 -15.3139 -16.9706 -15.0855
Male 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036***
8.3540 6.4379 8.0643 6.8944 5.3762 6.6959
Age 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
6.4583 5.8946 6.6942 4.6668 5.3543 4.5236
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-8.1335 -7.6811 -8.4191 -6.6150 -7.5880 -6.4511
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.003** 0.001* -0.000 0.001 0.001
0.1922 2.3444 1.7707 -0.2026 0.5264 0.7894
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000*
-1.3569 -2.6949 -2.3528 -0.8971 0.0816 -1.8610
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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window, the OLS estimate indicates a 0.3 percentage point increase while the OLS FE
estimate indicates a 1.0 percentage point increase. None of these estimates is statistically
significant. It is encouraging that the estimates are similar.
IV estimates are significantly larger. At 360 days, integration increases the probability of
a generalist prescription by 19.1 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at
the 90 percent level. At 720 days, the estimate is similar, though statistically insignificant,
indicating a 14.9 percentage point increase in the probability of a new cardiovascular drug
prescription.
The effect of integration is large in absolute terms. However, the effect of severity is larger
than the effect of integration for an economically significant range of severity scores. For
patients with a severity score less than 0.824, the effect of integration is larger. For patients
with a severity score in between 0.824 and 10.540, basically all but the most severe patients
in my sample, the effect of severity is far larger.8 The difference is large. For nearly all
individuals in this latter group, the effect of severity exceeds the effect of integration by at
least 1.0 percentage points.
Table 11 contains the regression for specialists, that is, among those patients with a car-
diologist visit, the regressand equals 1 for those who obtain a new prescription from a
cardiologist and 0 otherwise. There is little evidence in my data that cardiologists change
their prescribing behavior in response to integration. If there is an effect it would be very
similar, it is unlikely that non-compliant patients are non-randomly distributed among practice types.
8It is possible my fit would be better if it included a cubic term in severity. Unfortunately, the outcomes
I used to set my initial specification did not include the new prescription regressand due to the cost of
processing the pharmacy files. These files were significantly larger than the physician, outpatient, and
inpatient files.
That said, I argue it is important to impose a consistent functional form in these regressions for sake of
consistency and comparability. On these grounds it is more difficult to argue for the inclusion of a cubic term
when the quadratic terms are almost always economically insignificant, as well as statistically insignificant, in
almost all other regressions. That said, my pharmacy results are likely to provide a useful first approximation
at the very least, as the model predicts worst for the highest-severity patients, the smallest group of patients
in my sample.
When I reestimate the pharmacy model with a cubic term in severity, the results are highly similar. The
effect of integration increases (360 days: +1.0 percentage points, 720 days: XXX), but the cubic term is
positive as well as economically and statistically significant.
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Table 11: Effect of integration on the probability of a new cardiologist prescription (full
sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.008 0.013 0.031 0.007 -0.005 -0.023
1.1363 0.7345 0.4621 1.2027 -0.2385 -0.2906
Severity 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.060***
8.0071 4.9654 7.9371 11.5580 14.5721 11.8846
Severity squared -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
-3.4169 -2.1672 -3.3634 -5.8719 -7.3658 -5.9398
Male 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020***
5.1870 3.7692 5.2936 5.8089 3.1559 6.0583
Age 0.001 -0.001 0.002* 0.000 -0.001 0.000
1.4950 -0.2911 1.7152 0.1388 -0.3260 0.0756
Age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
-1.4330 0.3332 -1.6750 0.0573 0.5940 0.1301
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
-0.1221 -0.1486 -0.1561 -0.8822 -1.3300 -0.8988
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4393 0.7447 0.5369 1.0042 1.1406 0.7325
F – – 8.5 – – 17.8
N 30,046 30,046 29,654 25,924 25,924 25,569
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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small when compared to the effect of integration on generalist prescribing. OLS estimates
are positive but small and statistically insignificant, indicating increases in the probability
of a new cardiologist prescription of 0.8 and 0.7 percentage points within the 360- and 720-
day windows, respectively. The 360-day OLS FE estimate is slightly larger, indicating a 1.3
percentage point increase in the probability of a cardiologist prescription, while the 720-day
estimate is negative but smaller in magnitude, indicating a 0.5 percentage point reduction
in the window. IV estimates are like the OLS FE estimates but greater in size. Within 360
days, the probability of a new cardiologist prescription increases by 3.1 percentage points.
Within 720 days, the probability decreases by 2.3 percentage points. It is worth noting that
the F statistic for the 360-day regression takes on a low value of 8.5, even though I do not
make any strong claims based on this particular estimate.
Notably, there appears to be a much tighter relationship between cardiologist prescribing
behavior and severity. The effect of severity in both windows is positive and economically
significant. Furthermore, the t-statistics on the linear term – the quantitatively more im-
portant one – are extremely large for all estimators and in both windows. The t-statistics on
the coefficient for the linear severity term when estimated with OLS, OLS FE, and IV are,
respectively, 8.01, 4.97, and 7.94 in the 360-day window. In the 720-day window, t-statistics
are, respectively, 11.56, 14.57, and 11.88.
Inpatient admission
In Table 12 I present estimates of the effect of integration on the probability of inpatient
admission. OLS estimates are negative and statistically significant, indicating 0.1 percentage
point and 0.2 percentage point decreases in the probability of an inpatient admission within,
respectively, the 360- and 720-day windows. In contrast, OLS FE estimates are positive
though statistically insignificant, indicating 0.1 and 0.2 percentage point increases in the
probability of an inpatient admission. IV estimates are positive and, in fact, larger than
the OLS FE estimates, indicating a 0.3 percentage point increase in the probability of an
inpatient admission at 360 days and a 1.7 percentage point increase in the probability of an
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Table 12: Effect of integration on the probability of inpatient admission (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.001* 0.001 0.003 -0.002* 0.002 0.017*
-1.8231 0.3018 0.2956 -1.7608 0.5926 1.6749
Severity 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
5.7489 6.7284 5.5657 4.4685 4.2897 4.3987
Severity squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001**
0.1595 -0.2038 0.2452 2.0910 1.0081 2.2255
Male 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
4.4119 4.8486 4.3467 5.1932 4.5535 5.1437
Age -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000***
-1.3047 -2.4722 -1.2163 -2.6117 -3.5466 -2.6110
Age squared 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
2.2893 3.3922 2.1866 3.9681 5.1348 3.9297
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-2.0515 0.0982 -1.3565 -1.5380 -1.3444 -0.3278
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
1.0040 -0.7686 0.8083 0.5961 1.1014 -0.0083
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
inpatient admission at 720 days. While the 360-day estimate is not statistically significant,
the 720-day estimate is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. Severity has a positive
impact on inpatient admissions, both severity coefficients are statistically significant, and
the effect of severity is not dominated by the effect of integration.
The result is surprising. Unless one believes medical care is generally flat-of-the-curve, one
would expect greater utilization to lead to lower rates of inpatient admission. It is possible
that the positive effect I observe is an artifact of non-emergency utilization, specifically
higher rates of elective inpatient utilization within integrated practices. I have tried to
study this issue by using admission type classifiers in the data – e.g. emergency, urgent, or
emergent admission – but my estimates lacked precision.
52
Table 13: Effect of integration on physician services spending (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 2.81 6.25 63.87 6.6 29.1*** 97.0*
0.703 1.449 1.335 1.31 3.30 1.77
Severity 5.98*** 4.94*** 5.77*** 9.48*** 9.84*** 9.34***
5.555 4.331 5.488 6.587 5.739 6.429
Severity squared -0.248** -0.299* -0.206** -0.402** -0.420* -0.365*
-2.3494 -1.8981 -1.9732 -2.0880 -1.7479 -1.8213
Male 1.89* 2.95** 1.89* 7.38*** 10.66*** 7.32***
1.654 2.000 1.655 3.230 3.629 3.145
Age 0.581* 0.937** 0.593* 3.54*** 3.51*** 3.48***
1.8983 2.3698 1.9281 4.505 4.319 4.523
Age squared -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.037***
-3.3082 -2.9189 -3.3028 -4.4163 -3.9291 -4.4337
Distance to nearest specialist -1.138*** -0.957 -0.866*** -1.48*** -0.70 -1.09***
-5.1959 -1.5463 -3.6119 -5.431 -0.634 -3.654
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.012*** 0.015 0.010** 0.015*** -0.007 0.012**
3.6066 1.0094 2.5324 3.2576 -0.5412 2.4116
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Medical spending
In Tables 13 through 17 I present my estimates for the effect of integration on medical
spending.
Generalist and cardiologist spending
In Table 13, the explanatory variable is the sum of spending attributable to the patient’s
generalist and cardiologist physicians. OLS estimates are small and insignificant, indicating
spending increases of 2.8 dollars at 360 days and 6.6 dollars at 720 days. OLS FE estimates
are larger, showing increases of 6.3 dollars at 360 days and 29.1 dollars at 720 days. The
360-day estimate is statistically insignificant while the 720-day estimate is significant at the
99 percent level. IV estimates are substantially larger in both windows. In the 360-day
window, being treated by an integrated generalist causes an increase in physician services
spending of 63.9 dollars. In the 720-day window, the increase is 97.0 dollars. While the
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Table 14: Effect of integration on outpatient services spending (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -4.37* 1.38 -43.46*** -5.52 0.52 -64.02***
-1.838 0.351 -2.697 -1.522 0.100 -3.017
Severity 0.078 3.756** -0.139 0.294 7.961** -0.111
0.0201 2.0711 -0.0367 0.0510 2.1646 -0.0198
Severity squared 1.13 0.24 1.14 1.69 0.20 1.73
1.547 0.703 1.589 1.548 0.367 1.609
Male -1.69 -1.56 -2.19* -1.25 -0.96 -1.95
-1.412 -1.376 -1.873 -0.757 -0.485 -1.246
Age 0.453 0.678 0.547 0.511 1.180 0.578
0.9325 1.2024 1.2227 0.7276 1.6419 0.8866
Age squared -0.007 -0.009 -0.008* -0.008 -0.014* -0.009
-1.3008 -1.4288 -1.6688 -1.0454 -1.8230 -1.3037
Distance to nearest specialist 0.403** 0.941 0.194 0.289 -0.161 0.007
2.1828 0.8963 0.9109 1.0234 -0.0948 0.0237
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.004
0.0667 0.4863 0.3258 0.6927 0.5296 1.0377
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
360-day estimate is statistically insignificant, the 720-day estimate is significant at the 90
percent level. Though the increases appear modest, the effect of integration dominates
the (positive) effect of severity for all values of the severity score. The effect of the other
observables are non-zero, but are still dominated by the effect of integration.
Outpatient spending
Table 13 the estimates from the outpatient services spending regressions. OLS estimates
are negative and small in both windows. Within the 360-day window, the integration
coefficient indicates a 4.4 dollar decrease in outpatient services spending. In the 720-day
window the estimated effect is a 5.5 dollar decrease in outpatient services spending. The
360-day estimate is statistically significant at the 90 percent level while the 720-day estimate
is statistically insignificant. Both OLS FE estimates are small and statistically insignificant,
indicating spending increases of 1.4 and 0.5 dollars at 360 and 720 days, respectively. My
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Table 15: Effect of integration on cardiovascular drug spending (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 17.6 9.6 224.0** 35.3 75.8 381.6
1.40 0.43 2.39 1.11 0.81 1.33
Severity 616.8*** 637.0*** 616.0*** 1136.8*** 1181.0*** 1137.7***
23.32 24.27 23.38 29.58 36.18 29.57
Severity squared -40.9*** -43.8*** -40.7*** -74.8*** -82.2*** -74.6***
-11.84 -11.62 -11.79 -15.25 -18.01 -15.04
Male 137.2*** 136.6*** 138.0*** 246.7*** 233.4*** 246.7***
18.49 15.83 19.50 13.66 10.69 13.80
Age 13.7*** 13.4*** 13.5*** 27.7*** 31.2*** 27.6***
4.78 4.59 4.89 5.16 5.22 4.99
Age squared -0.138*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.281*** -0.329*** -0.281***
-4.0847 -3.9423 -4.1383 -4.4553 -5.0510 -4.2601
Distance to nearest specialist -1.67 5.81*** -0.40 -3.59 8.97** -1.48
-1.480 2.633 -0.341 -1.451 2.215 -0.640
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.009 -0.095** -0.004 0.005 -0.164** -0.018
0.4843 -2.3517 -0.1845 0.1870 -2.1938 -0.6537
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
IV estimates are far larger, negative, and statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
They indicate that integration reduces outpatient spending by 43.5 dollars within 360 days
and 64.0 dollars within 720 days.
These estimates indicate that spending decreases due to reductions along the extensive
margin more than offset the spending increases due to greater intensive margin utilization.
Also, the effect of integration is large in the sense that it is greater in magnitude than the
effect of severity for most values of the severity score in my sample. For individuals with
scores less than or equal to 6.24 – i.e. most of the sample – the effect of integration is
greater.
Cardiovascular drug spending
Table 15 contains the estimates from the regression for total cardiovascular drug spending.
OLS estimates are positive but statistically insignificant, indicating spending increases of
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17.6 dollars at 360 days and 35.3 dollars at 720 days. OLS FE estimates are also posi-
tive and statistically insignificant. The 360-day estimate indicates a 9.6 dollar increase in
cardiovascular drug spending. Within 720 days, the increase is 75.8 dollars.
IV estimates are positive and far larger. They indicate increases in cardiovascular drug
spending by 224.0 and 381.6 dollars, respectively, in the 360- and 720-day windows. Or,
on a monthly basis, integration increases spending, respectively, by 18.7 and 15.9 dollars
per month. Given mean spending per month of about 35 dollars, the effects I observe are
quantitatively significant. That said, the effect of integration is small compared to the effect
of severity for a wide range of individuals. For individuals with very low severity – a score
less than 0.373 in the 360-day sample and and 0.343 in the 720-day sample – the effect is of
integration is greater. Beyond these thresholds the effect of severity is greater. For example,
at the mean values of severity, respectively 1.01 and 1.03, spending increases through the
severity channel by 48.4 and 45.5 dollars per month.
Total spending
In Table 16 I set my outcome as the sum of physician, outpatient, and cardiovascular drug
spending. This measure of costs represents the spending attributable to outpatient care.
Both OLS and OLS FE estimates are positive and statistically insignificant. OLS estimates
indicate small spending increases of 16.0 and 36.4 dollars at, respectively, 360 and 720
days. OLS FE estimates indicate larger increases of 17.2 and 105.4 dollars within the same
windows. IV estimates are far larger. Within 360 days, the increase in spending is 244.4
dollars. This estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Within 720 days,
the increase in spending is 414.6 dollars, though the estimate is not statistically significant.
In Table 17 I add inpatient spending to my cost measure. While office-based physicians do
not directly affect inpatient spending – as in they might not have ordered the corresponding
inpatient services – they have some connection to it through their pre-admission care. OLS
estimates are small and statistically insignificant, indicating a decrease in spending of 13.7
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Table 16: Effect of integration on all (non-inpatient) medical spending, (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 16.0 17.2 244.4** 36.4 105.4 414.6
1.21 0.69 2.12 1.13 1.08 1.35
Severity 622.9*** 645.7*** 621.7*** 1146.6*** 1198.8*** 1147.0***
24.58 24.98 24.60 29.77 36.42 29.68
Severity squared -40.0*** -43.8*** -39.7*** -73.5*** -82.5*** -73.2***
-12.09 -11.88 -12.03 -14.45 -18.77 -14.22
Male 137.4*** 138.0*** 137.7*** 252.8*** 243.2*** 252.1***
19.14 15.94 20.04 13.98 11.28 13.90
Age 14.7*** 15.0*** 14.6*** 31.7*** 35.9*** 31.6***
4.49 4.43 4.60 5.36 5.73 5.20
Age squared -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.327*** -0.377*** -0.327***
-4.0747 -3.9383 -4.1411 -4.7825 -5.5586 -4.5938
Distance to nearest specialist -2.41** 5.80*** -1.07 -4.77** 8.11* -2.56
-2.228 2.755 -0.989 -1.979 1.723 -1.194
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.021 -0.065 0.007 0.024 -0.162** -0.003
1.1706 -1.4752 0.3532 0.8539 -2.0812 -0.0977
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Table 17: Effect of integration on all medical spending (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -13.7 -7.0 538.9* 31.1 137.0 1060.2*
-0.35 -0.09 1.83 0.44 0.56 1.78
Severity 717.1*** 754.9*** 713.5*** 1127.2*** 1265.0*** 1125.4***
15.05 24.03 14.88 8.65 10.83 8.70
Severity squared -36.2*** -48.6*** -35.5*** -28.3 -58.6*** -27.3
-3.56 -10.93 -3.46 -1.12 -2.84 -1.08
Male 190.5*** 190.1*** 188.9*** 380.2*** 373.4*** 382.1***
10.85 10.17 11.00 11.51 8.25 11.30
Age 8.40 4.74 9.57 32.0*** 22.6* 32.5***
0.990 0.470 1.138 2.62 1.67 2.68
Age squared -0.050 -0.009 -0.062 -0.249* -0.149 -0.258*
-0.5331 -0.0798 -0.6643 -1.8378 -1.0309 -1.8975
Distance to nearest specialist -6.41*** -7.68 -3.82* -12.19*** 5.55 -6.87*
-2.873 -1.252 -1.655 -2.637 0.387 -1.652
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.086** 0.082 0.063 0.112* -0.148 0.060
2.4861 0.8645 1.5580 1.9303 -0.8487 1.0948
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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dollars at 360 days and an increase in spending of 31.1 dollars at 720 days. OLS FE
estimates are also statistically insignificant, indicating a decrease in spending of 7.0 dollars
at 360 days and an increase in spending of 137.0 dollars at 720 days. IV estimates are
far larger and are both statistically significant (90 percent level). I observe a 538.9 dollar
increase at 360 days and a 1,060.2 dollar increase at 720 days. Because the hospitalization
rate in my sample is about 1 percent, inpatient spending is necessarily negatively skewed,
and right-tail values must be driving this result.
Nevertheless, these effects are large on a per-person and population basis. The average
deductible for an individual with employer-sponsored health insurance (single coverage) in
2012 was 1,097 dollars. Therefore, the estimated one-year effect of integration on medical
care spending represents 49.1 percent of the average deductible at the end of my sample.9
Furthermore, it is estimated that about 1 in 3 adults in the United States, approximately 70
million individuals, were affected by hypertension in 2011.10 About 80 percent of patients
in my sample are treated in non-integrated practices. For sake of argument, suppose this
ratio holds for the entire adult US population and ignore behavioral reponses, capacity
constraints, and other factors that certainly affect counterfactual outcomes. My estimates
indicate, in this naive counterfactual, that shifting all those adults with hypertension into
integrated practices would increase medical care spending by about 30 billion dollars per
year. In comparison, direct medical spending for hypertension in 2010 totaled 42.9 billion
dollars.
Whether or not I have recovered the true magnitude of the effect of integration on costs,
I argue I have provided abundant evidence that integration does not reduce medical care
spending. This is especially damning for the most optimistic integration advocates, because
hypertension – as a chronic condition – is one of those conditions for which care coordination
is said to especially matter. That said, it is still possible these spending increases are socially
9See Claxton et al. (2015) for deductible estimates.
10This is significantly higher than the 1 in 4 rate in 1999-2000. See http://circ.ahajournals.org/
content/112/11/1651.full.
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desirable, but they spending increases I observe cannot be justified on the basis of outcomes
with the one- and two-year estimates I have.
Additional discussion
Estimates from the full sample show that integration affects physician behavior along many
margins. For all but one outcome – the probability of a new cardiologist prescription – the
estimate for integration has the same sign across both windows. For each of those outcomes,
IV yields a statistically significant estimate in one of the treatment windows.
Some of my estimates are consistent with claims made by proponents of integration. The
reduction in outpatient utilization along the extensive margin suggests that integration of
generalists and cardiologists reduces unnecessary testing for patients who do not need it.
Higher levels of hypertension-specific human capital among cardiologists should lead to
lower levels of clinical uncertainty and, therefore, lower rates of testing. However, achieving
these lower rates is accompanied by greater utilization along other margins. Generalist
and cardiologist RVUs both appear to increase in response to integration and it appears
generalists in integrated firms are also more likely to prescribe antihypertensive medications.
It is not clear that these adjustments, on net, are socially beneficial. First, integration does
not lead to lower rates of inpatient admission. This highly surprising result could reflect
greater elective utilization instead of greater incidence of adverse outcomes. Either way,
greater rates of inpatient admission lead to unambiguously greater medical care spending
due to the high cost of inpatient care.
Advocates for greater integration among generalists and specialists should be discouraged
by these results. Hypertension is a very important test case for organizational reform pro-
posals. Because hypertension is a chronic condition with potentially severe complications,
interventions that presumably increase care coordination should positively affect individuals
with this condition. Unfortunately, the effects I do find indicate potentially worse outcomes
and higher costs when generalists and cardiologists integrate.
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CHAPTER 6 : Hypertension: Evidence from low- and high-access areas
Introduction
In the following two chapters I divide patients into two contrasting subsamples, reestimate
my models for each subgroup, and look for differential responses to integration. The low-
access subsample contains individuals whose generalist is located “far” from a cardiologist.
The high-access subsample contains individuals whose generalist is located “close” to a
cardiologist. To define “far” and “close,” I computed three quantiles of the distance to the
nearest specialist variable. Those in the lowest quantile are in the “close” group while those
in the highest quantile are in the “far” group.1 Differential effects should emerge because
distance to the nearest specialist is literally a measure of clinical isolation for both generalists
and patients. For patients marginally appropriate for referral, greater distance should reduce
the probability of referral due to the inconvenience of traveling, ceteris paribus. The added
incentive to refer generated by integration should increase referral probability in the low-
access sample.
For ease of reading, in the tables that follow I compare the IV estimate for integration
across each of my samples. Interested readers will find a full complement of tables at the
end of this document.
Results
Cardiologist visit
Table 18 contains IV estimates for integration for the full, low-access, and high-access
subsamples. F statistics and sample sizes for each sample are also included. Because
distances are computed at the ZIP code level and many patients are located in areas dense in
both population and cardiologists, the high-access subsample contains far more individuals
1As described in Chapter 2, I attempted to divide the sample into rural and urban subsamples or groups
containing a high density versus low density of specialists. However, rural subsamples were extremely small
and data loss after matching ZIPs to county with free, publicly available crosswalks was significant. Though
imperfect, my final subsamples are perhaps the best of the remaining alternatives.
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Table 18: IV comparison, primary specialist visit
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 0.115* 0.125 0.071 0.099 0.104 0.055
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
than the low-access subsample.
None of the subsample estimates are statistically significant. However, they are positive
and economically significant. In low-access areas the effect of integration on the probability
of a specialist visit is 12.5 percentage points at 360 days and 10.4 percentage points at 720
days. These effects are greater than the corresponding full-sample estimates. In high-access
areas, the effect of integration is also positive, measuring 7.1 and 5.5 percentage points
within 360 and 720 days, respectively.
Physician utilization
Table 19: IV comparison, physician utilization
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 1.314*** 0.227 1.923*** 1.784*** 1.129 2.206**
F 52.6 52.3 45.7 48.3 43.9 45.3
N 180,545 59,648 107,491 112,706 37,226 67,137
Panel B: Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 0.709 -1.572 1.804 1.862 1.093 3.280*
F 67.6 30.6 89.8 51.6 24.9 68.2
N 28,914 9,587 17,566 24,945 8,274 15,122
Panel A of Table 19 compares effects from IV regressions for generalist total RVUs, while
Panel B compares effects from the regressions for cardiologist RVUs. In both panels, the
effect is stronger within high-access areas. For generalists, the high-access estimates are
46.3 and 23.7 percent larger than the corresponding full-sample estimates. The estimates
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are statistically significant at the 99 and 95 percent levels, respectively. For specialists,
the differences between the high-access and full-sample estimates are even larger. The
high-access estimates are 154.4 and 76.2 percent greater than the corresponding full-sample
estimates. The 720-day estimate is statistically significant at the 90 percent level.
Outpatient utilization
Table 20: IV comparison, outpatient utilization
Panel A: Probability of any outpatient utilization
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated -0.081*** -0.004 -0.137*** -0.131*** -0.034 -0.204***
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
Panel B: Outpatient RVUs, conditional on at least one outpatient visit
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 3.30 -1.98 6.49** 3.62 -0.464 6.636***
F 28.5 7.3 21.9 27.5 7.1 24.5
N 5,874 1,909 3,339 5,373 1,752 3,084
In Panels A and B of Table 20 I present the effect of integration on outpatient utilization on,
respectively, the extensive and intensive margins of outpatient utilization. The full-sample
extensive margin effect I observe is driven by behavior in the high-access sample. In the
full sample, integration causes 8.1 and 13.1 percentage point decreases in the probability of
any outpatient utilization within the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively. Estimates in
the low-access sample are negative like the full-sample estimates, but statistically insignif-
icant and an order of magnitude smaller than the corresponding full-sample estimates. In
contrast, integration in the high-access subsample reduces the probability of any outpatient
utilization by 13.7 percentage points within 360 days and 20.4 percentage points within 720
days, significantly larger than the corresponding full sample estimates.
The intensive margin effect I observe in the full sample is also driven by behavior in the
high-access sample. In the full sample, I observe (statistically insignificant) increases of
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3.30 and 3.62 outpatient RVUs in the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively. Effects in
the low-access sample are in fact negative. That said, the estimates are unreliable due to
weak instrument problems (F statistics of 7.3 and 7.1, respective to the two windows). In
the high-access sample, effects are about twice the size of the estimated full-sample effects.
Integration increases outpatient RVUs in the high-access sample by 6.49 RVUs within 360
days and 6.37 RVUs within 720 days. The estimates are also statistically significant at the
95 and 99 percent levels, respectively.
Prescription drug utilization
Table 21: IV comparison, probability of a new cardiovascular drug prescription
Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 0.191* -0.005 0.241*** 0.149 -0.044 0.198*
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 0.031 -0.067 0.072 -0.023 -0.105 0.020
F 8.5 5.1 5.8 17.8 7.2 12.4
N 29,654 9,826 18,070 25,569 8,473 15,528
I present estimates for the effect of integration on prescribing activity in Table 21. Panel
A contains the estimates for the probability of a new cardiovascular prescription among
generalists while Panel B contains the corresponding estimates for cardiologists. In the full
sample, I find integration increases the probability that a generalist issues a new prescription
by 19.1 percentage points in the 360-day window and 14.9 percentage points in the 720-
day window. The 360-day estimate is statistically significant at the 90 percent level while
the 720-day estimate is statistically insignificant. I find small, negative, but statistically
insignificant effects in the low-access sample, indicating reductions of 0.5 and 4.4 percentage
points within their respective windows. In contrast, integration increases the probability
of a new generalist prescription by 24.1 percentage points in the 360-day window and 19.8
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percentage points in the 720-day window. Both these estimates are statistically significant
(99 and 95 percent level, respectively). They are significantly larger than the corresponding
full-sample estimates.
It is difficult to interpret the cardiologist estimates in the low- and high-access samples due
to weak instrument problems, so I forego a discussion of them.
Inpatient admission
Table 22: IV comparison, inpatient admission
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 0.003 -0.006 0.009 0.017* -0.014 0.040***
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
In Table 22, I present estimates for the effect of integration on the probability of inpatient
admission. In the full sample, I estimate increases of 0.3 and 1.7 percentage points in the
probability of an inpatient admission. Only the 720-day estimate is statistically significant
(90 percent level). These full sample effects are driven by positive effects in the high-
access sample. In the high-access sample, I observe a statistically insignificant increase of
0.9 percentage points within 360 days and a statistically significant increase (99 percent
level) of 4.0 percentage points within 720 days. Interestingly, I observe negative, though
statistically insignificant effects, within the low-access sample. The low-access estimates
indicate reductions of 0.6 and 1.4 percentage points within, respectively, the 360- and 720-
day windows.
If these estimates are indeed indicative of the true sign of the effect of integration on the
probability of an inpatient admission, then the results in this section suggest that the most
important effect of integration for outcomes is its effect on the probability of a relevant
specialist visit and clinical effects due to adjustments along other margins might actually
be second-order. I will return to this point in the subsequent chapter.
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Medical spending
Table 23: IV comparison, medical care spending
Panel A: Physician costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 63.87 -9.60 96.35* 97.0* 60.6 97.3*
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
Panel B: Outpatient costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated -43.46*** -46.61* -46.25** -64.02*** -49.06 -66.07**
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
Panel C: Pharmacy costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 224.0** -213.9 416.8*** 381.6 -67.7 629.7**
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
Panel D: All non-inpatient costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 244.4** -270.1 466.9*** 414.6 -56.2 660.9**
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
Panel E: All medical spending
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 538.9* -178.5 1041.3*** 1060.2* -367.4 1935.4***
F 52.8 52.3 46.1 48.3 43.8 45.6
N 180,714 59,698 107,621 112,803 37,270 67,210
In Table 23 I compare IV estimates in the full, low-access, and high-access samples on the
effect of integration on medical care spending. Generally speaking, estimates indicate that
outcomes in the high-access sample drive the full-sample estimates. Integration in high-
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access areas leads to greater spending on physician services, prescription drugs, all non-
inpatient services, and total costs. The exception is outpatient costs, where the differences
between low-access and high-access areas are relatively muted.
Interestingly, though unsurprisingly, I detect economically significant reductions in total
spending due to integration in the low-access sample. These effects are statistically in-
significant. They track the statistically insignificant reductions in inpatient admission for
low-access areas. For sake of argument, suppose integration truly has the above effects on
spending and outcomes. These estimates illustrate the importance as well as the difficulty
of choosing an appropriate intervention when trying to alter patterns of physician organi-
zation. Any improvements due to integration in the low-access subgroup are swamped by
worse outcomes and increased spending in high-access areas.
Additional discussion
Consistent with intuition, the positive effect of integration on the probability of a specialist
referral more strongly affects generalists in low-access areas. It is possible integration in low-
access areas leads to lower rates of inpatient admission and lower levels of medical spending,
but none of the relevant estimates are statistically significant. In contrast, Integration in
high-access areas strongly results in higher levels of physician utilization, prescription drug
utilization, and total medical spending.
The divergence in results across the two samples is potentially puzzling. However, disutility
for driving might rationalize the patterns I observe. A patient might be willing to make
one long trip to see a cardiologist, but unwilling to see that cardiologist for multiple visits.
This preference would generate both the stronger responses I observe in high-access areas
if utilization is driven by the number of cardiologist visits as well as the stronger specialist
visit effect I observe in low-access areas.
Note that if it is in fact the case that integration in low-access areas leads to better out-
comes and lower spending – a possibility hinted at in my results – then my results would
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indicate that care coordination problems for hypertension are small and policies strongly
incentivizing relatively severe changes in organizational form are, in a sense, overshooting.
Results from the low-access sample suggest that generalists might only need minimal assis-
tance from cardiologists in managing hypertension. A lower-intensity intervention, such as
carefully adjusting anti-kickback provisions or finding ways to help private payers develop
socially beneficial yet profitable utilization management policies, might achieve higher levels
of referral without inducing the far higher levels of utilization observed in the high-access
sample.
67
CHAPTER 7 : Hypertension Evidence from non-affiliated and affiliated practices
Introduction
In this chapter I re-run my regressions on hospital affiliation-based samples. In the SK&A
data, there is a variable that denotes whether an office reports a hospital affiliation. Patients
treated by a generalist in an office with a hospital affiliation belong to the “affiliated” group
while the rest are assigned to the “not affiliated” group. Data quality for this variable is
potentially lower than the other identifiers and coordinates I have used in the SK&A data.
First, the variable (CODE5) suffers from the same missing values problem as the inter-office
linking variable (CODE3). Though I impute values to improve data quality of the latter,
I have not imputed values for the former. Furthermore, other researchers have expressed
concerns that survey respondents do not have a uniform understanding of what SK&A
means by “hospital affiliation.”1 That said, if the hospital affiliation variable contains
useful information, differential effects should emerge among the two subsamples because
generalists without a hospital affiliation are more clinically isolated relative to those with
an affiliation.
In contrast to the access-based subsamples, sample sizes for the subgroup of interest – the
not-affiliated practices – are far larger than the other subgroup, as most practices do not
report a hospital affiliation in the SK&A data.
Results
Cardiologist visit
In Table 24 I compare estimates of the effect of integration on the probability of a cardiologist
visit in the full, not-affiliated, and affiliated samples. In the full sample I detect positive
effects of 11.5 and 9.9 percentage points within the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively.
The not-affiliated estimates are positive, but smaller and statistically insignificant. The 360-
1Source: Private conversations with other SK&A users. Interested researchers may contact the author
for more information.
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Table 24: IV comparison, primary specialist visit
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 0.115* 0.089 0.198** 0.099 0.039 0.298**
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
day estimate indicates an 8.9 percentage point increase in the probability of a cardiologist
visit, while the 720-day estimate indicates only a 3.9 percentage point increase. In contrast,
the estimates in the affiliated subsample are significantly higher, indicating a 19.8 percentage
point increase at 360 days and a 29.8 percentage point increase at 720 days. These estimates
are statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
These results are contrary to intuition, that more clinically isolated generalists will respond
more strongly to integration. They may be due to some underlying clinical feature I do
not observe. In the diabetes analysis, I find integration increases the probability of an
endocrinologist in the full sample, low-access sample, and not-affiliated sample, making this
result the exception among all my results, and preserving the confidence one might currently
have in my results. I further discuss the interpretation of this result in the final section of
the chapter.
Physician utilization
In Table 25 I compare estimates of the effect of integration on physician utilization across
my samples. Panel A contains estimates from the generalist RVU regressions while Panel
B contains estimates from the cardiologist RVU regressions.
Estimates in Panel A show that integration increases generalist utilization in both subsam-
ples. In the shorter window, the not-affiliated estimate is greater than the affiliated estimate
(1.49 vs 0.90) and both are statistically significant (99 and 90 percent level, respectively).
However, in the longer window the not-affiliated estimate is smaller than, though almost
equal to, the affiliated estimate (1.80 vs. 1.86). As in the 360-day window, both 720-day
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Table 25: IV comparison, physician utilization
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 1.314*** 1.490*** 0.900* 1.784*** 1.804*** 1.855**
F 52.6 33.3 36.9 48.3 31.2 27.5
N 180,545 153,027 27,518 112,706 94,939 17,767
Panel B: Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 0.709 1.224 -0.878 1.862 2.796** -0.979
F 67.6 54.7 9.9 51.6 53.9 10.2
N 28,914 25,363 3,551 24,945 21,680 3,265
estimates are statistically significant (99 and 96 percent level, respectively). It is difficult
to argue there is a differential effect between the samples given these estimates.
Estimates in Panel B suggest a differential effect between the not-affiliated and affiliated
subsamples. In the full sample I estimates positive but statistically insignificant effects of
integration on cardiologist RVUs, measuring a 0.71 RVU increase within 360 days and a
1.86 RVU increase within 720 days. The not-affiliated IV estimates are positive and larger
than corresponding full-sample estimates, indicating 1.22 and 2.80 RVU increases within
their respective windows. While the 360-day estimate is not statistically significant, the
720-day estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. In contrast, estimates in
the affiliated subsample are negative and also larger in magnitude than the corresponding
full-sample estimates. However, I must be cautious in interpreting these estimates because
my F statistics are marginally problematic, with values of 9.9 and 10.2 in the 360- and
720-day windows, respectively.
Outpatient utilization
I compare IV estimates of both extensive and intensive margin effects in Table 26. Panel A
contains estimates for the extensive margin regression. In the full sample I find integration
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Table 26: IV comparison, outpatient utilization
Panel A: Probability of any outpatient utilization
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated -0.081*** -0.092*** -0.026 -0.131*** -0.134*** -0.102
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
Panel B: Outpatient RVUs, conditional on at least one outpatient visit
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 3.30 4.20* 1.900 3.62 3.588* 4.19
F 28.5 21.3 7.4 27.5 20.9 9.2
N 5,874 3,956 1,918 5,373 3,642 1,731
reduces the probability of any outpatient utilization by 8.1 percentage points in the 360-
day window and by 13.1 percentage points in the 720-day window. Both estimates are
statistically significant at the 99 percent level. Estimates from the not-affiliated sample are
negative like the full-sample estimates and slightly larger in magnitude, indicating decreases
in the probability of any outpatient utilization of 9.2 and 13.4 percentage points at 360 and
720 days, respectively. These estimates are also statistically significant at the 99 percent
level. Estimates from the affiliated sample are also negative, smaller in magnitude, and
statistically insignificant. It is possible lack of significance is due to the comparatively
smaller amount of observations in this sample (27,529 and 17,774 patients in the affiliated
samples versus 153,185 and 95,029 patients in the non-affiliated samples). In the affiliated
sample, integration reduces the probability of any outpatient utilizatinon by 2.6 percentage
points in the 360-day window and 10.2 percentage points in the 720-day window.
Panel B contains estimates for the intensive margin regression. In the full sample integration
reduces outpatient utilization by 3.30 and 3.62 RVUs in the 360- and 720-day windows, re-
spectively. Neither estimate is statistically significant. In the not-affiliated sample, however,
the increases are statistically significant at the 90 percent level. At 360 days the increase
is 4.20 RVUs, which is 27.3 percent larger than the corresponding full-sample estimate. At
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720 days the increase is 3.59 RVUs, which is 0.8 percent smaller than the corresponding
full-sample estimate. Due to low values for the F statistic in the first stage, it is difficult to
interpret estimates from the affiliated subsample.
Prescription drug utilization
Table 27: IV comparison, probability of a new cardiovascular drug prescription
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 0.191* 0.208* 0.189* 0.149 0.140 0.232
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
Panel B: Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 0.031 0.060 -0.091 -0.023 -0.022 0.026
F 8.5 5.8 2.1 17.8 15.6 4.5
N 29,654 25,984 3,670 25,569 22,195 3,374
I compare estimates of the effect on prescribing behavior in Table 27. Panel A reports
results from the regression for new generalist prescriptions. I do not discern any systematic
differences between the estimates from the non-affiliated and affiliated subsamples. In the
full sample, integration increases the probability that a generalist issues a new cardiovascular
drug prescription by 19.1 percentage points within 360 days and 14.9 percentage points
within 720 days. Only the 360-day estimate is statistically significant (90 percent level).
In the 360-day window, both the non-affiliated and affiliated estimates are positive and
statistically significant at the 90 percent level. Compared to the full-sample estimate, the
non-affiliated estimate is larger, indicating an increase in the probability of a generalist
prescription of 20.8 percentage points. The affiliated estimate is slightly smaller, indicating
an increase of 18.9 percentage points. In the 720-day window, neither the non-affiliated nor
the affiliated estimate is statistically significant. And in contrast to the prior results, the
affiliated estimate, 0.232, is larger than the non-affiliated estimate, 0.140.
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Panel B reports results from the regression for new cardiologist prescriptions. None of
the estimates are statistically significant and most of these regressions suffer from weak
instrument problems, making it inadvisable to rely on these coefficients. Furthermore, the
IV estimates within each sample do not have the same sign.
Inpatient admission
Table 28: IV comparison, inpatient admission
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.017* 0.023* 0.009
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
I compare estimates of the effect of integration on the probability of inpatient admission in
Table 28 In the full sample I estimate increases in this probability of 0.3 and 1.7 percentage
points within 360 and 720 days, respectively. The 360-day estimate is not statistically sig-
nificant while the 720-day estimate is significant at the 90 percent level. The statistically
significant result I observe in the 720-day window is driven by behavior in not-affiliated
practices. The estimate for that subsample is positive, statistically significant (90 percent
level), and larger than the corresponding full sample estimate, indicating a 2.3 percentage
point increase in the probability of an inpatient admission. In contrast, the affiliated esti-
mates are not statistically significant and are far smaller in magnitude than the not-affiliated
estimates, indicating a reduction of 0.2 percentage points within 360 days and an increase
of 0.9 percentage points within 720 days.
Medical spending
I present estimates of integration on my cost measures in Table 29.
For some medical spending, differential effects of integration are not consistent across win-
dows. The effect of integration on physician, pharmacy, and all non-inpatient spending –
see, respectively, Panels A, C, and D – is greater among non-affiliated practices within the
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Table 29: IV comparison, medical care spending
Panel A: Physician costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 63.87 71.48 52.14 97.0* 91.7 131.6
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
Panel B: Outpatient costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated -43.46*** -47.74*** -28.65 -64.02*** -73.55*** -18.0
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
Panel C: Pharmacy costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 224.0** 299.0** 51.7 381.6 408.2 524.2
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
Panel D: All non-inpatient costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 244.4** 322.7** 75.2 414.6 426.3 637.7
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
Panel E: All medical spending
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 538.9* 704.7* 283.4 1060.2* 1193.6 975.1*
F 52.8 33.4 36.7 48.3 31.3 27.3
N 180,714 153,185 27,529 112,803 95,029 17,774
360-day window and but greater among affiliated practices within the 720-day window. For
example, I estimate increases in physician spending of 63.9 and 97.0 dollars at 360 and 720
days, respectively, in the full sample. The not-affiliated estimate for physician spending is
larger than the affiliated estimate in the shorter window (71.5 vs. 52.1) but the opposite is
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true in the longer window (91.7 vs. 131.6).
However, for other measures, differential effects are consistent across windows. Panel B
shows that reductions in outpatient spending due to integration are concentrated within
the not-affiliated subsample. In the full sample I observe statistically significant reduc-
tions in outpatient spending of 43.5 and 64.0 dollars within the 360- and 720-day windows,
respectively. The estimates from the affiliated subsample are substantially smaller and
statistically insignificant. In contrast, the estimates from the not-affiliated subsample are
larger and statistically significant at the 99 percent level, indicating reductions of 47.7 and
73.6 dollars within the respective windows.
Panel E shows that reductions in total medical spending – for hypertension this is the
sum of physician, outpatient, pharmacy, and inpatient spending – are greater within the
not-affiliated subsample. In the full sample I find that integration increases total medical
spending for hypertension patients by 538.9 dollars within 360 days and 1,060.2 dollars
within 720 days. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 90 percent level. Both
estimates from the not-affiliated subsamples are positive and larger, indicating increases of
704.7 and 1,193.6 dollars within the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively. The 360-day
estimate is statistically significant at the 90 percent level while the 720-day estimate is
statistically insignificant. By comparison, the estimates from the affiliated subsamples are
smaller. They indicate increases of 283.4 and 975.1 dollars in the 360- and 720-day windows,
respectively. Only the 720-day estimate is statistically significant (90 percent level).
Discussion
It is puzzling that the full-sample effect on the probability of a cardiologist visit is driven by
behavior in the affiliated sample. Because the not-affiliated generalists are more isolated, one
would expect them to respond even more strongly to the addition of a cardiologist to their
practices. It is possible that generalists who have obtained a hospital affiliation are subject
to norms and policies that generate even stronger referral incentives once a cardiologist is
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added to the firm. These incentives could be non-financial, such as peer or administrator
expectations that the generalist consult specialists when they are available. Clinicians I have
spoken to consider an example like this highly plausible. I cannot determine the reason for
this behavior with my data and both theory and external literature do not point to a single,
obvious explanation.
That said, this finding is an anomaly among my results. I reported that integration more
strongly increases the probability of a cardiologist visit in the previous chapter. In the
diabetes analysis I find that integration increases the probability of an endocrinologist visit
in the full sample and is driven by behavior in the low-access and not-affiliated subgroups.
These other findings should simultaneously increase confidence that integration increases the
probability of a specialist visit and illustrate the pitfalls of generalizing from the relatively
narrow evidence base on generalist-specialist integration we currently possess.
That said, I am able to replicate the full-sample reduction in the probability of any outpa-
tient service in the not-affiliated sample. This is the most robust result in my analysis and
its emergence here should provide some reassurance that the patterns that emerge in this
chapter are valid, if perhaps idiosyncratic to hypertension. Among the other behavioral
outcomes, integration generates differentially stronger affects in the not-affiliated sample
for specialist RVUs and outpatient RVUs, but does not generate systematically different
effects for generalist RVUs and the probability of a new generalist prescription in the two
subsamples.
As in the full sample and access-based samples, there is no evidence that integration im-
proves outcomes or reduces spending. If my inpatient admission regression primarily cap-
tures the effect of integration on outcomes, then they show that integration is worsening
outcomes for hypertension patients. If they primarily capture the effect of integration on
elective utilization, then I cannot rule out the possibility that integration is cost effective.
However, the remaining evidence in this dissertation and the external evidence I am aware
of are not encouraging. In my data, integration increases spending for patients in both
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affiliation subsamples. The external evidence I am aware is dated but suggests that it could
take a decade or more for strong clinical benefits to materialize (see Greenfield et al., 1995).
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CHAPTER 8 : Diabetes mellitus: Evidence from the full sample
Introduction
Diabetes mellitus (diabetes) is a condition affecting the endocrine system, causing individ-
uals to have too much glucose in their blood.1 Clinicians may employ a wide range of
strategies in treating this condition. The choice set includes insulin therapy, blood sugar
monitoring, improved diet and exercise, other oral or injected medications, pancreas trans-
plantation, and bariatric surgery. The latter two options are far less frequently used. Com-
plications of diabetes develop gradually, but are potentially severe. These complications
include cardiovascular disease, nerve damage, kidney damage, eye damage, foot damage,
skin damage, hearing impairment, and Alzheimer’s disease. Individuals who have trouble
achieving control over their diabetes or develop severe complications are likely candidates
for referral.2
Full-sample results
Endocrinologist visit
Table 30 contains estimates from the regression of the endocrinologist visit indicator on my
regressors. OLS estimates indicate statistically significant decreases in the probability of an
endocrinologist visit of 4.9 and 4.2 percentage points at 360 and 720 days, respectively. The
OLS FE estimates are also negative and statistically significant. The 360-day estimate indi-
cates a 1.9 percentage point decrease while the 720-day estimate indicates a 4.1 percentage
point decrease. In contrast, the IV estimates indicate large, positive, and statistically sig-
nificant increases in the probability of an endocrinologist visit. Within the 360-day window,
integration increases the probability of an endocrinologist visit by 41.1 percentage points.
1Clinically speaking, the term diabetes mellitus refers to several conditions, including Type I diabetes
(disorder of the pancreas), Type II diabetes (insulin resistance), gestational diabetes (onset of diabetes during
pregnancy). (See http://www.diabetes.ca/about-diabetes/types-of-diabetes for descriptions of these
types of diabetes.) Individuals with gestational diabetes are likely excluded from my sample, provided
physicians are coding their condition with the ICD-9 code for gestational diabetes.
2For example, see http://www.diabetes.org/living-with-diabetes/treatment-and-care/
whos-on-your-health-care-team/your-health-care-team.html.
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Table 30: Effect of integration on the probability of an endocrinologist visit (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.049*** -0.019** 0.411*** -0.042** -0.041*** 0.397**
-2.9671 -2.0813 3.2688 -2.3504 -2.6227 2.2112
Severity 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047***
10.3883 9.3661 10.7455 10.8632 9.3109 11.0365
Severity squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
-5.4014 -5.7622 -5.6966 -6.2086 -5.7775 -6.4443
Male -0.004* -0.003 -0.004 -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011***
-1.6551 -0.9126 -1.4025 -3.7544 -2.6727 -3.4587
Age -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004***
-4.4029 -4.1329 -4.7741 -2.7463 -2.1438 -2.9555
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.6978 2.7138 2.8924 1.0715 0.8636 1.1179
Distance to nearest specialist -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002***
-6.4333 -0.3221 -2.4966 -8.0346 -1.3510 -3.6696
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**
2.4738 1.1647 0.9977 4.0374 1.5962 2.5279
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
In the 720-window, the increase is 39.7 percentage points. These estimates are significant
at the 99 and 95 percent levels, respectively.
Though the IV estimator is potentially biased upward due to physician selection and the
effects I observe among diabetes patients are far larger than those observed in the hyper-
tension sample, it is highly unlikely the true effect is negative and my estimates may indeed
be highly accurate. In the 720-day sample, OLS and OLS FE estimates are are almost
identical. Furthermore, the effect of severity is positive and invariant to estimator in the
360-day window and hardly changes in the 720-day window.
Physician utilization
In this section I report estimates from regressions of generalist and endocrinologist RVUs
on my regressors. The effect of integration on generalist RVUs is indeterminate. I find
strongly suggestive evidence that the effect of integration on specialist RVUs is positive and
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Table 31: Effect of integration on generalist RVUs (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.540*** -0.065 0.667 -0.710*** 0.115 -0.822
-7.5129 -0.8543 1.0484 -5.4434 0.8646 -0.5163
Severity 0.186*** 0.155*** 0.186*** 0.308*** 0.254*** 0.310***
10.0154 10.4053 9.5053 9.4560 10.6724 8.8224
Severity squared -0.007** -0.006*** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.012***
-2.3476 -2.7798 -2.2313 -2.7834 -2.8393 -2.6220
Male 0.105*** 0.122*** 0.102*** 0.205*** 0.219*** 0.198***
3.9329 4.9181 3.7647 5.0411 7.6129 5.0232
Age 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.057***
0.3873 0.8209 0.4925 2.6661 2.8591 2.6729
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.001** -0.001**
-0.5367 -0.5967 -0.6656 -2.2944 -2.3119 -2.3418
Distance to nearest specialist -0.012*** -0.008 -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.027* -0.013*
-4.6591 -1.3299 -2.9266 -2.6092 -1.8024 -1.6510
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.3306 1.0571 1.6143 0.9309 1.5639 0.5780
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,653 188,653 185,669 130,198 130,198 128,002
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
large.
Estimates for the generalist RVU regressions are presented in Table 31. OLS estimates
are negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent level, indicating reductions in
generalist utilization by 0.54 RVUs at 360 days and 0.71 RVUs at 720 days. OLS FE
estimates are small and imprecisely estimated, indicating a decrease of 0.07 RVUs within
360 days and an increase of 0.82 RVUs within 720 days. IV estimates are also statistically
insignificant, indicating an increase of 0.67 RVUs within 360 days and a decrease of 0.82
RVUs within 720 days. If there is indeed an effect of integration on generalist RVUs, it may
be small.
Estimates for the endocrinologist RVU regressions are presented in Table 32. OLS estimates
are negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent level, indicating reductions in
generalist utilization by 0.63 RVUs at 360 days and 0.35 RVUs at 720 days. OLS FE
estimates are small and imprecisely estimated, indicating a decrease of 0.35 RVUs within
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Table 32: Effect of integration on endocrinologist RVUs (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.627*** -0.346 4.418 0.995*** 0.173 8.900
2.7095 -1.0035 1.0492 2.7619 0.4065 1.2265
Severity 0.770*** 0.551*** 0.770*** 1.38*** 1.17*** 1.39***
9.3668 7.1149 9.2893 13.489 9.912 13.638
Severity squared -0.015 0.003 -0.015 -0.051*** -0.033*** -0.052***
-1.0053 0.1860 -1.0113 -4.6811 -2.7691 -4.7690
Male -0.050 -0.100 -0.036 -0.100 -0.232 -0.095
-0.8209 -1.2935 -0.5706 -0.8493 -1.5407 -0.7452
Age -0.265*** -0.166*** -0.265*** -0.362*** -0.370*** -0.382***
-9.0487 -3.4553 -9.4635 -8.3788 -4.6334 -8.6392
Age squared 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
7.9979 3.0549 8.3660 7.1437 4.0338 7.3637
Distance to nearest specialist -0.025*** -0.002 -0.020** -0.038*** -0.049 -0.025
-4.1299 -0.0746 -2.4712 -4.7324 -0.8737 -1.6230
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*
3.4199 -0.4175 2.7525 3.3874 0.9638 1.7036
F – – 22.6 – – 21.3
N 49,719 49,719 49,136 45,382 45,382 44,775
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
360 days and an increase of 0.17 RVUs within 720 days.
IV estimates are also statistically insignificant, but positive and large. They indicate in-
creases of 4.42 and 8.90 endocrinologist RVUs within 360 and 720 days, respectively. The
lack of significance may be caused by smaller sample sizes, as the sample underlying these
results contains only about 25 percent of the full sample. Furthermore, if there is bias in-
duced by physician selection, the IV estimator is biased down, implying I am biased against
finding a result.
To help size these estimates, I repeat the calculation performed in Chapter 5. I find that even
though diabetes is far less prevalent than hypertension, integration on a large scale would
cause an even greater increase in physician work. As before, assume a routine office visit
generates 1 RVU on average. Therefore, one might think of integration among generalists
and endocrinologists as increasing utilization by five routine office visits within 360 days
(4.42 RVUs for endocrinologists and 0.67 RVUs for generalists) and eight routine office
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visits within 720 days (8.90 RVUs for endocrinologists and -0.82 RVUs for generalists). An
estimated 29.1 million Americans had diabetes in 2012.3 For sake of argument, suppose
28.8 of those Americans are adults.4 Furthermore, suppose all these adult Americans are
in medical care and 17 percent of these adult Americans are treated in integrated practices.
If we shifted the remaining adult Americans from non-integrated to integrated practices, it
would induce an increase in physician work equivalent to 50.0 million office visits, or 5.4
percent of total office visits in 2012. This effect is actually greater than the one I compute
for hypertension, even though far less people are diagnosed with diabetes.
Outpatient utilization
There is strong evidence that integration reduces outpatient utilization on the extensive
margin and highly suggestive evidence that integration increases outpatient utilization on
the intensive margin.
In Table 33 I present results from the any outpatient claim regression. All estimates are
negative and the IV estimates are particularly large. OLS estimates are small and statis-
tically insignificant, indicating a reduction of 0.3 percentage points at 360 days and 0.4
percentage points at 720 days. OLS FE estimates are slightly larger and the 720-day esti-
mate is statistically significant (90 percent level). They indicate reductions of 1.0 and 2.5
percentage points in the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively. IV estimates are larger
by an order of magnitude. Both are statistically significant at the 99 percent level. These
estimates indicate reductions in the probability of an outpatient claim by 21.5 percentage
points at 360 days and 31.3 percentage points at 720 days. These effects are quantitatively
large, even larger than the effects I observed in the hypertension sample.
Estimates for the outpatient RVU regressions are presented in Table 34. OLS estimates are
3All external data on prevalence and diagnosis rates for the calculation that follows is due to http:
//www.diabetes.org/diabetes-basics/statistics/.
4This is a rough estimate. Of the 29.1 million with diabetes, 21.0 million were diagnosed. About 0.21
million Americans under the age of 20 are estimated to have diagnosed diabetes. Assuming rates of diagnosis
are equal in the older and younger populations, this implies 0.29 million Americans under the age of 20 have
diabetes and 28.8 million Americans over the age of 20 have diabetes.
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Table 33: Effect of integration on the probability of outpatient service (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.003 -0.010 -0.215*** -0.004 -0.025* -0.313***
-0.3233 -0.8645 -3.3518 -0.3584 -1.8709 -3.7822
Severity 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.016***
5.8976 7.1256 5.3855 8.3122 9.8960 7.5407
Severity squared -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
-2.0696 -2.8891 -1.8094 -3.8491 -4.8736 -3.2153
Male -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.004***
-3.0076 -0.2471 -3.1041 -2.7083 -0.0320 -2.7198
Age -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.001
-2.0266 -1.2397 -1.5968 -1.8094 -1.8840 -1.5067
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.6242 0.8291 1.3579 1.6203 1.5449 1.4335
Distance to nearest specialist 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.001***
6.2358 1.6167 3.5067 6.4365 0.2725 3.2136
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000**
-4.2203 -1.4894 -2.6204 -4.4427 0.1172 -2.5338
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
small and negative. They indicate reductions of 0.65 and 0.55 RVUs within the 360- and
720-day windows, respectively. The 360-day estimate is significant at the 90 percent level
and the 720-day estimate is significant at the 95 percent level. OLS FE estimates are also
negative, indicating a decrease of 2.41 and 0.38 RVUs in the 360- and 720-day windows,
respectively. Only the 360-day estimate is statistically significant (90 percent level). In
contrast, the IV estimates are large and positive. The 360-day estimate indicates a 10.14
RVU increase in utilization among integrated firms. This estimate is statistically significant
at the 95 percent level. The 720-day estimate indicates a smaller 3.19 RVU increase in
intensive margin utilization. This estimate is not statistically significant.
As in my hypertension sample, it is possible lack of significance is a result of small sample
sizes. Because I estimate the model only for individuals with an outpatient claim and
outpatient service rates are small, sample sizes are merely 11, 036 at 360 days and 10, 729
at 720 days. Like the extensive margin estimates, the intensive margin estimates are also
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Table 34: Effect of integration on outpatient RVUs (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.65* -2.41* 10.14** -0.547** -0.379 3.189
-1.951 -1.790 2.030 -2.1792 -0.2842 0.5328
Severity 1.03*** 0.39 1.15*** 0.972*** 0.202 1.021***
5.428 1.411 6.089 5.7105 0.3752 5.8210
Severity squared -0.052*** -0.029 -0.059*** -0.024 0.026 -0.026
-4.0023 -1.2381 -3.9734 -1.3434 0.4600 -1.3595
Male 0.731*** 0.712* 0.777*** 0.644*** 0.826* 0.662***
2.8910 1.6813 3.0149 2.9353 1.8636 2.9297
Age -0.029 0.074 -0.024 0.073 0.670** 0.082
-0.3021 0.3613 -0.2363 0.9104 1.9869 0.9693
Age squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.006* -0.001
0.2917 -0.2062 0.2156 -0.9293 -1.9133 -0.9938
Distance to nearest specialist -0.041*** -0.046 -0.006 -0.035*** 0.109 -0.022
-2.6918 -0.2494 -0.2334 -2.9464 1.3886 -1.0523
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.001 0.000 0.000* -0.003 0.000
2.0122 0.1580 0.5369 1.7867 -1.6197 1.1025
F – – 20.0 – – 27.2
N 11,036 11,036 10,768 10,789 10,789 10,504
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 35: Effect of integration on the probability of inpatient admission (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.002 -0.004 -0.042*** -0.002 0.008 0.009
-1.3618 -1.0219 -2.8192 -0.6743 1.6288 0.2652
Severity 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.020***
13.2381 11.8198 12.8710 14.6300 10.9812 15.1202
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2221 0.7144 1.1576 0.7549 1.0789 0.5958
Male 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010***
11.0817 9.4988 11.0195 12.5368 6.2211 13.0584
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002***
-6.1414 -6.6997 -6.0587 -3.7763 -2.1813 -3.7988
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***
6.2302 6.8683 6.1376 3.9237 2.4545 3.9180
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* -0.001 -0.000
-1.4497 -0.0577 -2.4768 -1.9534 -1.4445 -1.1888
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.3715 -0.6302 0.8842 1.6410 1.4304 1.0373
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
large. Mean outpatient RVUs in the full sample are 2.28 in the 360-day window and 2.43
in the 720-day window. Even if the 360-day estimate is implausibly large, both estimates
provide suggestive evidence that integration does increase outpatient utilization along the
intensive margin.
Inpatient admission
In Table 35 I present estimates of the effect of integration on the probability of inpatient
admission. OLS estimates indicate a decrease of 0.2 percentage points in both windows.
Both estimates are statistically insignificant. OLS FE estimates are larger in magnitude,
but have opposite signs. They are also statistically insignificant. In the 360-day window, the
estimate indicates a reduction in the probability of an inpatient admission of 0.4 percentage
points. In the 720-day window, a 0.8 percentage point increase is indicated.
In the 360-day window, the IV estimate is negative, an order of magnitude larger than
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the corresponding OLS FE estimate, and statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
It indicates a 4.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of an inpatient admission.
However, the effect fades by 720 days. In the longer window, the IV estimate is positive and
statistically insignificant. It is very close to the OLS FE estimate. The 720-day IV estimate
indicates a 0.9 percentage point increase in the probability of an inpatient admission.
The effect of severity is right-signed. This effect is also economically snd statistically sig-
nificant (99 percent level) in both windows. The severity coefficients suggest the clinical
improvement due to integration within 360 days is economically significant. In this win-
dow, the effect of severity is far smaller than the effect of integration for most values of
the severity score. However, the effect of severity dominates the effect of integration in the
720-day window.
Though there are many possible interpretations of my results, I believe the most plausible
one is that any clinical gains for diabetes patients due to integration are not long-lived.
This is primarily a methodological issue. If one is willing to accept the 360-day result, that
integration reduces admissions in the shorter window, then one should be surprised that the
effect does not appear in the longer window. Save for the difference in claims window, the
720-day analysis is exactly the same. I also argue that the strength of my severity estimates,
measured by the size of my t-statistics, lends great credibility to my results. Intuitively,
severity should predict hospitalization rates very strongly. Not only are the estimated effects
right-signed, the values of the t-statistics on the linear term – the economically significant
term – are extremely large: 12.9 in the 360-day window and 15.1 in the 720-day window.5
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Table 36: Effect of integration on physician services spending (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 16.2*** -21.8** 246.6** 31.1*** -44.6* 307.3**
2.99 -2.09 2.54 2.87 -1.68 2.03
Severity 38.4*** 35.6*** 38.8*** 76.6*** 72.6*** 77.8***
12.88 10.43 12.85 10.58 8.97 10.58
Severity squared -1.57*** -1.53*** -1.60*** -3.53*** -3.27*** -3.60***
-4.850 -5.734 -4.812 -8.599 -7.119 -8.600
Male 5.49** 2.82 5.34** 5.12 -2.89 4.47
2.319 0.945 2.339 1.372 -0.541 1.189
Age -8.40*** -7.38*** -8.57*** -12.7*** -12.8*** -13.1***
-5.709 -3.476 -5.848 -5.66 -4.69 -5.88
Age squared 0.059*** 0.051** 0.060*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.086***
4.0993 2.5063 4.2124 3.7247 3.4581 3.8708
Distance to nearest specialist -0.878*** -0.625 -0.356 -1.78*** -1.77 -1.06**
-3.9712 -0.9180 -1.3978 -3.584 -1.063 -2.140
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.008*** 0.015* 0.006** 0.015** 0.032* 0.012**
3.1702 1.9512 2.1368 2.5130 1.6499 2.0408
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Medical spending
Generalist and endocrinologist spending
In Table 36, the explanatory variable is the sum of spending attributable to generalists
and endocrinologists. OLS estimates are positive and relatively small, indicating spending
increases of 16.2 dollars at 360 days and 31.1 dollars at 720 days. Both estimates are
significant at the 99 percent level. OLS FE estimates are larger in magnitude but negative,
indicating decreases of 21.8 at 360 days and 44.6 dollars at 720 days. These estimates are
also statistically significant.
IV estimates are positive, and larger by about an order of magnitude, which is consistent
with higher rates of endocrinologist utilization on both the extensive and intensive margins.
The 360-day estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level, indicating a 246.6
dollar increase in spending. The 720-day estimate is also statistically significant at the 95
percent level, indicating a 307.3 dollar increase in spending. These IV estimates seem large
in absolute terms. The estimated effects are also as important as, if not more important
than, the effect of severity. In the 360-day sample, the effect of integration is greater than
the effect of severity for patients with severity up to 2.54. In the 720-day sample, the
threshold is lower, at 2.01. Both these thresholds are above the 75th percentile for severity
in my diabetes samples.
Outpatient spending
Table 36 contains the estimates from the regression in which the outcome is the sum of
spending across all outpatient claims. OLS estimates are extremely small and statistically
insignificant in both windows. Within the 360-day window, the integration coefficient in-
dicates a 3.1 dollar decrease in outpatient services spending. In the 720-day window, the
5As in the hypertension analysis, it is possible that positive effects I observe are an artifact of non-
emergency utilization. I again tried to study this issue by using admission type classifiers in the data – e.g.
emergency, urgent, or emergent admission – but my estimates lacked precision.
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Table 37: Effect of integration on outpatient services spending (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -3.09 -1.20 -47.04 0.75 4.14 -197.05
-0.440 -0.218 -0.530 0.076 0.469 -1.063
Severity 12.6*** 10.3*** 12.7*** 13.0 7.3 12.6
5.47 2.59 5.52 1.31 0.58 1.26
Severity squared -0.055 0.155 -0.047 1.96 2.30 2.05
-0.1477 0.2732 -0.1241 1.073 1.019 1.109
Male 9.84*** 9.97*** 10.01*** 10.9*** 8.1** 11.2***
3.319 3.486 3.321 2.67 2.06 2.73
Age 0.215 0.391 0.266 -1.67* -0.34 -1.52
0.2342 0.2839 0.2869 -1.698 -0.222 -1.569
Age squared -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 0.011 0.001 0.010
-0.7277 -0.4544 -0.7646 1.0854 0.0564 0.9799
Distance to nearest specialist 0.406 0.067 0.306 1.029*** -0.444 0.548
1.3896 0.1196 0.8886 3.1464 -0.3612 1.1908
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.010*** -0.001 -0.007
-1.0825 -0.8783 -0.7795 -2.7419 -0.0345 -1.6142
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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integration coefficient indicates a 0.8 dollar increase in spending. OLS FE estimates are
also small and statistically insignificant, indicating a 1.2 dollar decrease and a 4.1 dollar
increase in outpatient spending in the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively.
IV estimates are also statistically insignificant, but they are comparatively large in mag-
nitude and have the same sign in both windows. They indicate a 47.0 dollar decrease
within 360 days and a 197.1 dollar decrease within 720 days. Similar to the hypertension
estimates, these IV estimates show that spending decreases due to reductions along the
extensive margin more than offset the spending increases due to greater intensive margin
utilization. They also show that the effect of integration is more important than the effect
of severity for all but very high scores. In the 360-day window, the effect of integration is
greater than the effect of severity when severity is less than or equal to 3.76. In the 720-day
window, the threshold value is 7.22.
Total spending
In Table 38 I set my outcome as the sum of physician and outpatient spending. Recall,
in the hypertension analyses my total non-inpatient spending measure included physician,
outpatient services, and prescription drug spending. Because I do not have a therapeutic
class identifier that can be used to flag diabetes medications, I do not analyze any prescrip-
tion drug measures for diabetes patients. OLS estimates are small and positive, indicating
increases of 13.1 and 31.8 dollars within 360 and 720 days, respectively. The former estimate
is statistically insignificant while the latter estimate is statistically significant at the 95 per-
cent level. OLS FE estimates are negative and slightly larger in size, indicating decreases
of 23.0 and 40.5 dollars within the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively. The 360-day
estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level while the 720-day estimate is not.
In contrast to the OLS FE estimates, IV estimates are positive and significantly larger,
indicating spending increases of 199.5 and 110.3 dollars within 360 and 720 days, respec-
tively. Only the 360-day estimate is statistically significant (99 percent level). The effect
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Table 38: Effect of integration on non-inpatient spending (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 13.1 -23.0** 199.5*** 31.8** -40.5 110.3
1.52 -1.97 2.59 2.35 -1.50 0.85
Severity 51.0*** 45.8*** 51.4*** 89.6*** 79.8*** 90.3***
13.05 10.04 12.91 7.86 5.12 7.99
Severity squared -1.62*** -1.37** -1.64*** -1.56 -0.97 -1.56
-2.601 -2.045 -2.605 -0.858 -0.390 -0.856
Male 15.3*** 12.8*** 15.3*** 16.0*** 5.2 15.7***
3.84 3.13 3.83 3.16 0.82 3.18
Age -8.18*** -6.98*** -8.31*** -14.4*** -13.2*** -14.6***
-4.179 -2.586 -4.139 -6.29 -4.33 -6.37
Age squared 0.051** 0.045* 0.052** 0.094*** 0.087*** 0.096***
2.5144 1.6812 2.5081 3.8333 3.0242 3.9262
Distance to nearest specialist -0.472 -0.559 -0.050 -0.751 -2.216 -0.517
-1.3190 -0.7983 -0.1306 -1.4337 -1.0896 -0.7947
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.032 0.005
1.2263 0.6831 0.7718 0.7573 1.1109 0.6665
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 39: Effect of integration on physician, outpatient, and inpatient spending (full sample)
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -69.2 43.1 -686.1 -68.4 54.5 852.4
-1.62 0.37 -1.52 -0.76 0.39 1.05
Severity 240.2*** 190.5*** 240.6*** 372.1*** 299.7*** 379.7***
5.84 4.70 5.68 4.12 3.02 4.17
Severity squared 6.31 7.03 6.34 27.2 26.7 26.3
0.946 1.134 0.938 1.49 1.37 1.42
Male 181.7*** 150.0*** 181.2*** 318.3*** 263.2*** 316.2***
8.22 5.66 8.48 10.24 5.82 10.16
Age -34.4*** -35.1** -33.3*** -47.8** -51.8** -48.5***
-2.66 -2.53 -2.59 -2.49 -2.39 -2.60
Age squared 0.327** 0.355** 0.316** 0.423** 0.490** 0.424**
2.3648 2.4091 2.2976 2.0775 2.2364 2.1540
Distance to nearest specialist -3.76** 1.99 -5.12*** -7.11*** -14.22 -4.58
-2.270 0.327 -2.796 -2.775 -1.345 -1.554
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.026 -0.148* 0.036** 0.077** 0.057 0.060*
1.5009 -1.8905 2.0591 2.5096 0.4432 1.8125
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
of integration is also large compared to the effect of severity within the 360-day window.
The effect of severity is positive, but only greater than or equal to the effect of severity for
patients with severity scores of 4.54 or greater. Within the 720-day window, the threshold
value is much lower, indicating the severity effect dominates for severity scores greater than
or equal to 1.25.
In Table 39 I add inpatient spending to my cost measure. OLS estimates are negative
but statistically insignificant in both windows. The estimates indicate 69.2 and 68.4 dollar
reductions in spending in the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively. OLS FE estimates are
positive, but smaller in magnitude. They indicate a 43.1 dollar increase in spending within
360 days and a 54.5 dollar increase in spending within 720 days. IV estimates are far larger,
but statistically insignificant. In the 360-day window, integration reduces spending by 686.1
dollars. However, in the 720-day window, integration increases spending by 852.4 dollars.
As in the hypertension analysis, it seems the effect of integration on inpatient outcomes
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drives the effect of integration on total spending. So again I find that achieving better
health outcomes is extremely important for the success of policies increasing generalist and
specialist integration. These estimates also suggest that spending reductions for diabetes
patients due to integration might be short-lived, a point I further discuss in the following
section.
Additional discussion
Estimates from the full sample of diabetes patients show that generalist-endocrinologist
integration has economically important effects along multiple margins. I recover strong
evidence that integration increases the probability of an endocrinologist visit and that it
also reduces the probability of any outpatient utilization. These effects are significantly
larger than the effects I observe in the corresponding hypertension analysis. The effect of
integration on the probability of an endocrinologist visit is about four times as large as the
effect of integration on the probability of a cardiologist visit. The effect on the probability
of any outpatient service for diabetes patients is roughly three times as large as the effect
for hypertension patients.
The differences are so large as to almost seem implausible, but to the best of my knowl-
edge there is a clinical basis for these differences. Informal conversations with practicing
physicians reveals that management of diabetes patients can be far more difficult than man-
agement of hypertension patients. There is some evidence consistent with this in my data,
as mean severity in the diabetes samples is greater than mean severity in the hypertension
samples. Furthermore, I do observe a substantially larger effect of integration on specialist
RVUs in the diabetes sample (though all estimates are statistically insignificant). These
estimates are consistent with a story in which generalists with formal ties to an endocri-
nologist are more eager to exploit that connection for clinical reasons. Furthermore, if
outpatient utilization on the extensive margin is driven by the generalist’s desire to resolve
clinical uncertainty, the large negative effect of integration on the probability of any out-
patient service would be consistent with greater use of endocrinologists. After referral, the
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burden would be transferred to the provider with greater clinical expertise in diabetes.
Though my estimates for both inpatient admission and spending are opposite-signed in the
360- and 720-day windows, they cannot encourage those advocating for greater integra-
tion among generalists and specialists. Diabetes is another important test case for policies
attempting to increase care coordination by increasing rates of integration. The complica-
tions of diabetes are greater in number and are in some ways more severe than those for
hypertension. Therefore, if there are any clinical benefits to integration, one should have a
very strong prior those benefits would emerge from my diabetes data. Unfortunately, my
estimates suggest that clinical benefits from generalist-endocrinologist integration are not
long-lived. While integration causes a statistically significant reduction in inpatient admis-
sions within 360 days, the reduction dissipates by 720 days. My cost estimates suggest that
this failure to achieve longer-lasting clinical improvements is the reason why integration
does not reduce total medical spending in the longer window of my study.
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CHAPTER 9 : Diabetes mellitus: Evidence from low- and high-access areas
Introduction
The plan of this chapter is identical to the plan of the corresponding chapter in my hyper-
tension analysis, save for analyses of prescription drug utilization and outcomes. Recall,
I define a low-access subsample that contains individuals whose generalist is located “far”
from a cardiologist and a high-access subsample containing individuals whose generalist is
located “close” to a cardiologist. An individual is assigned to one of these groups if the dis-
tance between the patient’s generalist and the nearest endocrinologist is sufficiently high or
low. In the hypertension sample, the number of cardiologists was sufficiently high to make
the high-access group about two times as large as the low-access group. In the diabetes
sample, the low- and high-access groups are almost equal. This is consistent with the fact
that while there were about 23,000 cardiologists in the United States in 2010, there were
less than 6,000 endocrinologists at the same time.1
As before I search for differential responses to integration between the low- and high-access
groups. Because generalists in low-access areas are clinically isolated, relative to their high-
access counterparts, they should respond more strongly to the addition of an endocrinologist
to their practices. Many of my full-sample results are corroborated in the low-access sample.
However for some outcomes the full-sample effect is driven by the high-access sample. I first
present my results below. In the final section I further develop the implications of my results
and discuss whether the relatively strong high-access responses are easily rationalized.
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Table 40: IV comparison, endocrinologist visit
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 0.411*** 0.519*** 0.125 0.397** 0.719*** -0.011
F 23.7 17.3 30.2 20.6 14.5 31.0
N 185,697 60,727 64,546 128,021 41,829 44,531
Results
Endocrinologist visit
Table 40 contains IV estimates for the effect of integration on the probability of an endocri-
nologist visit. In the full sample I detect statistically significant increases in both windows.
Within 360 days I observe a 41.1 percentage point increase and within 720 days I observe
a 39.7 percentage point increase. These estimates are significant at the 99 and 95 percent
level, respectively. The estimated effects in low-access areas are also statistically significant
and are, in fact, even greater. They indicate 51.9 and 71.9 percentage point increases in
the probability of an endocrinologist visit, respectively. Both estimates are significant at
the 99 percent level. In contrast, the high-access estimates are far smaller and statistically
insignificant.
Physician utilization
In Table 41 I compare IV estimates from the generalist and endocrinologist RVU regressions.
Only one of these estimates is significant at any conventional level, so the results in this
table are at best suggestive.
Panel A contains estimates for the generalist RVU regressions. In the full sample IV es-
timates are statistically insignificant, indicating an increase of 0.67 RVUs in the 360-day
window and a decrease of 0.82 RVUs in the 720-day window. Integration may differentially
affect generalists in low- and high-access areas. In low-access areas, I estimate statisti-
1See http://www.cardiosolution.com/market-situation/ and http://www.healio.com/
endocrinology/diabetes/news/print/endocrine-today/\%7B511d7427-678b-42e0-9b7b-4e374fabc62a\
%7D/us-endocrinologist-shortage-affects-access-to-care-physician-satisfaction.
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Table 41: IV comparison, physician utilization
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 0.667 1.249 -1.132 -0.822 2.344 -3.788*
F 23.7 17.3 30.2 20.6 14.5 30.9
N 185,669 60,721 64,533 128,002 41,827 44,522
Panel B: Endocrinologists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 4.418 7.672 3.517 8.900 13.153 5.55
F 22.6 13.6 23.6 21.3 16.1 25.0
N 49,136 16,183 17,988 44,775 14,716 16,314
cally significant increases of 1.25 and 2.34 RVUs within 360 and 720 days, respectively. In
high-access areas, I observe decreases of 1.13 and 3.79 RVUs within the 360- and 720-day
windows, respectively. Only the 720-day high-access estimate is statistically significant (90
percent level). These estimates indicate that lack of significance in the full sample may be
due in part to divergent behavior across low- and high-access areas.
Panel B contains estimates for the endocrinologist RVU regressions. None of these estimates
are statistically significant. In the full sample IV estimates are large and positive, indicating
increases of 4.42 and 8.90 RVUs for endocrinologists within 360 and 720 days, respectively.
The low-access estimates are greater than the high-access estimates within both windows
(360 days: 7.67 vs. 3.52, 720 days: 13.14 vs. 5.55).
Outpatient utilization
Table 42 contains estimates for the outpatient utilization regressions. Panel A compares
estimates of the extensive margin effect for outpatient utilization. In the full sample I detect
large, negative, and statistically significant decreases in the probability of any outpatient
utilization. At 360 days the reduction is 21.5 percentage points while at 720 days the
reduction is 31.3 percentage points. These estimates are statistically significant at the 99
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Table 42: IV comparison, outpatient utilization
Panel A: Probability of any outpatient utilization
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated -0.215*** -0.266** -0.164*** -0.313*** -0.355*** -0.236***
F 23.7 17.3 30.2 20.6 14.5 31.0
N 185,697 60,727 64,546 128,021 41,829 44,531
Panel B: Outpatient RVUs, conditional on at least one outpatient visit
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 10.14** 0.510 15.4*** 3.189 7.83 4.91
F 20.0 8.3 20.4 27.2 10.8 25.7
N 10,768 3,478 3,644 10,504 3,384 3,555
percent level. Both sets of subsample estimates are negative and statistically significant at
the 99 percent level. However, in both windows only the low-access estimate is larger than
the full-sample estimate. At 360 days, the low-access estimate indicates a 26.6 percentage
point reduction while the high-access estimate indicates a 16.4 percentage point reduction in
the probability of any outpatient utilization. At 720 days, the low-access estimate indicates
a 35.5 percentage point reduction while the high-access estimate indicates a 23.6 percentage
point reduction in the same probability.
Panel B compares estimates of the intensive margin effect for outpatient utilization. In the
full sample I estimate large, positive effects. The 720-day estimate is substantially smaller
than the 360-day estimate. At 360 days I detect a statistically significant (95 percent level)
increase of 10.14 RVUs while at 720 days I estimate a statistically insignificant increase of
3.19 RVUs. If the intensive margin effect of integration is indeed positive, it is not clear from
Panel B whether the effect is concentrated within low- or high-access areas. In the 360-day
window the low-access estimate, 0.510, is far smaller than the high-access estimate, 15.40.
But in the 720-day window, the low-access estimate, 7.83, is larger than the high-access
estimate.
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Table 43: IV comparison, inpatient admission
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated -0.042*** 0.002 -0.063 0.009 0.084 -0.041
F 23.7 17.3 30.2 20.6 14.5 31.0
N 185,697 60,727 64,546 128,021 41,829 44,531
Inpatient admission
In Table 43 I present estimates for the inpatient admission regressions. In the full sam-
ple I detect a negative, large, and statistically significant decrease in the probability of an
inpatient admission at 360 days, a reduction of 4.2 percentage points. At 720 days, the
estimated effect is positive but statistically insignificant at 0.9 percentage points. In the
low-access subsamples I estimate positive but statistically insignificant effects of 0.2 percent-
age points within the 360-day windows and 8.4 percentage points in the 720-day window.
In contrast, the high-access estimates are negative and large, though also statistically in-
significant. Within 360 days I detect a 6.3 percentage point decrease and within 720 days
I detect a 4.1 percentage point decrease.
Recall, integration in low-access areas increases the probability of an endocrinologist visit
and the point estimates suggest endocrinologist RVUs might also increase as well. Yet I
fail to detect a decrease in the probability of an inpatient admission in low-access areas.
This should be a discouraging result for those advocating for greater generalist-specialist
integration.
Medical spending
I present estimates of the effect of integration on my cost measures in Table 44.
Panel A contains estimates for physician costs. The statistically significant spending in-
creases I observe in the full sample are concentrated within low-access areas. In the full
sample, integration increases spending by 246.6 dollars within 360 days and 307.3 dollars
within 720 days. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. In the
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Table 44: IV comparison, medical care spending
Panel A: Physician costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 246.6** 271.2** 29.5 307.3** 438.4 85.2
F 23.7 17.3 30.2 20.6 14.5 31.0
N 185,697 60,727 64,546 128,021 41,829 44,531
Panel B: Outpatient costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated -47.04 -168.04 214.6*** -197.05 -327.4 186.8**
F 23.7 17.3 30.2 20.6 14.5 31.0
N 185,697 60,727 64,546 128,021 41,829 44,531
Panel C: All non-inpatient costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated 199.5*** 103.2 244.1** 110.3 111.0 272.0*
F 23.7 17.3 30.2 20.6 14.5 31.0
N 185,697 60,727 64,546 128,021 41,829 44,531
Panel D: All medical spending
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Low-access High-access Full sample Low-access High-access
Integrated -686.1 -200.4 -1467.8 852.4 2029.9 -267.0
F 23.7 17.3 30.2 20.6 14.5 31.0
N 185,697 60,727 64,546 128,021 41,829 44,531
low-access sample, the effect of integration is larger, indicating spending increases of 271.2
and 438.4 dollars within 360 and 720 days, respectively. The 360-day estimate is statistically
significant at the 95 percent level while the 720-day estimate is statistically insignificant.
In the high-access sample, the effect of integration is positive, small by comparison, and
statistically insignificant, indicating increases of 29.5 and 85.2 dollars within the 360- and
720-day windows, respectively.
Panel B contains estimates for outpatient costs. I observe strongly suggestive evidence
of a differential effect between low- and high-access areas. In the full sample I observe
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negative but statistically insignificant decreases in outpatient spending. Integration reduces
outpatient services spending by 47.0 dollars within 360 days and 197.1 dollars within 720
days. I observe greater spending reductions in low-access areas. My low-access estimates
indicate spending reductions of 168.0 dollars in the 360-day window and 327.4 dollars in the
720-day window. As in the full sample, these estimates are not statistically significant. In
contrast, I observe statistically significant spending increases in high-access areas for both
windows. In the 360-day window, integration increases spending by 214.6 dollars while in
the 720-day window the increase is 186.8 dollars.
Panel C contains estimates for the sum of physician and outpatient costs. In the full sample
I detect a statistically significant (99 percent level) spending increase of 199.5 dollars within
360 days and a statistically insignificant increase of 110.3 dollars within 720 days. For both
subsamples my estimates indicate integration increases spending in both windows. Only
the high-access estimates are statistically significant, indicating spending increases of 244.1
and 272.0 dollars in the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively. The 360-day estimate is
significant at the 95 percent level while the 720-day estimate is significant at the 90 percent
level.
Panel D contains estimates for all medical spending, exclusive of pharmacy costs. Though
none of the estimates are statistically significant, they again demonstrate that the effect
of integration on inpatient utilization strongly determines the effect of integration on total
medical spending. Recall, in the full sample I find integration reduces the probability
of an inpatient admission in the 360-day window but do not replicate the result in the
720-day window. These admission effects are reflected in the (statistically insignificant)
full-sample estimates for the effect of integration on the spending measure in Panel D.
The 360-day full-sample estimate is negative (-686.1 dollars) while the 720-day estimate is
positive (852.4). In the low-access sample the effect of integration on the probability of an
inpatient admission increases from 0.2 percentage points within 360 days to 8.4 percentage
points within 720 days. The effect of integration on low-access medical spending increases
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from -200.4 dollars within 360 days to 2,029.9 dollars within 720 days. Similarly, in the
high-access sample the effect of integration on the probability of an inpatient admission
increases from -6.3 percentage points to -4.1 percentage points within the 360- and 720-day
windows, respectively. The effect of integration on high-access medical spending increases
from -1,467.8 dollars within 360 days to -267.0 dollars within 720 days.
Additional discussion
The strongest evidence I have indicates that the effects of integration on the probability of an
endocrinologist visit as well as the probability of any outpatient utilization are differentially
stronger in the low-access sample. There is at best suggestive evidence that endocrinologist
RVUs increase more strongly in low-access areas. These results are consistent with my
findings in the full sample.
Some of my results are more difficult to rationalize. In low-access areas, integration strongly
increases the probability of an endocrinologist visit and seems to increase both generalist
and endocrinologist RVUs. In high-access areas, integration has much weaker effects on
the probability of an endocrinologist visit, generalists reduce RVUs, and endocrinologists
increase RVUs. The travel time argument I make in Chapter 6, to rationalize the differential
patterns I observe between low- and high-access hypertension patients, cannot rationalize
the results in this chapter. This explanation fails specifically due to the higher levels of
endocrinologist intensive margin usage in low-access areas. If patients are willing to see a
relatively distant endocrinologist, but are unwilling to make very many trips to see him or
her, endocrinologists RVUs should be lower in low-access areas. To the best of my knowl-
edge, there are no obvious, clinically plausible assumptions that can explain the differential
utilization patterns I observe in these low- and high-access samples but also generate the
behavior I have already rationalized in the hypertension sample. It seems reasonable to
defer this question to future research.
The inpatient admission and medical spending estimates provide further evidence that inte-
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gration will not achieve the goals of its most strident advocates. First, in both the low- and
high-access samples the (statistically insignificant) effect of integration on the probability
of inpatient admission is worse in the 720-day window compared to the 360-day window.
Second, though referral and utilization strongly increase in low-access areas, I do not ob-
serve decreases in the probability of an inpatient admission. Because spending effects in
the aggregate are highly responsive to inpatient expenditures, integration’s failure to reduce
inpatient admissions in low-access areas again leads to higher total medical spending. In
contrast, the effect of integration on specialist utilization is much less strong in high-access
areas, yet I observe (statistically significant) decreases in the probability of an inpatient
admission in both windows. I argue these results provide further evidence that policies
encouraging formal integration are too blunt and too potent for the generalist-specialist
coordination problems that actually confront us.
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CHAPTER 10 : Diabetes mellitus: Evidence from non-affiliated and affiliated
practices
Introduction
With the exception of prescription drug analyses, the plan of this chapter follows the plan of
Chapter 7. I have again divided patients into two groups. The not-affiliated group contains
patients whose primary care physician does not report a hospital affiliation. The affiliated
group contains the remaining patients. Those in the not-affiliated group should experience
a stronger response to integration than those outside it due to the greater clinical isolation
of not-affiliated generalists. In contrast to the corresponding hypertension analysis, I do
indeed estimate stronger effects in the more clinically isolated subgroup. I present my
results in the next section and provide additional discussion in the final section.
Results
Endocrinologist visit
Table 45: IV comparison, primary specialist visit
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 0.411*** 0.642*** 0.092 0.397** 0.604** 0.113
F 23.7 13.9 56.3 20.6 13.2 49.8
N 185,697 160,974 24,723 128,021 110,355 17,666
I compare estimates for the effect of integration on the probability of an endocrinologist
visit for the full, not-affiliated, and affiliated samples in Table 45 In the full sample I
detect large, positive, and statistically significant effects in both windows. The 360-day
estimate indictates a 41.1 percentage point increase and the 720-day estimate indicates
a 39.7 percentage point increase. Behavior in the not-affiliated subsample drives these
estimates. Among patients of not-affiliated practices, integration increases the probability of
an endocrinologist visit by 64.2 percentage points within 360 days and 60.4 percentage points
within 720 days. The full-sample estimates are large, but these not-affiliated estimates are
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even larger. In contrast, integration causes smaller, statistically significant increases in the
probability of an endocrinologist visit of 9.2 percentage points within 360 days and 11.3
percentage points within 720 days.
Physician utilization
Table 46: IV comparison, physician utilization
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 0.667 1.200 0.442 -0.822 -1.135 0.729
F 23.7 13.9 56.3 20.6 13.2 49.7
N 185,669 160,947 24,722 128,002 110,339 17,663
Panel B: Endocrinologists
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 4.418 5.923 1.334 8.900 10.908 5.066
F 22.6 9.8 37.1 21.3 13.3 30.4
N 49,136 43,635 5,501 44,775 39,274 5,501
I compare estimates for the effect of integration on generalist and endocrinologist RVUs in
Table 46. Panel A contains estimates for the generalist RVU regressions. In the full sample I
estimate a 0.67 RVU increase in the 360-day window and a 0.82 RVU decrease in the the 720-
day window. The change in sign appears to be driven by the response in the not-affiliated
sample. Similar to the full sample, I observe an increase in RVUs in the 360-day window
(1.20 RVUs) and a decrease in RVUs in the 720-day window (1.14 RVUs). In contrast, the
estimates for the affiliated subsamples are positive, though smaller in magnitude, in both
windows. In the 360-day window integration causes increases of 0.44 and 0.73 RVUs in the
360- and 720-day windows, respectively. Because none of these estimates are statistically
significant, it is difficult to make any strong inferences from these results.
Panel B contains estimates for the specialist RVU regressions. In the full sample I observe in-
creases of 4.42 and 8.90 RVUs within 360 days and 720 days, respectively. The not-affiliated
estimates are substantially larger than the non-affiliated estimates in both windows. In the
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not-affiliated subsample, integration causes an increase of 5.92 RVUs within 360 days and
8.90 RVUs within 720 days. The 360-day estimate may be suspect due to weak instrument
problems (F statistic of 9.8). These estimates are larger than the corresponding full-sample
estimates and significantly larger than the affiliated subsample estimates. In the affiliated
subsample, integration causes an increase of 1.33 RVUs in the 360-day window and an in-
crease of 5.07 RVUs in the 720-day window. As in Panel A, the estimates in Panel B are
not statistically significant, so it is inadvisable to rely heavily on these results.
Outpatient utilization
Table 47: IV comparison, outpatient utilization
Panel A: Probability of any outpatient utilization
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated -0.215*** -0.342*** -0.077 -0.313*** -0.513*** -0.084
F 23.7 13.9 56.3 20.6 13.2 49.8
N 185,697 160,974 24,723 128,021 110,355 17,666
Panel B: Outpatient RVUs, conditional on at least one outpatient visit
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 10.14** 19.47** 5.44 3.189 5.94 1.090
F 20.0 9.9 11.2 27.2 15.4 16.0
N 10,768 7,680 3,088 10,504 7,562 2,942
I compare estimates of the effect of integration on extensive margin utilization in Panel
A and intensive margin utilization in Panel B. There is strong evidence that full-sample
extensive margin effects are driven by behavior in the not-affiliated subsample, while there is
at best suggestive evidence that intensive margin effects are also driven by the not-affiliated
subsample.
With respect to extensive margin estimates in the full sample, integration reduces the
probability of any outpatient utilization by 21.5 and 31.3 percentage points within 360
and 720 days, respectively. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 99 percent
level. The estimates for the not-affiliated subsample are negative, larger in magnitude, and
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also statistically significant at the 99 percent level, indicating decreases of 34.2 and 51.3
percentage points within 360 and 720 days. In the affiliated subsample, estimates are also
negative, but much smaller and statistically insignificant, indicating decreases of 7.7 and
8.4 percentage points within the 360- and 720-day windows.
In Panel B, there is evidence suggesting that intensive margin effects are stronger in the
not-affiliated subsample, but it is weak. In the full sample I observe increases of 10.14 and
3.19 RVUs in response to integration within the 360- and 720-day windows, respectively.
The 360-day estimate is statistically significant at the 95 percent level while the 720-day
estimate is statistically insignificant. The not-affiliated estimates are significantly larger
than the affiliated estimates. In the not-affiliated subsample, I observe increases of 19.47
and 5.94 RVUs within the 360- and 720-day windows. The 360-day estimate is statistically
significant at the 95 percent level, but the instrument may be weak, as the F statistic for
the first stage is 9.9. The 720-day estimate is not statistically significant. In the affiliated
subsample, estimates are also positive, but they are far smaller as well as statistically
insignificant. The estimates indicate increases of 5.44 RVUs within 360 days and 1.09
RVUs within 720 days.
Inpatient admission
Table 48: IV comparison, inpatient admission
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated -0.042*** -0.068*** -0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.036
F 23.7 13.9 56.3 20.6 13.2 49.8
N 185,697 160,974 24,723 128,021 110,355 17,666
Table 48 compares estimates for the effect of integration on the probability of an inpatient
admission. In the 360-day window for the full sample, I estimate a strong negative effect
that indicates a 4.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of an inpatient admission.
The estimate is significant at the 99 percent level. This effect dissipates by the end of
the 720-day window, as I observe a small, statistically insignificant increase of only 0.9
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percentage points.
The improvement in outcomes I observe within 360 days is driven by gains in the not-
affiliated subsample. In this window, integration for not-affiliated practices reduces the
probability of an inpatient admission by 6.8 percentage points. The estimate is significant
at the 99 percent level. However, mirroring the full-sample results, the 360-day gains for the
non-affiliated subsample do not persist int othe 720-day window, the estimate indicating
only a 0.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of an inpatient admission. Though
estimates from the affiliated subsample are not statistically significant, they do suggest that
improvement in outcomes due to integration are indeed restricted to the 360-day window.
At 360 days I do not detect any effect, with a point estimate of 0.000. At 720 days I detect
an increase in the probability of inpatient admission of 3.6 percentage points.
Medical spending
I compare spending estimates for physician, outpatient, and my two cost aggregates in
Table 49. Panel A provides strong evidence that integration increases physician spending
more strongly in the not-affiliated subsample. In the full sample I observe increases of 246.6
dollars in the 360-day window and 307.3 dollars in the 720-day window. Both estimates
are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. In the not-affiliated subsample, both
estimates are greater than the corresponding full sample estimates, indicating spending in-
creases of 355.1 and 378.3 dollars at 360 and 720 days, respectively. The 360-day estimate
is statistically significant at the 95 percent level while the 720-day estimate is statistically
insignificant. In the affiliated subsample, both estimates are positive, smaller than the corre-
sponding full sample estimate, and statistically significant. The 360-day estimate indicates
a 96.8 dollar increase in physician services spending and is significant at the 90 percent
level. The 720-day estimate indicates a 238.1 dollar increase in physician spending and is
significant at the 95 percent level.
Panel B does not provide evidence that reductions in outpatient spending are concentrated
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Table 49: IV comparison, medical care spending
Panel A: Physician costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 246.6** 355.1** 96.8* 307.3** 378.3 238.1**
F 23.7 13.9 56.3 20.6 13.2 49.8
N 185,697 160,974 24,723 128,021 110,355 17,666
Panel B: Outpatient costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated -47.04 -52.21 -63.3 -197.05 -279.73 -129.7
F 23.7 13.9 56.3 20.6 13.2 49.8
N 185,697 160,974 24,723 128,021 110,355 17,666
Panel C: All non-inpatient costs
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated 199.5*** 302.93** 33.5 110.3 98.6 108.4
F 23.7 13.9 56.3 20.6 13.2 49.8
N 185,697 160,974 24,723 128,021 110,355 17,666
Panel D: All medical spending
360-day window 720-day window
Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated Full sample Not affiliated Affiliated
Integrated -686.1 -962.9 -135.0 852.4 743.7 1248.1
F 23.7 13.9 56.3 20.6 13.2 49.8
N 185,697 160,974 24,723 128,021 110,355 17,666
in either subsample. None of the estimates are statistically significant. In the 360-day
window, the not-affiliated estimate (-52.2 dollars) is smaller in magnitude than the affiliated
estimate (-63.3 dollars), but in the 720-day window, the not-affiliated estimate (-279.7
dollars) is instead larger in magnitude than the affiliated estimate (-129.7 dollars). Similarly,
there is not enough evidence in Panel C for me to conclude that the not-affiliated and
affiliated subsamples respond differentially to integration.
Panel D estimates the effect of integration on the sum of physician, outpatient, and inpatient
spending. None of the estimates are statistically significant. But similar to the estimates
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for the low- and high-access subsamples, the spending decreases I observe in the 360-day
window dissipate by 720 days. In the full sample, integration reduces spending by 686.1
dollars within 360 days and increases spending within 852.4 dollars within 720 days. The
not-affiliated estimates follow this pattern, indicating a spending decrease of 962.9 dollars
within 360 days and a spending increase of 743.7 dollars within 720 days. The same holds
for the affiliated estimates, with a 135.0 dollar decrease within the 360-day window and a
1,248.1 dollar increase within the 720-day window.
Additional discussion
As in the full sample and access-based samples, I confirm that integration more strongly
increases the probability of an endocrinologist visit and more strongly decreases the prob-
ability of an outpatient claim among not-affiliated generalists. Though I do not detect dif-
ferential effects for generalist RVUs, there is suggestive evidence that integration increases
endocrinologist RVUs more strongly among not-affiliated practices.
The inpatient admission and medical spending results still argue against integration-centric
policies. On one hand, integration reduces the probability of inpatient admission for not-
affiliated practices in both windows. This contrasts with the low-access results. In that
sample, utilization and admission move in the same direction. In the not-affiliated sample,
greater utilization among not-affiliated practices results in lower rates of inpatient admis-
sion. On the other hand, the 720-day estimate for the not-affiliated sample (-0.002) is more
than an order of magnitude smaller than the 360-day estimate (-0.068). Outcomes also
worsen in the affiliated sample, with no effect at 360 days and an increase of 3.6 percentage
points at 720 days. Because spending effects follow inpatient admission effects, savings from
integration in the 360-day regressions fail to appear in the 720-day regressions.
110
CHAPTER 11 : Conclusion
This dissertation sheds new light on a historically neglected facet of health care organiza-
tions: integration among generalist and specialist physician. I estimate the effect of this
integration on the provision of health care, health care outcomes, and health care spending.
Implications for scholarship
Understanding these effects is an important scholarly matter because physicians are central
actors in the US health care system. In this section I evaluate existing theories for generalist-
specialist integration with the evidence I have generated.
The popular view in health services research that integration is unambiguously good, par-
ticularly for chronic conditions, is strongly rejected by my results. First, integration fails
to generate long-lasting reductions in inpatient admissions. Though the probability of an
inpatient admission for diabetes patients decreases with integration in the 360-day window,
the decrease does not persist into the 720-day window. I do not detect an improvement for
hypertension patients in the 360-day window and outcomes appear to worsen in the 720-day
window. Second, because spending is so highly driven by inpatient admissions, the failure
to improve outcomes results in a failure to reduce spending. The failure to detect improve-
ments should be especially striking for concerned observers. Diabetes and hypertension are
two conditions most likely to benefit from integration if coordination is only a clinical issue.
If there are improvements to be found, I would find them in my data given my sample sizes.
Rosen (1983) shows how economies of scope arising from skill complementarities can affect
generalist-specialist integration patterns. I argue this theory is also an awkward fit for the
data. Suppose outpatient care for diabetes and hypertension consists of a low-intensity task
and a high-intensity task, of which generalists mainly do the former, specialists the latter. If
the cost of acquiring skill in the high-intensity task decreases in skill in the low-intensity task,
then generalists are less likely to integrate with specialists, as the net benefit to integration
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decreases with the skill complementarity. If Rosen’s theory explained generalist-specialist
integration, generalist output would be greater in non-integrated practices than integrated
practices. Generalists who opted for smaller firm boundaries would have higher levels of
skill complementarity and, therefore, higher rates of completing the high-intensity task. In
my setting this means generalists would generate higher RVUs in non-integrated practices.
However, integration generates a statistically significant increase in generalist RVUs in the
hypertension sample. (The effect of integration on generalist RVUs in the diabetes sample
are statistically insignificant.)
Stigler (1951) theorizes that specialization among firms is a function of market size. This
theory is likely ruled out by integration patterns both before and during my observation
period. Specialization in my setting entails firms that contain only generalists, only endocri-
nologists, or only cardiologists. This theory is inconsistent with my descriptive analysis.
While incidence and prevalence of diabetes and hypertension increased over my observation
period, integration rates for hypertension increased slightly in the more dependable years
of my SK&A data, 2010 through 2012, and remained effectively unchanged for diabetes
in that same period. Other surveys suggest that even if this theory had some explanatory
power, its impact would be much less important in comparison to integrating for negotiating
power, as observed during the rapid growth of HMOs in the 1990s.
Becker and Murphy (1992) posit a link between coordination costs and integration. The
data suggest that a Becker and Murphy (1992) type of rationalization for integration pat-
terns does not fit my setting well. The greater are coordination costs, the smaller are firms.
If generalist-specialist coordination is at least as costly as coordination among generalists,
then higher coordination costs lead to less generalist-specialist integration. I observe slight
increases in the rate of both generalist-endocrinologist and generalist-cardiologist integra-
tion over my observation period. Thus according to the theory, coordination costs must
have declined over my observation period, the gains to generalist-specialist integration have
increased over my observation period, or both. I would not argue that coordination costs
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have declined. At the time of this writing, several years after the end of my observation
period, health IT competition is still unsettled and many transactions (e.g. medical record
transfer and health insurer billing) are handled via facsimile. I am also unaware of literature
suggesting that the gains to generalist-specialization have increased in recent years. The
most important study of provider effectiveness in treating hypertension finds no mortality
effect of being treated by a generalist or specialist, which suggests that gains from coordi-
nation between physicians might indeed be small.1 If one takes my results at face value,
one would conclude that integration worsens outcomes over time. At the very least there is
no evidence in my results that suggests Becker and Murphy (1992) is the most important
model for understanding generalist-specialist integration.
What remains is to choose between the two referral-based theories of integration. In Gari-
cano and Santos (2004), integration affects patterns of care because it allows side payments
that reduce the upstream physician’s incentive to exploit the hidden information he gains
from his initial encounters with the patient. Save for those who should receive palliative
care, higher severity levels justify more treatment and more spending. In this model, we ex-
pect severity-based specialization among generalist and specialists, with the former treating
the lower-severity individuals and the latter treating those with greater severity. In David
and Helmchen (2011), integration affects patterns of care because it increases the upstream
physician’s incentive to release tasks – steps in what are commonly agreed-upon treatment
algorithms – earlier in patient treatment. In this model, a practice that integrates might
implement a relatively indiscriminate referral policy in which most hypertension patients
are referred to a cardiologist. To my knowledge, it is not difficult to defend this behavior
on the basis of quality of care.2 As noted earlier, one of the most striking patterns in
the data is that organizational form has a much stronger impact than severity in nearly all
my regressions. I interpret this finding as strong evidence in favor of David and Helmchen
1In other words, physician integration might not be the relevant margin for hypertension patients. Co-
ordination between generalists and lower-credentialed providers such as nurses or case managers, however,
is an alternate source of gains
2For example, many preventive medicine interventions are cost effective, but not cost saving. Relatively
high utilization in chronic disease management might fall into this classification.
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(2011) as opposed to Garicano and Santos (2004), though elements of the latter might still
apply as a secondary concern.
Implications for policy
This research is also relevant for policy due to the long-standing interest in reducing provider
fragmentation in the health services research and policy communities.
I provide extremely strong evidence that physician behavior responds to organizational
form. When generalist and specialists integrate, they are more likely to make referrals and
they are less likely to utilize outpatient services. Work intensity also seems to respond to
integration. There is suggestive evidence that patients diagnosed by integrated generalists
receive greater amounts of specialist care. There is also suggestive evidence that integration
induces greater generalist effort for hypertension patients, but I do not find this is the case
for diabetes patients. I also find strong evidence that integration induces greater use of
prescription drugs in the treatment of hypertension.
However, clinical and financial gains from these behavioral changes fail to emerge. On one
hand, this is surprising. Hypertension and diabetes are two of the most important test
cases for policies increasing integration. Both conditions are potentially long-lasting and
can lead to serious complications. Treatment for these conditions often involves more than
one physician, particularly a generalist and the most relevant specialist. Therefore if there
are clinical benefits to integration, one would expect this study to document them. On the
other hand, most physicians acquire scant on-the-job training in non-medical areas such as
management, accounting, and operations. Groups of very highly skilled and independent in-
dividuals like physicians may still lack the complementary abilities needed to achieve their
full potential. In my literature review I reported findings from the CTS that physicians
can be extremely difficult to manage and the supply of necessary leadership may be low.
Though the underlying data is now old, dating to the late 1990s, it is not clear that man-
aging physician organizations now is appreciably less complicated than it was then. This
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is a potentially important problem given the impact better management can have on hard
clinical outcomes like mortality (see Bloom et al., 2012, and the cites therein).
Because clinical and financial gains do not emerge from my data, my research strongly
suggests policymakers should decelerate initiatives that integrate generalist and specialist
physicians. In fact, I further recommend that health care policymakers reimplement the
analysis in this dissertation for a much wider range conditions to avoid extrapolating across
specialties. Though cardiology and endocrinology are important specialties, they differ from
other specialties such as gastroenterology and psychiatry along several important dimen-
sions, including reliance on procedures and comparative advantage of the generalist and
specialist. The analysis in my dissertation is proof of concept and highly scalable at min-
imal cost. The data sources I relied on for this project are easily accessible. The missing
data problems I needed to solve before computing any estimates seem much less severe
in newer releases of the data. Based on first-stage estimates, the differential distances in-
strument I employed for my analysis appears to work very well, and the weak instruments
problem caused by the inclusion of fixed effects may well disappear if physician demographic
data are utilized instead. Given the high costs of ineffectual policy and the relatively low
cost of scaling up this analysis, it seems impossible that generating a comprehensive set of
estimates would fail any reasonable cost-benefit calculation.
Though most of the implications of this research are dour, I do assume physicians will be
paid on a fee-for-service basis in my back-of-the-envelope calculations. This is a reasonable
assumption for the near future. Yet this also leaves room for the possibility that integration
induces beneficial outcomes under different contractual arrangements. My estimates are not
informative on this point. However, increasing cooperation between market participants and
scholars in health economics and allied fields provides some hope that the features of an
effective contract might be identified.3
3See http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3526936/ for an example of this research.
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APPENDIX A : Full-sample estimates
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Table 50: Primary specialist visit, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.013 0.000 0.115* -0.012 0.017 0.099
-1.5578 0.0166 1.8587 -1.0207 1.0209 1.1674
Severity 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.032***
7.4166 6.4125 7.4929 9.2295 9.0450 9.3042
Severity squared -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
-1.8903 -2.4353 -1.6450 -3.0610 -4.5398 -2.8362
Male -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.006* 0.001
-0.5669 1.0745 -0.4055 0.4932 1.6732 0.5823
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
-1.1130 -0.9580 -1.0891 0.8630 0.7970 0.9325
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
1.5159 1.5007 1.4427 -0.0862 -0.0457 -0.1857
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000
-1.2506 0.1392 0.2255 -1.4083 0.7829 -0.2306
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000
-0.3386 0.6409 -1.2106 0.0109 -1.9288 -0.5674
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.049*** -0.019** 0.411*** -0.042** -0.041*** 0.397**
-2.9671 -2.0813 3.2688 -2.3504 -2.6227 2.2112
Severity 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047***
10.3883 9.3661 10.7455 10.8632 9.3109 11.0365
Severity squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
-5.4014 -5.7622 -5.6966 -6.2086 -5.7775 -6.4443
Male -0.004* -0.003 -0.004 -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011***
-1.6551 -0.9126 -1.4025 -3.7544 -2.6727 -3.4587
Age -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004***
-4.4029 -4.1329 -4.7741 -2.7463 -2.1438 -2.9555
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.6978 2.7138 2.8924 1.0715 0.8636 1.1179
Distance to nearest specialist -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002***
-6.4333 -0.3221 -2.4966 -8.0346 -1.3510 -3.6696
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**
2.4738 1.1647 0.9977 4.0374 1.5962 2.5279
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 51: Primary specialist RVUs, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.115 -0.768** 0.709 0.181 -0.715 1.862
0.8114 -2.1075 0.5028 1.4184 -1.3990 1.3508
Severity 0.446*** 0.461*** 0.430*** 0.521*** 0.435*** 0.495***
6.3418 4.4826 6.0344 6.2632 2.8906 5.8232
Severity squared -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.018 -0.023***
-4.4724 -3.4253 -3.9487 -3.4478 -0.9929 -3.0215
Male 0.217*** 0.264*** 0.221*** 0.304*** 0.377*** 0.316***
3.6843 2.6841 3.7571 5.7829 4.8433 5.8003
Age -0.092*** -0.031 -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.059 -0.076***
-4.1687 -0.8577 -4.2878 -2.8973 -1.4092 -2.8630
Age squared 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001***
4.4263 0.9720 4.6497 3.2204 1.6830 3.1856
Distance to nearest specialist -0.015 -0.058 -0.013 -0.020** -0.006 -0.014*
-1.5499 -1.4009 -1.2538 -2.1081 -0.1676 -1.9000
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.002 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000*
2.5302 1.2188 2.2715 2.1914 0.3147 1.7199
F – – 67.6 – – 51.6
N 29,297 29,297 28,914 25,291 25,291 24,945
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.627*** -0.346 4.418 0.995*** 0.173 8.900
2.7095 -1.0035 1.0492 2.7619 0.4065 1.2265
Severity 0.770*** 0.551*** 0.770*** 1.38*** 1.17*** 1.39***
9.3668 7.1149 9.2893 13.489 9.912 13.638
Severity squared -0.015 0.003 -0.015 -0.051*** -0.033*** -0.052***
-1.0053 0.1860 -1.0113 -4.6811 -2.7691 -4.7690
Male -0.050 -0.100 -0.036 -0.100 -0.232 -0.095
-0.8209 -1.2935 -0.5706 -0.8493 -1.5407 -0.7452
Age -0.265*** -0.166*** -0.265*** -0.362*** -0.370*** -0.382***
-9.0487 -3.4553 -9.4635 -8.3788 -4.6334 -8.6392
Age squared 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
7.9979 3.0549 8.3660 7.1437 4.0338 7.3637
Distance to nearest specialist -0.025*** -0.002 -0.020** -0.038*** -0.049 -0.025
-4.1299 -0.0746 -2.4712 -4.7324 -0.8737 -1.6230
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*
3.4199 -0.4175 2.7525 3.3874 0.9638 1.7036
F – – 22.6 – – 21.3
N 49,719 49,719 49,136 45,382 45,382 44,775
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 52: Generalist RVUs, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.516*** 0.044 1.314*** -0.620*** 0.225* 1.784***
-7.8311 0.6890 3.3685 -6.4062 1.7899 3.2531
Severity 0.059*** 0.015 0.054*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.080***
3.8077 0.9491 2.9755 3.6206 2.6296 3.0253
Severity squared -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004
-0.8323 0.3507 -0.2939 -1.6084 -1.2850 -1.2847
Male -0.015 -0.001 -0.015 0.037 0.074** 0.036
-0.9242 -0.0595 -0.9312 1.1524 2.2553 1.0701
Age -0.010* -0.003 -0.010* 0.018 0.023* 0.016
-1.7958 -0.3781 -1.8547 1.6083 1.9037 1.5259
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
1.3709 0.6776 1.3534 -0.8954 -0.8623 -0.8046
Distance to nearest specialist -0.026*** -0.006 -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.012 -0.020***
-9.9631 -0.8612 -5.2159 -7.4358 -0.7582 -3.9925
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000
5.1907 0.8308 2.7761 3.2357 -0.5231 1.4219
F – – 52.6 – – 48.3
N 183,467 183,467 180,545 114,544 114,544 112,706
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.540*** -0.065 0.667 -0.710*** 0.115 -0.822
-7.5129 -0.8543 1.0484 -5.4434 0.8646 -0.5163
Severity 0.186*** 0.155*** 0.186*** 0.308*** 0.254*** 0.310***
10.0154 10.4053 9.5053 9.4560 10.6724 8.8224
Severity squared -0.007** -0.006*** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.012***
-2.3476 -2.7798 -2.2313 -2.7834 -2.8393 -2.6220
Male 0.105*** 0.122*** 0.102*** 0.205*** 0.219*** 0.198***
3.9329 4.9181 3.7647 5.0411 7.6129 5.0232
Age 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.057***
0.3873 0.8209 0.4925 2.6661 2.8591 2.6729
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.001** -0.001**
-0.5367 -0.5967 -0.6656 -2.2944 -2.3119 -2.3418
Distance to nearest specialist -0.012*** -0.008 -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.027* -0.013*
-4.6591 -1.3299 -2.9266 -2.6092 -1.8024 -1.6510
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.3306 1.0571 1.6143 0.9309 1.5639 0.5780
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,653 188,653 185,669 130,198 130,198 128,002
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 53: Any outpatient visit, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.003 -0.007 -0.081*** -0.002 -0.008 -0.131***
-0.6830 -0.8194 -3.8415 -0.3023 -0.9343 -4.1249
Severity 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005***
1.8294 1.9593 1.8970 4.4204 4.8593 4.6121
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
1.0219 0.0480 0.9182 -0.0344 -1.8132 -0.2186
Male -0.002** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.003*
-2.4416 -1.2185 -2.7345 -1.6235 -0.7781 -1.7595
Age -0.001** -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
-2.0116 -0.9616 -1.9109 -1.4796 -0.2272 -1.4555
Age squared 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.7180 0.7068 1.6116 1.3623 0.1633 1.3638
Distance to nearest specialist 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001
3.5183 0.6550 1.6261 3.3481 -0.0839 1.4355
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.3998 1.2718 0.4728 -0.5513 1.2047 0.3302
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.003 -0.010 -0.215*** -0.004 -0.025* -0.313***
-0.3233 -0.8645 -3.3518 -0.3584 -1.8709 -3.7822
Severity 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.016***
5.8976 7.1256 5.3855 8.3122 9.8960 7.5407
Severity squared -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
-2.0696 -2.8891 -1.8094 -3.8491 -4.8736 -3.2153
Male -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.000 -0.004***
-3.0076 -0.2471 -3.1041 -2.7083 -0.0320 -2.7198
Age -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.001
-2.0266 -1.2397 -1.5968 -1.8094 -1.8840 -1.5067
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.6242 0.8291 1.3579 1.6203 1.5449 1.4335
Distance to nearest specialist 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.001***
6.2358 1.6167 3.5067 6.4365 0.2725 3.2136
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000**
-4.2203 -1.4894 -2.6204 -4.4427 0.1172 -2.5338
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 54: Outpatient RVUs, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.47** -5.88 3.30 -0.46** 1.29 3.62
-2.350 -0.853 1.338 -2.551 0.941 1.637
Severity 0.389*** 0.195 0.260** 0.351** 0.193 0.236*
3.0762 0.6553 1.9935 2.3561 0.5030 1.7876
Severity squared 0.000 0.040 0.022 0.006 0.031 0.027
0.0208 0.7505 1.1152 0.2562 0.4491 1.3921
Male -0.150 -0.068 -0.162 -0.050 0.025 -0.048
-1.1087 -0.2575 -1.1707 -0.3435 0.0962 -0.3225
Age -0.040 -0.176 -0.023 -0.069 -0.103 -0.072
-0.6453 -1.5062 -0.3255 -1.0135 -0.5926 -1.0021
Age squared 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.2980 1.4783 -0.0188 0.6473 0.5641 0.6121
Distance to nearest specialist -0.048*** 0.090 -0.036** -0.047*** 0.274 -0.033*
-3.0347 0.2420 -2.2132 -3.0628 0.9829 -1.9028
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000
1.4733 0.0356 0.8518 1.3824 -1.0220 0.5653
F – – 28.5 – – 27.5
N 6,048 6,048 5,874 5,539 5,539 5,373
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.65* -2.41* 10.14** -0.547** -0.379 3.189
-1.951 -1.790 2.030 -2.1792 -0.2842 0.5328
Severity 1.03*** 0.39 1.15*** 0.972*** 0.202 1.021***
5.428 1.411 6.089 5.7105 0.3752 5.8210
Severity squared -0.052*** -0.029 -0.059*** -0.024 0.026 -0.026
-4.0023 -1.2381 -3.9734 -1.3434 0.4600 -1.3595
Male 0.731*** 0.712* 0.777*** 0.644*** 0.826* 0.662***
2.8910 1.6813 3.0149 2.9353 1.8636 2.9297
Age -0.029 0.074 -0.024 0.073 0.670** 0.082
-0.3021 0.3613 -0.2363 0.9104 1.9869 0.9693
Age squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.006* -0.001
0.2917 -0.2062 0.2156 -0.9293 -1.9133 -0.9938
Distance to nearest specialist -0.041*** -0.046 -0.006 -0.035*** 0.109 -0.022
-2.6918 -0.2494 -0.2334 -2.9464 1.3886 -1.0523
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.001 0.000 0.000* -0.003 0.000
2.0122 0.1580 0.5369 1.7867 -1.6197 1.1025
F – – 20.0 – – 27.2
N 11,036 11,036 10,768 10,789 10,789 10,504
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 55: Any new cardiovascular prescription, full sample
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.003 0.003 0.191* 0.003 0.010 0.149
0.3487 0.3037 1.9476 0.3835 0.5957 1.2263
Severity 0.250*** 0.264*** 0.250*** 0.254*** 0.277*** 0.254***
20.7245 20.1813 20.5839 29.1518 29.8085 29.0214
Severity squared -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.021***
-10.8831 -10.8842 -10.7604 -15.3139 -16.9706 -15.0855
Male 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036***
8.3540 6.4379 8.0643 6.8944 5.3762 6.6959
Age 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
6.4583 5.8946 6.6942 4.6668 5.3543 4.5236
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-8.1335 -7.6811 -8.4191 -6.6150 -7.5880 -6.4511
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.003** 0.001* -0.000 0.001 0.001
0.1922 2.3444 1.7707 -0.2026 0.5264 0.7894
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000*
-1.3569 -2.6949 -2.3528 -0.8971 0.0816 -1.8610
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.008 0.013 0.031 0.007 -0.005 -0.023
1.1363 0.7345 0.4621 1.2027 -0.2385 -0.2906
Severity 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.060***
8.0071 4.9654 7.9371 11.5580 14.5721 11.8846
Severity squared -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
-3.4169 -2.1672 -3.3634 -5.8719 -7.3658 -5.9398
Male 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.020***
5.1870 3.7692 5.2936 5.8089 3.1559 6.0583
Age 0.001 -0.001 0.002* 0.000 -0.001 0.000
1.4950 -0.2911 1.7152 0.1388 -0.3260 0.0756
Age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
-1.4330 0.3332 -1.6750 0.0573 0.5940 0.1301
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
-0.1221 -0.1486 -0.1561 -0.8822 -1.3300 -0.8988
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4393 0.7447 0.5369 1.0042 1.1406 0.7325
F – – 8.5 – – 17.8
N 30,046 30,046 29,654 25,924 25,924 25,569
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 56: Inpatient admission, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.001* 0.001 0.003 -0.002* 0.002 0.017*
-1.8231 0.3018 0.2956 -1.7608 0.5926 1.6749
Severity 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
5.7489 6.7284 5.5657 4.4685 4.2897 4.3987
Severity squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001**
0.1595 -0.2038 0.2452 2.0910 1.0081 2.2255
Male 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
4.4119 4.8486 4.3467 5.1932 4.5535 5.1437
Age -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000***
-1.3047 -2.4722 -1.2163 -2.6117 -3.5466 -2.6110
Age squared 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
2.2893 3.3922 2.1866 3.9681 5.1348 3.9297
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-2.0515 0.0982 -1.3565 -1.5380 -1.3444 -0.3278
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
1.0040 -0.7686 0.8083 0.5961 1.1014 -0.0083
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus patients, full sample
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.002 -0.004 -0.042*** -0.002 0.008 0.009
-1.3618 -1.0219 -2.8192 -0.6743 1.6288 0.2652
Severity 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.020***
13.2381 11.8198 12.8710 14.6300 10.9812 15.1202
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2221 0.7144 1.1576 0.7549 1.0789 0.5958
Male 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010***
11.0817 9.4988 11.0195 12.5368 6.2211 13.0584
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002***
-6.1414 -6.6997 -6.0587 -3.7763 -2.1813 -3.7988
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***
6.2302 6.8683 6.1376 3.9237 2.4545 3.9180
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* -0.001 -0.000
-1.4497 -0.0577 -2.4768 -1.9534 -1.4445 -1.1888
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.3715 -0.6302 0.8842 1.6410 1.4304 1.0373
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 57: Physician cost, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 2.81 6.25 63.87 6.6 29.1*** 97.0*
0.703 1.449 1.335 1.31 3.30 1.77
Severity 5.98*** 4.94*** 5.77*** 9.48*** 9.84*** 9.34***
5.555 4.331 5.488 6.587 5.739 6.429
Severity squared -0.248** -0.299* -0.206** -0.402** -0.420* -0.365*
-2.3494 -1.8981 -1.9732 -2.0880 -1.7479 -1.8213
Male 1.89* 2.95** 1.89* 7.38*** 10.66*** 7.32***
1.654 2.000 1.655 3.230 3.629 3.145
Age 0.581* 0.937** 0.593* 3.54*** 3.51*** 3.48***
1.8983 2.3698 1.9281 4.505 4.319 4.523
Age squared -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.037***
-3.3082 -2.9189 -3.3028 -4.4163 -3.9291 -4.4337
Distance to nearest specialist -1.138*** -0.957 -0.866*** -1.48*** -0.70 -1.09***
-5.1959 -1.5463 -3.6119 -5.431 -0.634 -3.654
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.012*** 0.015 0.010** 0.015*** -0.007 0.012**
3.6066 1.0094 2.5324 3.2576 -0.5412 2.4116
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 16.2*** -21.8** 246.6** 31.1*** -44.6* 307.3**
2.99 -2.09 2.54 2.87 -1.68 2.03
Severity 38.4*** 35.6*** 38.8*** 76.6*** 72.6*** 77.8***
12.88 10.43 12.85 10.58 8.97 10.58
Severity squared -1.57*** -1.53*** -1.60*** -3.53*** -3.27*** -3.60***
-4.850 -5.734 -4.812 -8.599 -7.119 -8.600
Male 5.49** 2.82 5.34** 5.12 -2.89 4.47
2.319 0.945 2.339 1.372 -0.541 1.189
Age -8.40*** -7.38*** -8.57*** -12.7*** -12.8*** -13.1***
-5.709 -3.476 -5.848 -5.66 -4.69 -5.88
Age squared 0.059*** 0.051** 0.060*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.086***
4.0993 2.5063 4.2124 3.7247 3.4581 3.8708
Distance to nearest specialist -0.878*** -0.625 -0.356 -1.78*** -1.77 -1.06**
-3.9712 -0.9180 -1.3978 -3.584 -1.063 -2.140
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.008*** 0.015* 0.006** 0.015** 0.032* 0.012**
3.1702 1.9512 2.1368 2.5130 1.6499 2.0408
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 58: Outpatient cost, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -4.37* 1.38 -43.46*** -5.52 0.52 -64.02***
-1.838 0.351 -2.697 -1.522 0.100 -3.017
Severity 0.078 3.756** -0.139 0.294 7.961** -0.111
0.0201 2.0711 -0.0367 0.0510 2.1646 -0.0198
Severity squared 1.13 0.24 1.14 1.69 0.20 1.73
1.547 0.703 1.589 1.548 0.367 1.609
Male -1.69 -1.56 -2.19* -1.25 -0.96 -1.95
-1.412 -1.376 -1.873 -0.757 -0.485 -1.246
Age 0.453 0.678 0.547 0.511 1.180 0.578
0.9325 1.2024 1.2227 0.7276 1.6419 0.8866
Age squared -0.007 -0.009 -0.008* -0.008 -0.014* -0.009
-1.3008 -1.4288 -1.6688 -1.0454 -1.8230 -1.3037
Distance to nearest specialist 0.403** 0.941 0.194 0.289 -0.161 0.007
2.1828 0.8963 0.9109 1.0234 -0.0948 0.0237
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.004
0.0667 0.4863 0.3258 0.6927 0.5296 1.0377
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -3.09 -1.20 -47.04 0.75 4.14 -197.05
-0.440 -0.218 -0.530 0.076 0.469 -1.063
Severity 12.6*** 10.3*** 12.7*** 13.0 7.3 12.6
5.47 2.59 5.52 1.31 0.58 1.26
Severity squared -0.055 0.155 -0.047 1.96 2.30 2.05
-0.1477 0.2732 -0.1241 1.073 1.019 1.109
Male 9.84*** 9.97*** 10.01*** 10.9*** 8.1** 11.2***
3.319 3.486 3.321 2.67 2.06 2.73
Age 0.215 0.391 0.266 -1.67* -0.34 -1.52
0.2342 0.2839 0.2869 -1.698 -0.222 -1.569
Age squared -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 0.011 0.001 0.010
-0.7277 -0.4544 -0.7646 1.0854 0.0564 0.9799
Distance to nearest specialist 0.406 0.067 0.306 1.029*** -0.444 0.548
1.3896 0.1196 0.8886 3.1464 -0.3612 1.1908
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.010*** -0.001 -0.007
-1.0825 -0.8783 -0.7795 -2.7419 -0.0345 -1.6142
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
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Table 59: Pharmacy cost (hypertension), full sample
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 17.6 9.6 224.0** 35.3 75.8 381.6
1.40 0.43 2.39 1.11 0.81 1.33
Severity 616.8*** 637.0*** 616.0*** 1136.8*** 1181.0*** 1137.7***
23.32 24.27 23.38 29.58 36.18 29.57
Severity squared -40.9*** -43.8*** -40.7*** -74.8*** -82.2*** -74.6***
-11.84 -11.62 -11.79 -15.25 -18.01 -15.04
Male 137.2*** 136.6*** 138.0*** 246.7*** 233.4*** 246.7***
18.49 15.83 19.50 13.66 10.69 13.80
Age 13.7*** 13.4*** 13.5*** 27.7*** 31.2*** 27.6***
4.78 4.59 4.89 5.16 5.22 4.99
Age squared -0.138*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.281*** -0.329*** -0.281***
-4.0847 -3.9423 -4.1383 -4.4553 -5.0510 -4.2601
Distance to nearest specialist -1.67 5.81*** -0.40 -3.59 8.97** -1.48
-1.480 2.633 -0.341 -1.451 2.215 -0.640
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.009 -0.095** -0.004 0.005 -0.164** -0.018
0.4843 -2.3517 -0.1845 0.1870 -2.1938 -0.6537
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
126
Table 60: Total cost, full sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 16.0 17.2 244.4** 36.4 105.4 414.6
1.21 0.69 2.12 1.13 1.08 1.35
Severity 622.9*** 645.7*** 621.7*** 1146.6*** 1198.8*** 1147.0***
24.58 24.98 24.60 29.77 36.42 29.68
Severity squared -40.0*** -43.8*** -39.7*** -73.5*** -82.5*** -73.2***
-12.09 -11.88 -12.03 -14.45 -18.77 -14.22
Male 137.4*** 138.0*** 137.7*** 252.8*** 243.2*** 252.1***
19.14 15.94 20.04 13.98 11.28 13.90
Age 14.7*** 15.0*** 14.6*** 31.7*** 35.9*** 31.6***
4.49 4.43 4.60 5.36 5.73 5.20
Age squared -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.327*** -0.377*** -0.327***
-4.0747 -3.9383 -4.1411 -4.7825 -5.5586 -4.5938
Distance to nearest specialist -2.41** 5.80*** -1.07 -4.77** 8.11* -2.56
-2.228 2.755 -0.989 -1.979 1.723 -1.194
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.021 -0.065 0.007 0.024 -0.162** -0.003
1.1706 -1.4752 0.3532 0.8539 -2.0812 -0.0977
F – – 52.8 – – 48.3
N 183,640 183,640 180,714 114,644 114,644 112,803
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 13.1 -23.0** 199.5*** 31.8** -40.5 110.3
1.52 -1.97 2.59 2.35 -1.50 0.85
Severity 51.0*** 45.8*** 51.4*** 89.6*** 79.8*** 90.3***
13.05 10.04 12.91 7.86 5.12 7.99
Severity squared -1.62*** -1.37** -1.64*** -1.56 -0.97 -1.56
-2.601 -2.045 -2.605 -0.858 -0.390 -0.856
Male 15.3*** 12.8*** 15.3*** 16.0*** 5.2 15.7***
3.84 3.13 3.83 3.16 0.82 3.18
Age -8.18*** -6.98*** -8.31*** -14.4*** -13.2*** -14.6***
-4.179 -2.586 -4.139 -6.29 -4.33 -6.37
Age squared 0.051** 0.045* 0.052** 0.094*** 0.087*** 0.096***
2.5144 1.6812 2.5081 3.8333 3.0242 3.9262
Distance to nearest specialist -0.472 -0.559 -0.050 -0.751 -2.216 -0.517
-1.3190 -0.7983 -0.1306 -1.4337 -1.0896 -0.7947
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.032 0.005
1.2263 0.6831 0.7718 0.7573 1.1109 0.6665
F – – 23.7 – – 20.6
N 188,681 188,681 185,697 130,217 130,217 128,021
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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APPENDIX B : Low-access estimates
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Table 61: Primary specialist visit, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.018 -0.009 0.125 -0.027 -0.023 0.104
-1.3269 -0.5387 1.4187 -1.3438 -0.7105 0.8562
Severity 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.028***
5.4229 5.5473 4.4733 5.2170 5.8311 4.9952
Severity squared -0.001 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001
-1.2702 -2.1450 -0.6540 -1.6657 -3.3311 -1.0437
Male -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
-0.6130 -0.4334 -0.6142 -0.0999 -0.1646 -0.1775
Age -0.002* -0.002 -0.003* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-1.7805 -1.0354 -1.7842 -0.7964 -0.6599 -0.7817
Age squared 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.1414 1.3594 2.0977 1.3568 1.1993 1.3373
Distance to nearest specialist -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.002** -0.005 -0.001*
-1.8380 -0.1148 -1.1297 -2.4821 -1.0984 -1.8647
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
0.7884 1.5443 0.2969 1.7008 0.9061 1.2557
F – – 52.3 – – 43.8
N 61,203 61,203 59,698 38,210 38,210 37,270
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.049*** -0.017 0.519*** -0.045 -0.043 0.719***
-2.9671 -0.8174 4.3834 -1.6026 -1.5696 3.5642
Severity 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.037***
10.3883 6.6008 7.2401 6.9992 6.2522 7.1936
Severity squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002***
-5.4014 -3.2262 -3.4430 -2.8292 -2.3724 -3.0949
Male -0.004* -0.003 -0.004 -0.010*** -0.008 -0.012***
-1.6551 -0.6375 -1.0923 -2.5821 -1.1029 -2.7507
Age -0.004*** -0.003** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007***
-4.4029 -2.1713 -3.0496 -3.1908 -2.8513 -3.4109
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000**
2.6978 1.3825 1.9747 2.0375 1.7516 2.1466
Distance to nearest specialist -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003 -0.001
-6.4333 -0.2948 -1.0174 -7.2567 -1.2837 -1.4336
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000
2.4738 0.7716 0.1993 5.5276 1.8404 1.5329
F – – 17.3 – – 14.5
N 188,681 62,869 60,727 43,396 43,396 41,829
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 62: Primary specialist RVUs, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.065 -0.057 -1.572 0.046 -0.420 1.093
0.2905 -0.0916 -1.2886 0.1841 -0.5808 0.5685
Severity 0.390*** 0.283*** 0.415*** 0.471*** 0.420*** 0.438***
7.4091 2.7276 6.8049 5.7079 3.3519 6.0806
Severity squared -0.025*** -0.025* -0.030*** -0.021** -0.025** -0.017**
-4.0528 -1.8603 -4.3695 -2.3039 -2.1353 -2.0162
Male 0.097 0.249** 0.088 0.219** 0.343*** 0.225***
1.4207 2.5052 1.3584 2.5299 3.3367 2.5947
Age -0.047 -0.046 -0.051 -0.040 -0.077 -0.038
-1.2673 -0.8182 -1.4248 -0.6531 -1.6412 -0.6390
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.001
1.4483 1.0744 1.6166 0.9220 2.0331 0.9094
Distance to nearest specialist 0.007 -0.086 0.005 0.004 -0.143 0.005
0.6077 -1.3748 0.3991 0.4374 -1.0850 0.4522
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
0.6787 1.9279 0.6997 0.3877 1.3144 0.1127
F – – 30.6 – – 24.9
N 9,765 9,765 9,587 8,430 8,430 8,274
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.592* -0.226 7.672 0.934* 0.739 13.153
1.6915 -0.6233 1.0621 1.7820 0.8900 1.1024
Severity 0.754*** 0.572*** 0.778*** 1.14*** 0.97*** 1.16***
9.9105 5.5227 10.0285 11.379 6.189 12.824
Severity squared -0.028*** -0.012 -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.033** -0.039***
-3.2173 -1.0607 -3.4965 -2.6479 -2.3553 -3.1642
Male 0.017 -0.019 0.059 0.027 -0.170 0.037
0.1723 -0.0967 0.4767 0.1832 -0.5543 0.2087
Age -0.237*** -0.165*** -0.237*** -0.300*** -0.433*** -0.329***
-5.9918 -2.8612 -6.1758 -3.5542 -2.7916 -3.4470
Age squared 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004** 0.003***
5.4009 2.4620 5.5018 2.9085 2.4917 2.8461
Distance to nearest specialist -0.025*** 0.064** -0.014 -0.038*** -0.041 -0.020
-2.7022 2.5018 -1.1738 -2.6719 -0.3077 -0.9782
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000
2.1805 -3.0700 1.3301 2.0111 0.1259 0.8909
F – – 13.6 – – 16.1
N 16,573 16,573 16,183 15,127 15,127 14,716
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 63: Generalist RVUs, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.397*** 0.237** 0.227 -0.503*** 0.589* 1.129
-7.9392 2.5436 0.5673 -6.0699 1.9525 1.5361
Severity 0.059*** 0.023 0.052** 0.120*** 0.125** 0.111**
2.7529 0.8913 2.3037 3.0096 2.3156 2.2616
Severity squared -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008* -0.012** -0.005
-1.1786 -0.4355 -0.7141 -1.8702 -1.9979 -0.8853
Male -0.026 -0.013 -0.035* 0.013 0.070 0.004
-1.3425 -0.5380 -1.8461 0.2806 1.0448 0.0934
Age -0.017** -0.010 -0.018** -0.002 0.020 -0.008
-2.1209 -0.7610 -2.2111 -0.0908 1.1731 -0.4419
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
1.4761 0.6268 1.5425 0.2277 -0.8384 0.5866
Distance to nearest specialist -0.025*** 0.004 -0.023*** -0.027*** 0.014 -0.022***
-5.7956 0.2721 -5.5464 -4.3405 0.3539 -3.4960
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** -0.001 0.000*
3.5086 0.5290 3.3098 2.3499 -0.8247 1.6471
F – – 52.3 – – 43.9
N 61,153 61,153 59,648 38,166 38,166 37,226
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.389*** 0.170 1.249 -0.650*** 0.644*** 2.344
-4.6661 1.2086 0.7965 -3.8639 2.9420 0.9167
Severity 0.158*** 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.280*** 0.258*** 0.277***
7.7044 7.2175 6.5322 6.4967 5.0771 6.1402
Severity squared -0.004 -0.005* -0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -0.010
-1.2487 -1.6956 -0.9340 -1.3143 -0.8936 -1.1834
Male 0.097*** 0.159*** 0.086** 0.138** 0.226*** 0.119**
2.8559 5.0095 2.4535 2.4847 3.0235 1.9800
Age -0.013 -0.011 -0.010 0.021 0.069** 0.024
-0.7817 -0.5920 -0.5748 0.6817 2.0640 0.7219
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000
0.7217 0.7830 0.5237 -0.4069 -1.7371 -0.4958
Distance to nearest specialist -0.010*** -0.001 -0.006 -0.011** -0.017 -0.002
-3.9958 -0.0746 -1.2802 -2.2156 -0.5790 -0.2061
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
2.6240 0.0892 0.9399 1.0906 0.8802 -0.1574
F – – 17.3 – – 14.5
N 62,863 62,863 60,721 43,394 43,394 41,827
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 64: Any outpatient visit, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.005 0.017 -0.004 -0.006 0.015 -0.034
-0.9936 1.3852 -0.1479 -0.6243 0.9734 -0.8124
Severity 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005** 0.004
0.4406 1.3848 0.2503 1.3410 2.3626 1.3637
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
1.0616 0.2551 1.1181 0.6943 -0.6654 0.6459
Male -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
-1.2066 -0.1560 -1.4278 -0.4689 -1.0016 -0.5668
Age -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
-1.1632 0.0019 -1.0044 -1.5330 0.2526 -1.2449
Age squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
0.8584 -0.3541 0.6904 1.3500 -0.4078 1.0288
Distance to nearest specialist 0.001*** -0.001 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.001 0.002***
3.4107 -1.0491 3.0579 3.3268 -0.2558 2.8992
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-1.1948 2.2791 -1.1224 -1.3383 -0.1689 -1.2436
F – – 52.3 – – 43.8
N 61,203 61,203 59,698 38,210 38,210 37,270
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.001 -0.026 -0.266** -0.003 -0.042 -0.355***
-0.0536 -1.4985 -2.4674 -0.1903 -1.6409 -2.6169
Severity 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.019***
6.0508 5.7896 5.0020 6.7563 7.1256 6.4989
Severity squared -0.001** -0.001** -0.000* -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001**
-2.5428 -2.4668 -1.8755 -2.4401 -2.9818 -2.2197
Male -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.000
-0.5976 0.0138 -0.5418 -0.0328 0.7908 0.1529
Age -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
-1.9987 -0.4652 -1.6175 -0.4867 -0.2302 -0.1381
Age squared 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.6494 0.2355 1.4274 0.3837 0.0470 0.1069
Distance to nearest specialist 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.002***
5.8756 2.6187 2.5763 6.6363 2.4300 3.1875
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000**
-4.0778 -2.0928 -2.0010 -4.6201 -1.0646 -2.5030
F – – 17.3 – – 14.5
N 62,869 62,869 60,727 43,396 43,396 41,829
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 65: Outpatient RVU, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.15 11.78 -1.98 -0.303 0.000 -0.464
-0.283 1.054 -0.635 -0.5609 nan -0.1394
Severity 0.541*** 0.645 0.656*** 0.496** 0.960** 0.520*
3.7746 1.5016 2.6793 2.5766 2.0059 1.6779
Severity squared -0.020 -0.007 -0.038 -0.014 -0.090 -0.016
-1.6184 -0.0914 -1.0794 -0.8018 -1.6168 -0.3827
Male -0.172 0.350 -0.260 0.002 0.325 -0.118
-0.7196 0.7148 -1.3163 0.0081 0.6566 -0.5622
Age -0.101 -0.031 -0.106 -0.076 0.047 -0.078
-1.2172 -0.1811 -1.2337 -0.6601 0.2013 -0.6951
Age squared 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001
1.0355 0.2704 0.9935 0.5960 -0.1441 0.5916
Distance to nearest specialist -0.065*** 0.371 -0.063*** -0.083*** 0.750 -0.077***
-2.5784 0.3760 -2.6056 -3.0897 0.7540 -2.9553
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.001** -0.011 0.000*
1.5159 -0.2040 1.3039 2.2071 -0.8086 1.6901
F – – 7.3 – – 7.1
N 2,016 2,016 1,909 1,846 1,846 1,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.331 -3.596** 0.510 -0.45 -4.88 7.83
-0.7195 -2.3670 0.0390 -1.099 -0.750 1.262
Severity 0.968*** 0.281 0.990*** 0.733*** -1.017 0.817***
4.2563 0.9446 3.6016 2.6920 -1.5619 2.6532
Severity squared -0.073*** -0.050 -0.073** -0.024 0.151** -0.030
-3.1002 -0.8376 -2.5338 -0.6903 2.1782 -0.7490
Male 0.252 0.145 0.271 0.385* 0.361 0.449*
0.8944 0.4101 0.7142 1.7177 1.2182 1.8459
Age -0.078 -0.163 -0.089 -0.042 0.343 -0.082
-0.6206 -0.8190 -0.7838 -0.2804 1.6037 -0.5825
Age squared 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001
0.3969 0.8611 0.5229 0.0947 -1.5419 0.3754
Distance to nearest specialist -0.011 0.324 -0.001 -0.004 -0.776 0.026
-0.4221 0.8449 -0.0276 -0.2014 -1.4463 0.7740
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.012 -0.000 -0.000 0.006 -0.000
0.1544 -1.2304 -0.1168 -0.5143 0.6945 -1.0965
F – – 8.3 – – 10.8
N 3,678 3,678 3,478 3,591 3,591 3,384
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
133
Table 66: Any new cardiovascular prescription, low-access sample
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.011 -0.009 -0.005 0.013 0.026 -0.044
0.8374 -0.4416 -0.0350 0.8229 0.8118 -0.2468
Severity 0.264*** 0.276*** 0.264*** 0.262*** 0.286*** 0.262***
21.3476 23.1028 22.0441 18.9042 22.5953 20.4617
Severity squared -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.023***
-12.0505 -14.5327 -12.0683 -9.8729 -12.6244 -10.3029
Male 0.037*** 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.039***
7.7441 4.5584 7.7859 6.9136 6.2517 6.8874
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007***
4.6134 4.7477 4.2563 3.5550 3.7787 3.2300
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-5.9562 -6.3168 -5.6196 -4.9881 -5.8144 -4.6885
Distance to nearest specialist -0.002* -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002**
-1.9565 -0.3123 -2.0113 -2.0908 -0.0949 -2.3442
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.8192 -0.4788 0.9324 1.1711 0.0952 1.3370
F – – 52.3 – – 43.8
N 61,203 61,203 59,698 38,210 38,210 37,270
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.011 0.026 -0.067 -0.003 -0.013 -0.105
-0.8552 1.4388 -0.5997 -0.2781 -0.4172 -0.9684
Severity 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.059***
6.9481 6.1577 6.9420 7.3028 5.1597 7.6412
Severity squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
-2.8299 -3.7489 -3.0396 -3.4635 -3.4036 -3.8211
Male 0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 0.015*** 0.013** 0.015***
2.0165 1.9648 2.0774 3.7095 2.1122 3.8218
Age 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002
1.0819 0.3608 1.0877 1.5669 0.1194 1.3259
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
-0.9758 -0.3935 -0.9946 -1.2743 0.1594 -1.0441
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.009* 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
0.4276 1.7789 0.1681 0.2365 0.3827 0.0884
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
-0.2143 -1.0043 0.0498 -0.1886 0.1003 -0.5245
F – – 5.1 – – 7.2
N 10,008 10,008 9,826 8,632 8,632 8,473
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 67: Inpatient admission, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.002 0.004 -0.006 -0.004* 0.004 -0.014
-1.3270 1.0747 -0.7908 -1.7349 0.5496 -0.9512
Severity 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.004* 0.005** 0.003*
1.1473 1.7153 1.1294 1.8779 2.1332 1.8548
Severity squared 0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001 0.001***
1.6361 0.8964 1.6620 3.0363 1.3397 3.1999
Male 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***
3.1959 2.6337 3.1266 4.5630 2.7925 4.5823
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-0.4726 -1.0778 -0.4288 -0.3048 -0.0390 -0.3250
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2699 1.5936 1.2180 1.0880 0.6630 1.0971
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.001* -0.000**
-1.4201 0.5728 -1.6205 -2.5656 -1.6872 -2.2576
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
0.5002 -0.8083 0.7027 1.7055 1.2407 1.7016
F – – 52.3 – – 43.8
N 61,203 61,203 59,698 38,210 38,210 37,270
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.084
0.1729 -0.1934 0.0527 -0.5673 0.8486 1.2324
Severity 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.021***
9.0202 6.3866 8.6207 11.7315 7.4736 12.7353
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
0.8976 0.9136 0.6402 -0.0325 -0.2740 -0.4754
Male 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.008***
4.0945 2.7273 4.1861 5.0446 2.1283 5.5995
Age -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001 0.000 -0.001
-2.1476 -2.5407 -1.9643 -1.3465 0.5354 -1.3552
Age squared 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000
2.1885 2.5952 2.0228 1.3811 -0.4939 1.3508
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.8705 1.0731 0.7319 0.6033 0.1014 1.3412
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
-1.0355 -1.2688 -0.9819 -0.4413 0.2752 -1.2327
F – – 17.3 – – 14.5
N 62,869 62,869 60,727 43,396 43,396 41,829
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
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Table 68: Physician cost, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 3.12 14.98*** -9.60 0.8 42.2*** 60.6
0.758 2.982 -0.194 0.15 3.09 0.98
Severity 6.40*** 4.37*** 6.35*** 11.8*** 13.8*** 11.6***
5.124 3.196 4.885 6.24 5.60 6.16
Severity squared -0.561*** -0.405* -0.559*** -0.742*** -1.127*** -0.643**
-3.2750 -1.8736 -3.0483 -2.9831 -3.4236 -2.3161
Male -1.29 0.18 -1.69 1.84 6.59* 1.33
-0.792 0.089 -1.089 0.834 1.704 0.590
Age 0.239 0.781 0.255 2.52*** 3.24*** 2.24**
0.5480 1.2967 0.5726 2.593 3.025 2.403
Age squared -0.009** -0.011* -0.009** -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.028***
-1.9853 -1.7951 -2.0024 -3.1581 -3.1681 -3.0161
Distance to nearest specialist -1.31*** 1.08 -1.34*** -1.53*** 1.51 -1.34***
-5.142 0.913 -4.944 -4.835 0.713 -3.922
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.014*** 0.003 0.014*** 0.016*** -0.031 0.014***
3.8968 0.2018 3.9520 3.5916 -0.9523 3.0271
F – – 52.3 – – 43.8
N 61,203 61,203 59,698 38,210 38,210 37,270
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 17.8** -6.1 271.2** 12.9 -8.3 438.4
2.06 -0.40 2.11 1.01 -0.26 1.42
Severity 34.3*** 31.6*** 35.1*** 65.4*** 65.8*** 66.7***
6.84 5.21 7.03 5.23 4.08 5.28
Severity squared -1.72*** -1.42*** -1.83*** -3.00*** -2.82** -3.11***
-4.219 -3.035 -4.665 -3.318 -2.214 -3.488
Male 6.21** 4.98 4.89* 4.84 3.55 2.49
2.476 1.264 1.907 0.887 0.411 0.434
Age -8.03*** -7.13** -8.21*** -15.8*** -21.4*** -16.3***
-3.434 -2.234 -3.502 -4.33 -5.51 -4.41
Age squared 0.054** 0.051 0.056** 0.111*** 0.169*** 0.116***
2.3667 1.6261 2.4231 3.0052 4.4030 3.0511
Distance to nearest specialist -0.665** 0.391 -0.093 -1.578*** 0.100 -0.569
-2.4518 0.4175 -0.2244 -2.8911 0.0414 -0.5598
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.008*** 0.009 0.005 0.016*** 0.028 0.010
2.7459 0.9871 1.4239 2.6948 1.1099 1.2595
F – – 17.3 – – 14.5
N 62,869 62,869 60,727 43,396 43,396 41,829
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 69: Outpatient cost, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -2.02 9.54 -46.61* -1.41 8.12 -49.06
-0.288 1.114 -1.677 -0.118 0.763 -1.345
Severity -1.14 5.98 -1.66 -0.82 10.94* -1.40
-0.136 1.435 -0.210 -0.076 1.811 -0.138
Severity squared 1.67 0.41 1.68 2.26 0.14 2.26
1.163 0.699 1.237 1.258 0.165 1.344
Male -0.61 -1.02 -1.90 3.40 -1.46 1.10
-0.240 -0.425 -0.796 0.949 -0.363 0.317
Age -1.253 0.237 -0.973 -1.24 1.67 -0.85
-1.6063 0.2520 -1.3845 -0.994 1.254 -0.875
Age squared 0.011 -0.003 0.008 0.013 -0.016 0.008
1.3257 -0.3129 1.0123 0.9690 -1.2552 0.7527
Distance to nearest specialist 0.312 -1.237 0.208 0.202 -0.585 0.143
1.2346 -0.5734 0.7421 0.5147 -0.3076 0.3590
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.001 0.064 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.003
0.3657 1.0220 0.2884 0.8477 0.1119 0.6794
F – – 52.3 – – 43.8
N 61,203 61,203 59,698 38,210 38,210 37,270
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -8.36 -5.40 -168.04 -3.7 19.8 -327.4
-1.157 -0.640 -1.440 -0.24 0.58 -1.54
Severity 16.6*** 16.9*** 16.6*** -4.81 -11.39 -5.97
4.56 4.31 4.43 -0.153 -0.301 -0.180
Severity squared -0.864** -0.773** -0.814** 5.22 6.10 5.57
-2.4333 -2.2719 -2.1704 0.874 0.839 0.889
Male 11.6*** 9.8*** 11.8*** 9.07 7.45 9.92
2.70 2.62 2.71 1.386 1.109 1.483
Age -0.822 -0.775 -0.542 -2.43 -2.22 -1.87
-0.4129 -0.3295 -0.2663 -0.882 -0.662 -0.696
Age squared -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.012 0.016 0.007
-0.0481 0.1279 -0.1626 0.4460 0.4489 0.2541
Distance to nearest specialist 0.890*** -0.273 0.495 1.69*** 1.67 0.95*
3.3269 -0.1644 1.1460 5.358 1.401 1.708
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.008*** 0.002 -0.005 -0.016*** -0.006 -0.011**
-3.0472 0.2522 -1.4265 -4.3502 -0.7599 -2.1402
F – – 17.3 – – 14.5
N 62,869 62,869 60,727 43,396 43,396 41,829
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
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Table 70: Pharmacy cost (hypertension), low-access sample
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -5.4 -72.7 -213.9 -20.9 -52.9 -67.7
-0.33 -1.54 -1.22 -0.55 -0.36 -0.19
Severity 617.1*** 629.0*** 619.4*** 1130.7*** 1227.7*** 1133.8***
21.59 24.46 22.83 19.83 26.46 20.25
Severity squared -38.3*** -40.1*** -38.4*** -71.1*** -85.3*** -70.8***
-8.59 -7.72 -9.02 -7.69 -10.61 -7.74
Male 121.8*** 118.0*** 123.8*** 230.3*** 213.4*** 233.7***
8.85 8.61 9.48 7.67 6.02 7.86
Age 14.3*** 14.0*** 14.5*** 14.9 20.6*** 15.1
3.74 3.90 3.79 1.58 2.70 1.64
Age squared -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.146*** -0.131 -0.206** -0.132
-3.5223 -3.7525 -3.5859 -1.1985 -2.4107 -1.2404
Distance to nearest specialist -4.12*** -1.31 -4.40*** -7.74** -18.53 -6.85**
-2.657 -0.157 -2.762 -2.351 -1.331 -2.151
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.036 0.009 0.039* 0.047 0.245 0.034
1.5690 0.1174 1.6885 1.2505 1.0567 0.9441
F – – 52.3 – – 43.8
N 61,203 61,203 59,698 38,210 38,210 37,270
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 71: Total cost, low-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -4.3 -48.2 -270.1 -21.5 -2.6 -56.2
-0.26 -0.96 -1.58 -0.54 -0.02 -0.15
Severity 622.4*** 639.4*** 624.1*** 1141.7*** 1252.5*** 1144.0***
19.89 23.61 21.25 17.88 26.72 18.13
Severity squared -37.2*** -40.0*** -37.3*** -69.6*** -86.3*** -69.2***
-7.19 -7.42 -7.72 -6.61 -11.04 -6.63
Male 119.9*** 117.1*** 120.2*** 235.5*** 218.6*** 236.2***
8.22 8.13 8.74 7.53 6.33 7.56
Age 13.3*** 15.0*** 13.8*** 16.2* 25.5*** 16.5*
3.24 3.94 3.36 1.77 3.33 1.82
Age squared -0.143*** -0.158*** -0.148*** -0.148 -0.257*** -0.152
-3.2346 -3.8976 -3.3968 -1.4010 -3.0030 -1.4622
Distance to nearest specialist -5.12*** -1.47 -5.53*** -9.06*** -17.60 -8.05***
-3.123 -0.162 -3.377 -2.760 -1.165 -2.633
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.051** 0.076 0.053** 0.068* 0.217 0.051
2.0919 0.6719 2.2269 1.8389 0.9046 1.4611
F – – 52.3 – – 43.8
N 61,203 61,203 59,698 38,210 38,210 37,270
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 9.4 -11.5 103.2 9.2 11.4 111.0
0.81 -0.61 0.74 0.42 0.24 0.37
Severity 51.0*** 48.5*** 51.6*** 60.6 54.4 60.8
8.19 6.53 8.20 1.63 1.16 1.56
Severity squared -2.58*** -2.19*** -2.64*** 2.22 3.28 2.46
-4.449 -3.537 -4.471 0.339 0.407 0.360
Male 17.8*** 14.8** 16.7*** 13.9 11.0 12.4
4.13 2.51 3.84 1.41 0.82 1.26
Age -8.85*** -7.91 -8.75*** -18.2*** -23.6*** -18.2***
-2.857 -1.610 -2.739 -4.13 -5.28 -4.10
Age squared 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.123*** 0.185*** 0.122***
1.6107 1.0749 1.5321 2.6927 4.0600 2.6507
Distance to nearest specialist 0.225 0.117 0.403 0.109 1.774 0.380
0.5617 0.0674 0.7192 0.1707 0.6527 0.3500
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.012 -0.001 0.000 0.022 -0.001
-0.0386 1.0032 -0.1194 0.0148 0.8315 -0.0790
F – – 17.3 – – 14.5
N 62,869 62,869 60,727 43,396 43,396 41,829
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
139
APPENDIX C : High-access estimates
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Table 72: Primary specialist visit, high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.011 -0.008 0.071 -0.006 0.023 0.055
-1.2316 -0.6663 1.2636 -0.4928 1.0975 0.6615
Severity 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***
6.8197 5.5519 6.9568 9.1311 7.5319 9.2342
Severity squared -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
-1.9513 -2.1651 -1.8658 -3.1728 -2.9897 -3.1470
Male -0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.011** 0.003
-0.0512 1.4869 0.0799 0.8060 2.1106 0.9640
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
-0.7849 -0.9290 -0.7853 1.1111 0.8023 1.2047
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
1.0921 1.3444 1.0551 -0.3903 -0.1870 -0.5021
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 46.1 – – 45.6
N 108,916 108,916 107,621 68,037 68,037 67,210
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.049*** -0.020 0.125 -0.043** -0.039 -0.011
-2.9671 -1.2752 0.9242 -2.4210 -1.2852 -0.0633
Severity 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.052***
10.3883 8.0131 9.5627 9.6489 7.2091 9.9477
Severity squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
-5.4014 -4.8959 -5.3069 -6.3903 -4.8096 -6.7176
Male -0.004* -0.005 -0.006 -0.009* -0.016** -0.009*
-1.6551 -1.0047 -1.4598 -1.9365 -2.5496 -1.8817
Age -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004* -0.003 -0.004*
-4.4029 -3.4002 -4.3289 -1.8533 -0.7309 -1.8463
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.6978 2.4821 2.8353 0.6556 0.1306 0.7038
Distance to nearest specialist -0.002*** 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
-6.4333 nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
2.4738 nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 30.2 – – 31.0
N 188,681 65,049 64,546 44,906 44,906 44,531
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
141
Table 73: Primary specialist RVU, high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.155 -0.693 1.804 0.226 -0.889 3.280*
1.0568 -1.4419 1.0392 1.4569 -1.1240 1.6693
Severity 0.445*** 0.536*** 0.428*** 0.590*** 0.573*** 0.570***
4.7358 3.9553 4.6030 5.9278 3.0524 5.4601
Severity squared -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.037** -0.036***
-3.3271 -3.5778 -3.2515 -3.8227 -2.1114 -3.7353
Male 0.255*** 0.213 0.261*** 0.338*** 0.424*** 0.349***
3.0992 1.4007 3.3449 3.6011 2.8472 3.9045
Age -0.113*** -0.026 -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.064 -0.097***
-3.0553 -0.3868 -2.9078 -3.4784 -0.8964 -3.4508
Age squared 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001***
3.2270 0.3422 3.1239 3.7189 0.9745 3.7955
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 89.8 – – 68.2
N 17,751 17,751 17,566 15,300 15,300 15,122
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.552** -0.021 3.517 0.79** 1.02 5.55
1.9923 -0.0337 0.7364 2.033 1.099 0.800
Severity 0.822*** 0.517*** 0.826*** 1.64*** 1.29*** 1.65***
7.2097 4.5482 7.0919 10.876 7.657 11.331
Severity squared -0.015 0.001 -0.016 -0.074*** -0.033 -0.076***
-0.7853 0.0440 -0.8231 -4.7751 -1.5696 -4.9835
Male -0.127 -0.171 -0.114 -0.246 -0.261 -0.240
-1.4993 -1.2981 -1.4310 -1.4593 -1.3728 -1.4433
Age -0.311*** -0.124 -0.306*** -0.407*** -0.387*** -0.406***
-3.9563 -1.0449 -4.0067 -5.1184 -3.1866 -5.2337
Age squared 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
3.6222 0.8802 3.6292 4.6460 2.8002 4.7152
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 23.6 – – 25.0
N 18,097 18,097 17,988 16,428 16,428 16,314
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 74: Generalist RVUs, high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.552*** -0.027 1.923*** -0.639*** 0.279** 2.206**
-6.3677 -0.2869 3.0448 -4.7854 2.3189 2.2437
Severity 0.064*** 0.013 0.062*** 0.070*** 0.075 0.068**
3.2970 0.6633 3.0037 2.7110 1.6256 2.5037
Severity squared -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004
-0.5569 0.6092 -0.3284 -1.0681 -0.7031 -1.0397
Male -0.014 -0.003 -0.012 0.044 0.069* 0.047
-0.5999 -0.1511 -0.4932 0.9747 1.8456 0.9612
Age -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 0.030 0.034* 0.031*
-1.1420 -0.1009 -0.9736 1.6067 1.6490 1.7179
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
0.9351 0.6268 0.6641 -1.0425 -0.8951 -1.1755
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 45.7 – – 45.3
N 108,782 108,782 107,491 67,961 67,961 67,137
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.680*** -0.264* -1.132 -0.923*** -0.152 -3.788*
-6.6659 -1.7744 -0.9146 -4.2557 -0.5565 -1.6659
Severity 0.181*** 0.136*** 0.181*** 0.247*** 0.194*** 0.239***
7.0131 6.7667 7.1280 5.2225 4.8171 4.9931
Severity squared -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006
-1.3458 -1.1767 -1.3324 -0.9420 -0.8527 -0.8107
Male 0.111*** 0.075* 0.110*** 0.255*** 0.230*** 0.249***
3.0664 1.7136 3.0450 3.7604 4.8766 3.6178
Age 0.004 0.024 0.004 0.063*** 0.048* 0.064***
0.2496 1.4327 0.2353 2.9069 1.9266 2.7466
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001**
-0.3800 -1.3514 -0.3591 -2.4558 -1.2747 -2.3443
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 30.2 – – 30.9
N 65,036 65,036 64,533 44,897 44,897 44,522
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
143
Table 75: Any outpatient visit, high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.003 -0.021* -0.137*** -0.001 -0.022* -0.204***
-0.7102 -1.8145 -4.3436 -0.1267 -1.9133 -5.0611
Severity 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006***
1.5543 1.2048 1.4851 4.6380 3.9942 4.7110
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000
0.7480 0.0423 0.6885 -0.6919 -1.9859 -0.7443
Male -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.002 0.000 -0.003
-1.6753 -0.6265 -1.8896 -1.2553 0.2216 -1.4228
Age -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
-1.7775 -0.7147 -1.5947 -1.0767 -0.2456 -1.0966
Age squared 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.6563 0.7340 1.5590 0.9771 0.2693 1.0950
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 46.1 – – 45.6
N 108,916 108,916 107,621 68,037 68,037 67,210
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.008 -0.016 -0.164*** -0.012 -0.033 -0.236***
-0.8810 -0.7899 -2.7073 -1.2483 -1.4616 -3.5829
Severity 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.014***
4.1097 4.2570 4.0595 5.6213 4.9214 5.2288
Severity squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001***
-1.2059 -1.3510 -1.1316 -3.1451 -2.5142 -2.7706
Male -0.005** 0.002 -0.005** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.007***
-2.3054 0.7340 -2.3443 -3.1823 -0.2983 -3.1560
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003** -0.002* -0.002**
-0.7799 -0.5166 -0.5138 -2.5278 -1.8508 -2.2489
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000**
0.4526 0.0814 0.2472 2.3016 1.5263 2.0867
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 30.2 – – 31.0
N 65,049 65,049 64,546 44,906 44,906 44,531
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 76: Outpatient RVUs high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.69*** 191.30 6.49** -0.744*** -0.795 6.636***
-2.712 0.735 1.996 -2.7903 -0.3879 2.5844
Severity 0.205 0.203 0.205 0.159 -0.100 0.186
1.0707 0.5886 0.9366 1.0062 -0.1927 1.0483
Severity squared 0.036 0.029 0.038 0.037 0.073 0.039
1.0195 0.6149 1.0598 1.1973 0.8267 1.2128
Male -0.120 -0.346 -0.125 -0.126 -0.250 -0.052
-0.6469 -1.2015 -0.5492 -0.6742 -0.9389 -0.2339
Age -0.003 -0.389** 0.026 -0.095 -0.371* -0.104
-0.0336 -2.1303 0.2531 -0.9008 -1.6890 -0.9219
Age squared -0.000 0.004** -0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.001
-0.2239 2.0404 -0.5223 0.5880 1.6674 0.5961
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 21.9 – – 24.5
N 3,396 3,396 3,339 3,146 3,146 3,084
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -1.0 -11.6*** 15.4*** -0.26 2.49 4.91
-1.51 -4.92 2.83 -0.479 0.665 1.142
Severity 0.723*** -0.032 0.762** 0.908*** 0.191 0.932***
2.6212 -0.0588 2.4322 4.7402 0.2665 4.8319
Severity squared -0.025 0.022 -0.024 -0.003 -0.019 -0.003
-1.2863 0.5715 -1.1617 -0.1345 -0.2964 -0.1035
Male 0.603 0.741 0.641 0.871** 1.255* 0.883**
1.2803 0.9721 1.4036 2.3378 1.6704 2.3386
Age 0.104 0.530 0.080 0.059 2.036 0.089
0.5621 0.7794 0.3670 0.3193 1.6084 0.4813
Age squared -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.019 -0.001
-0.5363 -0.6705 -0.3751 -0.3163 -1.5581 -0.4869
Distance to nearest specialist -1.03 0.00 -1.28 -4.20 -11.90 -4.43
-0.563 nan -0.497 -1.233 -0.886 -1.379
Distance to nearest specialist squared 1.59 0.00 1.75 3.98 11.18 4.27
1.000 nan 0.913 1.137 0.790 1.302
F – – 20.4 – – 25.7
N 3,684 3,684 3,644 3,602 3,602 3,555
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
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Table 77: Any new cardiovascular prescription, high-access sample
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.002 0.017 0.241*** 0.001 0.015 0.198*
-0.3199 1.2145 2.8703 0.1724 0.6834 1.9164
Severity 0.243*** 0.261*** 0.243*** 0.250*** 0.280*** 0.250***
15.5182 13.8345 15.4614 22.3660 20.7127 22.4230
Severity squared -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.021***
-7.8248 -7.2193 -7.8071 -10.9139 -11.4048 -10.9847
Male 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035***
6.6886 5.8729 6.4371 5.3082 3.7981 5.0733
Age 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.006***
5.3904 3.4231 5.3596 3.1165 2.5371 3.1233
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-7.4141 -5.4758 -7.4242 -5.1340 -4.6406 -5.0694
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 46.1 – – 45.6
N 108,916 108,916 107,621 68,037 68,037 67,210
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.016** 0.003 0.072 0.010 -0.008 0.020
2.1224 0.1249 0.7627 1.5452 -0.2421 0.1988
Severity 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.065***
6.1918 3.5153 6.1245 15.8692 11.3378 15.9398
Severity squared -0.003** -0.002 -0.003** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
-2.5669 -1.5577 -2.5689 -8.0469 -5.8718 -8.0276
Male 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.019** 0.023***
4.0985 2.9298 4.1885 5.3842 2.5273 5.4956
Age 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.5794 -0.7578 0.7763 -1.1301 -0.7527 -1.1302
Age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.5709 0.8914 -0.7805 1.1933 0.9532 1.2054
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 5.8 – – 12.4
N 18,262 18,262 18,070 15,711 15,711 15,528
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 78: Inpatient admission, high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.002* -0.003 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 0.040***
-1.8157 -1.2485 0.7348 -1.5053 -0.4909 2.9412
Severity 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007***
9.3194 7.3998 9.1409 4.1410 3.2540 4.1232
Severity squared -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
-2.9025 -2.0521 -2.7514 0.6109 0.3267 0.6837
Male 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
3.5257 4.2115 3.4413 3.3643 2.9923 3.4007
Age -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*
-1.3556 -2.2543 -1.1997 -2.0369 -3.0161 -1.9493
Age squared 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
1.9485 2.7401 1.7820 2.7942 3.5912 2.6735
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 46.1 – – 45.6
N 108,916 108,916 107,621 68,037 68,037 67,210
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.001 -0.006 -0.063 -0.002 0.009 -0.041
-0.8868 -0.9287 -1.0868 -0.9038 1.0901 -0.7850
Severity 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.021***
8.1072 7.7672 7.9057 9.9987 7.1403 9.7576
Severity squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.6568 -0.1230 0.6997 0.2784 0.4513 0.3375
Male 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.011***
6.0469 4.7352 6.0131 5.2455 3.5533 5.3550
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
-4.0766 -3.7602 -4.1621 -2.9338 -3.3981 -3.0346
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
4.1828 4.0405 4.2904 3.0407 3.6906 3.1350
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 30.2 – – 31.0
N 65,049 65,049 64,546 44,906 44,906 44,531
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 79: Physician cost, high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 2.42 1.70 96.35* 7.9 31.7** 97.3*
0.492 0.290 1.863 1.24 2.42 1.65
Severity 5.90*** 4.94*** 5.75*** 9.01*** 8.36*** 8.77***
4.478 3.277 4.788 5.285 4.519 5.335
Severity squared -0.159 -0.244 -0.125 -0.350 -0.198 -0.322
-1.1255 -1.2529 -0.9283 -1.5453 -0.7030 -1.4629
Male 3.05** 3.80** 3.10** 9.44*** 12.34*** 9.52***
2.189 2.404 2.185 3.127 3.969 3.051
Age 0.682 1.018* 0.743 3.87*** 3.98*** 3.97***
1.4103 1.7257 1.4947 3.464 3.035 3.719
Age squared -0.012** -0.013** -0.013** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.040***
-2.2319 -2.0102 -2.2935 -3.2767 -2.7412 -3.5168
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 46.1 – – 45.6
N 108,916 108,916 107,621 68,037 68,037 67,210
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 9.7 -35.1*** 29.5 27.1 3.0 85.2
1.01 -3.33 0.29 1.58 0.08 0.62
Severity 42.7*** 38.8*** 42.6*** 84.3*** 78.5*** 85.2***
10.20 7.61 10.33 7.91 8.18 8.21
Severity squared -1.69*** -1.81*** -1.68*** -4.04*** -3.63*** -4.09***
-3.096 -3.742 -3.041 -4.407 -6.122 -4.560
Male 4.00 -0.59 4.08 8.13 -11.27 7.93
1.136 -0.153 1.178 1.236 -1.400 1.179
Age -11.6*** -8.8*** -11.6*** -13.2*** -11.3*** -13.3***
-6.09 -4.12 -5.97 -4.63 -3.15 -4.82
Age squared 0.090*** 0.063*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.068* 0.087***
4.8285 2.9287 4.7483 2.9989 1.8858 3.1339
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 30.2 – – 31.0
N 65,049 65,049 64,546 44,906 44,906 44,531
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
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Table 80: Outpatient cost, high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -5.33*** -4.58 -46.25** -7.02** -4.64 -66.07**
-2.608 -0.716 -2.521 -2.197 -0.457 -2.461
Severity -0.173 2.145 -0.234 0.731 6.852* 0.478
-0.0374 1.2346 -0.0509 0.1096 1.7069 0.0731
Severity squared 0.961 0.190 0.971 1.34 -0.05 1.37
1.0158 0.5293 1.0292 0.981 -0.064 1.016
Male -1.39 -0.44 -1.50 -2.33 0.41 -2.26
-0.819 -0.277 -0.897 -1.039 0.157 -1.068
Age 1.17** 0.99 1.18** 1.22 0.42 1.13
2.014 1.281 2.103 1.614 0.394 1.489
Age squared -0.014** -0.012 -0.015** -0.016** -0.007 -0.015**
-2.3338 -1.4640 -2.4299 -2.1104 -0.6226 -1.9697
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 46.1 – – 45.6
N 108,916 108,916 107,621 68,037 68,037 67,210
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -8.4 14.7 214.6*** 2.1 -13.0 186.8**
-0.87 1.10 2.73 0.17 -0.97 2.37
Severity 9.03** 2.91 9.54** 22.8*** 11.9 23.8***
2.515 0.373 2.538 4.67 1.05 4.99
Severity squared 0.539 1.087 0.485 0.156 0.794 0.066
0.7944 0.8598 0.6997 0.1420 0.5205 0.0615
Male 7.28 8.92 7.99 11.3 8.3 11.6
1.040 1.259 1.124 1.47 1.30 1.54
Age 0.750 -0.092 0.442 -4.46 0.89 -4.76*
0.3493 -0.0404 0.1946 -1.569 0.167 -1.667
Age squared -0.014 -0.003 -0.012 0.040 -0.012 0.043
-0.5967 -0.1327 -0.4763 1.3019 -0.2400 1.3735
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 30.2 – – 31.0
N 65,049 65,049 64,546 44,906 44,906 44,531
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
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Table 81: Pharmacy cost (hypertension), high-access sample
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 23.7 80.6** 416.8*** 51.8 76.2 629.7**
1.41 2.34 3.89 1.44 0.75 2.31
Severity 609.6*** 637.2*** 608.4*** 1135.0*** 1179.3*** 1136.8***
18.50 17.25 18.62 26.42 27.82 26.81
Severity squared -41.9*** -45.8*** -41.6*** -75.5*** -84.8*** -75.6***
-8.99 -8.30 -9.00 -13.71 -14.30 -13.89
Male 139.7*** 140.1*** 139.8*** 256.5*** 244.3*** 255.2***
15.98 12.42 16.12 14.13 10.27 13.56
Age 13.0*** 11.7*** 12.8*** 32.9*** 35.3*** 33.0***
4.05 2.98 3.98 5.12 4.41 5.06
Age squared -0.132*** -0.121*** -0.130*** -0.345*** -0.382*** -0.348***
-3.4135 -2.6363 -3.3543 -4.8417 -4.5747 -4.7182
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 46.1 – – 45.6
N 108,916 108,916 107,621 68,037 68,037 67,210
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 82: Total cost, high-access sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 20.8 77.7** 466.9*** 52.7 103.3 660.9**
1.20 2.27 3.30 1.43 1.00 2.18
Severity 615.3*** 644.3*** 613.9*** 1144.8*** 1194.5*** 1146.0***
19.87 17.94 19.99 27.89 28.65 28.28
Severity squared -41.1*** -45.8*** -40.8*** -74.5*** -85.0*** -74.5***
-9.45 -8.57 -9.45 -13.92 -14.71 -14.07
Male 141.4*** 143.5*** 141.4*** 263.6*** 257.1*** 262.4***
17.05 13.31 17.01 13.61 10.50 12.94
Age 14.9*** 13.7*** 14.8*** 38.0*** 39.7*** 38.1***
4.02 3.00 3.95 5.36 4.74 5.31
Age squared -0.158*** -0.145*** -0.157*** -0.401*** -0.426*** -0.404***
-3.5729 -2.7366 -3.5029 -5.1394 -4.8909 -5.0241
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 46.1 – – 45.6
N 108,916 108,916 107,621 68,037 68,037 67,210
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 1.3 -20.4 244.1** 29.2 -9.9 272.0*
0.10 -1.06 2.16 1.53 -0.25 1.86
Severity 51.7*** 41.7*** 52.1*** 107.1*** 90.5*** 108.9***
7.74 5.71 7.66 10.11 7.48 10.25
Severity squared -1.15 -0.72 -1.20 -3.88*** -2.83** -4.02***
-1.015 -0.586 -1.028 -3.887 -2.018 -3.876
Male 11.3 8.3 12.1 19.4** -3.0 19.6**
1.39 0.92 1.49 2.23 -0.29 2.26
Age -10.9*** -8.9*** -11.1*** -17.7*** -10.4 -18.0***
-3.96 -3.07 -4.02 -3.99 -1.52 -4.22
Age squared 0.076** 0.060** 0.077*** 0.127*** 0.055 0.130***
2.5626 2.0796 2.5986 2.7178 0.8273 2.8827
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 nan 0.000 0.000 nan
nan nan nan nan nan nan
F – – 30.2 – – 31.0
N 65,049 65,049 64,546 44,906 44,906 44,531
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
151
APPENDIX D : Hospital-affiliated estimates
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Table 83: Primary specialist visit, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.010 0.001 0.198** -0.001 0.017 0.298**
-0.8319 0.0907 2.3522 -0.0459 0.6185 2.2990
Severity 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.030***
6.3422 5.0806 6.1063 6.8209 5.6332 7.0180
Severity squared -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001
-2.7740 -2.4908 -2.6340 -1.0704 -1.9884 -1.0637
Male -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.008
-0.0578 -0.0083 0.1352 1.2960 0.8614 1.1834
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003
-1.1047 -0.7975 -0.8062 -1.3594 -1.2153 -1.1054
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1441 0.9799 0.7559 1.5948 1.5065 1.2626
Distance to nearest specialist -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.008** 0.001
-1.4011 -0.7853 1.0720 -1.3318 2.0388 0.9794
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-0.2253 1.8486 -1.6256 0.2656 -1.6299 -1.0464
F – – 36.7 – – 27.3
N 28,118 28,118 27,529 18,160 18,160 17,774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.049*** -0.014 0.092 -0.008 -0.054* 0.113
-2.9671 -0.7178 1.0411 -0.3392 -1.7219 0.9342
Severity 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.051***
10.3883 5.7108 6.6233 7.9287 6.2403 8.5332
Severity squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***
-5.4014 -2.7263 -2.7870 -3.1614 -3.0334 -3.7459
Male -0.004* -0.014*** -0.010* -0.009 -0.006 -0.009
-1.6551 -2.5815 -1.9397 -1.4003 -0.6895 -1.3144
Age -0.004*** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.004 -0.007**
-4.4029 -2.1837 -3.5670 -2.4596 -1.3722 -2.4970
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
2.6978 1.8151 3.3224 1.7014 0.6130 1.7543
Distance to nearest specialist -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.002 -0.003***
-6.4333 0.0978 -3.3520 -5.2443 0.5049 -3.1289
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000**
2.4738 -0.4754 2.5903 3.2007 -0.8998 2.5194
F – – 56.3 – – 49.8
N 188,681 25,268 24,723 18,070 18,070 17,666
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 84: Primary specialist RVUs, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.478** -0.862 -0.878 -0.652*** -0.411 -0.979
-2.4741 -1.1578 -0.5525 -4.7508 -0.6804 -0.3851
Severity 0.386*** 0.468** 0.379*** 0.219** -0.042 0.212**
3.5084 2.0771 3.2839 2.0561 -0.2198 2.0825
Severity squared -0.036*** -0.043* -0.036*** -0.001 0.038 -0.001
-3.1991 -1.7425 -3.0793 -0.1339 1.3774 -0.0784
Male 0.265** 0.470** 0.262* 0.390*** 0.341 0.402***
1.9678 1.9862 1.9474 2.5958 1.4681 2.6654
Age -0.028 0.004 -0.030 -0.059 0.014 -0.060
-0.5843 0.0523 -0.6370 -0.9867 0.1319 -1.0129
Age squared 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
1.0318 0.3368 1.1068 1.4599 0.2398 1.5092
Distance to nearest specialist 0.003 0.021 -0.000 0.019 0.134 0.014
0.2257 0.1707 -0.0230 1.3781 0.9511 0.8711
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000
0.5800 -1.2392 0.8339 -0.6122 -1.3095 -0.6418
F – – 9.9 – – 10.2
N 3,601 3,601 3,551 3,320 3,320 3,265
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.255 -0.577 1.334 0.809 0.722 5.066
0.8126 -1.0945 0.4046 1.3304 1.5296 1.2035
Severity 0.768*** 0.401 0.793*** 1.68*** 0.88*** 1.74***
3.2934 1.2798 3.9062 7.361 2.878 7.770
Severity squared -0.012 0.057 -0.015 -0.086*** 0.012 -0.091***
-0.3686 1.0765 -0.5234 -3.4086 0.2961 -3.4025
Male -0.021 -0.059 -0.027 0.140 0.207 0.158
-0.1096 -0.2110 -0.1423 0.5589 0.4499 0.6286
Age -0.412*** -0.335** -0.404*** -0.336** -0.664*** -0.325**
-3.2841 -2.3414 -3.1094 -2.3148 -2.8411 -2.1581
Age squared 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003* 0.006** 0.003*
2.9760 2.2849 2.8171 1.9232 2.5003 1.7652
Distance to nearest specialist -0.027 0.038 -0.019 -0.051*** -0.158 -0.028
-1.5708 0.3446 -0.7760 -2.6072 -0.6088 -0.9280
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.6627 -1.0043 0.3367 1.3562 0.3605 0.5862
F – – 37.1 – – 30.4
N 5,583 5,583 5,501 5,585 5,585 5,501
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 85: Generalist RVUs, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.189*** 0.023 0.900* -0.153* 0.214 1.855**
-2.7038 0.2926 1.7769 -1.7133 1.2478 2.1145
Severity 0.006 0.064 0.005 0.019 0.206** 0.022
0.1808 1.5509 0.1513 0.4473 2.0439 0.5131
Severity squared 0.004 -0.008 0.004 0.000 -0.027* -0.001
1.1277 -1.3049 1.1885 0.0219 -1.6697 -0.1436
Male -0.103*** -0.094*** -0.107*** -0.156*** -0.022 -0.148***
-3.3294 -2.7303 -3.3860 -3.2082 -0.3146 -2.9462
Age -0.028* -0.057*** -0.022 0.029* -0.033 0.033*
-1.8703 -3.3339 -1.5080 1.6600 -1.6385 1.8162
Age squared 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000
1.6428 3.0680 1.2346 -1.2366 1.9187 -1.4243
Distance to nearest specialist -0.013*** 0.003 -0.005 -0.022** 0.051 -0.011
-3.0233 0.1696 -0.7406 -2.3882 1.0291 -0.8845
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
1.8164 -0.2839 0.1659 1.6097 -1.4792 0.4695
F – – 36.9 – – 27.5
N 28,106 28,106 27,518 18,152 18,152 17,767
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.044 -0.162 0.442 -0.002 -0.012 0.729
0.4241 -0.8141 0.9924 -0.0113 -0.0551 1.0082
Severity 0.213*** 0.227*** 0.220*** 0.267*** 0.274*** 0.277***
7.0326 4.6081 7.2265 4.4222 3.6537 4.4096
Severity squared -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.021** -0.023***
-5.1296 -3.5267 -5.3432 -3.0496 -2.2264 -2.9988
Male 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.118*** 0.278*** 0.254*** 0.269***
2.6490 3.0045 2.6171 4.0138 2.6826 3.7641
Age 0.001 -0.013 0.002 0.065** 0.018 0.065**
0.0687 -0.5926 0.0966 2.5235 0.5401 2.4861
Age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001**
-0.0376 0.6904 -0.0925 -2.1201 -0.1681 -2.1094
Distance to nearest specialist -0.009* 0.002 -0.006 -0.012 0.041 -0.006
-1.8274 0.1479 -1.2002 -1.2724 1.0596 -0.5471
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
1.3079 -1.0353 0.9381 0.3449 -0.6952 0.0223
F – – 56.3 – – 49.7
N 25,267 25,267 24,722 18,067 18,067 17,663
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 86: Any outpatient visit, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.003 -0.010 -0.026 0.010 -0.004 -0.102
0.3375 -0.5049 -0.6412 0.7777 -0.1946 -1.3840
Severity 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.009*** 0.007 0.007**
0.4091 0.6536 0.1904 2.6994 1.5029 2.3704
Severity squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
0.7192 -0.5978 0.7606 -0.8170 -1.0998 -0.6468
Male -0.005 -0.004 -0.006* -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
-1.4520 -1.1320 -1.7129 -1.1860 -1.2688 -1.2941
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003 -0.004**
-1.2911 -1.3547 -1.2913 -2.0189 -1.6280 -2.1414
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000**
1.0442 1.2150 1.0127 1.8331 1.6056 1.9770
Distance to nearest specialist 0.001** -0.002 0.001 0.002** 0.004 0.001
2.0971 -1.2557 1.1482 2.2293 1.3053 1.0404
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
-0.6922 1.1606 -0.0688 -0.9405 -1.9638 -0.1180
F – – 36.7 – – 27.3
N 28,118 28,118 27,529 18,160 18,160 17,774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.022 -0.059*** -0.077 -0.023 -0.073** -0.084
-1.2766 -2.6879 -0.9815 -1.2168 -2.4240 -0.8820
Severity 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.020***
3.5078 3.7531 3.2398 4.5994 4.5709 4.3291
Severity squared -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001**
-1.4259 -2.0114 -1.2847 -2.0290 -2.6738 -2.0468
Male -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.006 -0.002
-0.1674 0.1722 -0.1012 -0.3574 0.9521 -0.3066
Age -0.002 -0.003* -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
-1.0250 -1.7310 -0.8732 -1.5510 -1.1604 -1.1097
Age squared 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.9845 1.7134 0.8691 1.5310 1.1438 1.1735
Distance to nearest specialist 0.003*** 0.004 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.000 0.003***
4.8889 1.4737 3.4859 4.6051 -0.1269 3.3909
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000***
-3.8279 -1.8298 -2.7724 -3.5529 0.5178 -2.7201
F – – 56.3 – – 49.8
N 25,268 25,268 24,723 18,070 18,070 17,666
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 87: Outpatient RVUs, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.196 0.000 1.900 0.52 18.34** 4.19
0.3944 nan 0.3831 1.088 2.187 0.832
Severity 0.338** 0.315 0.313* 0.254** 0.540* 0.301*
2.0045 1.1271 1.7132 2.0846 1.7871 1.7342
Severity squared -0.021 0.004 -0.018 -0.008 -0.032 -0.013
-0.8130 0.1169 -0.6904 -0.4922 -1.2606 -0.7950
Male -0.531*** -0.389 -0.500*** -0.504** -0.238 -0.427*
-2.7230 -1.2386 -2.6958 -2.3116 -0.6640 -1.9259
Age -0.050 -0.355* -0.027 -0.139 -0.269 -0.100
-0.4207 -1.6619 -0.1526 -1.0780 -0.9137 -0.5946
Age squared 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001
0.3275 1.6551 0.0784 0.9927 0.8958 0.4794
Distance to nearest specialist -0.087*** -1640.424*** -0.085** -0.102*** 3.833*** -0.095**
-3.3295 -3.1211 -2.5390 -3.2318 5.4133 -2.5224
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.001*** 59.956*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.081*** 0.001***
2.8359 3.1227 2.7182 2.9479 -5.2605 2.6438
F – – 7.4 – – 9.2
N 1,978 1,978 1,918 1,789 1,789 1,731
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.48 -6.59 5.44 -0.398 0.249 1.090
-0.863 -1.506 1.073 -0.8868 0.1296 0.2360
Severity 1.02*** 1.10 1.18*** 1.17*** 2.21** 1.25***
3.237 1.284 3.199 3.676 2.041 3.357
Severity squared -0.069** -0.096 -0.085** -0.075*** -0.146 -0.085**
-2.3540 -1.1980 -2.4377 -2.6507 -1.5570 -2.5016
Male 1.01* 1.05 1.11** 0.844** 0.964 0.861**
1.759 1.019 1.968 2.1493 0.8473 2.1244
Age -0.220 0.087 -0.234 -0.033 1.098 -0.034
-1.1736 0.6723 -1.2515 -0.2095 1.3034 -0.2077
Age squared 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.011 0.000
1.2131 -0.6881 1.2997 0.1814 -1.3499 0.1737
Distance to nearest specialist -0.050 0.215 -0.008 -0.029 0.565*** -0.019
-1.1577 0.6354 -0.1269 -0.8727 3.4623 -0.4340
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.001 -0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.009*** 0.000
1.2261 -0.7661 0.3978 0.8067 -3.0126 0.5577
F – – 11.2 – – 16.0
N 3,188 3,188 3,088 3,040 3,040 2,942
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 88: Any new cardiovascular prescription, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.022** -0.014 0.189* 0.028** 0.004 0.232
2.1545 -1.0382 1.7382 1.9872 0.1348 1.5140
Severity 0.240*** 0.247*** 0.241*** 0.213*** 0.230*** 0.213***
11.2726 12.8298 11.3348 12.8164 10.6441 12.5663
Severity squared -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.015***
-5.3725 -6.2207 -5.4207 -5.5614 -4.8363 -5.5518
Male 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.031***
6.9880 5.3212 7.0698 4.8450 4.4222 4.6748
Age 0.007*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.005 0.009***
2.8140 2.1719 3.1718 2.3971 1.2611 2.6911
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000***
-3.9881 -3.6809 -4.3846 -3.3808 -2.2298 -3.6924
Distance to nearest specialist 0.001 -0.002 0.002* 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.7210 -0.8325 1.7095 0.3589 0.1428 1.2298
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-0.5352 -0.0518 -1.3086 -0.3721 -0.0472 -1.2214
F – – 36.7 – – 27.3
N 28,118 28,118 27,529 18,160 18,160 17,774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.016* 0.019 -0.091 -0.010 -0.124*** 0.026
-1.6726 0.9437 -0.9931 -0.8975 -3.5071 0.2283
Severity 0.054*** 0.031** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.042*** 0.061***
6.1815 2.4837 6.1251 7.9189 3.3292 7.6319
Severity squared -0.004*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003***
-2.9368 -0.1164 -3.0045 -5.4021 -0.0297 -5.2038
Male 0.024*** 0.023** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.035** 0.032***
2.7781 1.9743 3.0062 3.8139 2.4148 4.0835
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005*
-0.9667 -0.1198 -0.8243 -1.4888 -0.0891 -1.6454
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
1.0362 0.2561 0.8958 1.7452 0.3273 1.8869
Distance to nearest specialist 0.002* -0.006 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.001
1.8924 -0.5897 1.4343 0.7237 0.4470 0.4673
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-1.4174 0.5690 -1.3648 -0.7110 -0.4753 -0.6791
F – – 2.1 – – 4.5
N 3,722 3,722 3,670 3,431 3,431 3,374
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 89: Inpatient admission, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 0.009
-0.6897 -0.6943 -0.2042 -1.2760 -1.5829 0.5044
Severity 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.007 0.002
5.8039 4.6982 5.6077 0.7323 1.6442 0.7132
Severity squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001** 0.000 0.001**
-3.2887 -2.8486 -3.3296 2.2677 0.2184 2.3612
Male 0.002* 0.003 0.002* 0.004*** 0.004* 0.005***
1.6923 1.6279 1.7744 2.9467 1.8002 3.1582
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
-0.7809 -1.0772 -0.8462 -0.8561 -0.8742 -0.8740
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1197 1.3072 1.1741 1.4889 1.0745 1.4356
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
-1.5117 -0.9027 -0.9591 -0.5100 -0.8461 0.0393
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4671 0.8038 0.2528 0.3189 0.7097 0.0498
F – – 36.7 – – 27.3
N 28,118 28,118 27,529 18,160 18,160 17,774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.009 0.036
1.3294 -0.1724 -0.0112 1.1382 1.2671 0.9873
Severity 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.018***
5.0007 3.4921 4.8655 4.0651 2.8533 4.5303
Severity squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.0296 -0.1370 0.0754 0.7883 0.3591 0.5563
Male 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.014***
4.8582 4.6566 4.9163 5.5155 3.3888 5.8559
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002
-1.6073 -1.4933 -1.6396 1.6475 0.9825 1.6430
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
1.5260 1.4320 1.5684 -1.4940 -0.7481 -1.5050
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.2760 1.5907 0.2303 0.1829 0.1289 0.7094
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
-1.1859 -1.9985 -1.2372 -0.2789 0.1358 -0.5073
F – – 56.3 – – 49.8
N 25,268 25,268 24,723 18,070 18,070 17,666
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 90: Physician cost, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -8.52 7.18 52.14 -9.1 36.4*** 131.6
-1.393 1.242 0.942 -1.09 3.41 1.57
Severity 0.472 2.341 0.563 1.54 5.91* 2.39
0.2137 0.9275 0.2623 0.604 1.845 0.970
Severity squared 0.112 -0.270 0.129 0.039 -0.453 0.005
0.4656 -0.9194 0.5485 0.1525 -1.2498 0.0176
Male -2.38 -0.29 -2.46 -1.08 8.83** -0.75
-1.043 -0.118 -1.050 -0.354 2.047 -0.229
Age 0.254 -1.509 0.566 3.92** 1.15 4.33**
0.2677 -1.3067 0.5820 2.394 0.634 2.536
Age squared -0.010 0.010 -0.013 -0.045** -0.014 -0.050***
-0.9881 0.8305 -1.2939 -2.4234 -0.6698 -2.5770
Distance to nearest specialist -0.659* 0.014 -0.186 -1.00* 3.33 -0.18
-1.8129 0.0126 -0.3198 -1.877 1.291 -0.224
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.008 -0.012 0.004 0.012* -0.063 0.004
1.4974 -1.4187 0.4856 1.6855 -1.5024 0.3938
F – – 36.7 – – 27.3
N 28,118 28,118 27,529 18,160 18,160 17,774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 23.3*** -52.5** 96.8* 46.7*** -85.3* 238.1**
2.63 -2.36 1.81 3.06 -1.76 2.15
Severity 32.9*** 31.3*** 34.0*** 73.3*** 71.5*** 76.9***
5.79 6.02 6.05 8.91 6.78 8.72
Severity squared -1.97*** -1.96*** -2.06*** -4.48*** -4.57*** -4.72***
-3.191 -2.595 -3.437 -5.589 -3.997 -5.739
Male 12.5** 9.1* 12.2** 22.8*** 24.2*** 23.1***
2.35 1.67 2.45 2.76 2.63 2.72
Age -10.5*** -11.1** -10.8*** -9.14* -17.91** -9.26*
-2.70 -2.21 -2.71 -1.772 -2.351 -1.744
Age squared 0.078** 0.088* 0.081** 0.040 0.132* 0.040
2.0539 1.7632 2.0736 0.7407 1.6917 0.7192
Distance to nearest specialist -1.36** 1.74 -0.87 -2.71*** 2.60 -1.48
-2.461 0.924 -1.485 -2.992 0.524 -1.408
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.010* -0.032 0.007 0.017 -0.025 0.010
1.8622 -1.5463 1.1615 1.5082 -0.4727 0.7506
F – – 56.3 – – 49.8
N 25,268 25,268 24,723 18,070 18,070 17,666
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
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Table 91: Outpatient cost, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -4.14 0.74 -28.65 1.8 15.2 -18.0
-1.069 0.079 -0.632 0.31 0.97 -0.24
Severity 7.48** 3.12 7.27** 10.9*** 10.8* 10.5***
2.482 0.706 2.437 3.04 1.76 2.92
Severity squared -0.016 0.711 -0.001 -0.390 0.091 -0.349
-0.0252 0.7099 -0.0010 -1.1897 0.1036 -1.0887
Male -5.52*** -7.16** -5.76*** -8.59*** -17.58*** -8.30***
-2.648 -2.082 -2.687 -2.898 -4.708 -2.853
Age 2.18** 1.53 2.15** 1.10 1.51 0.96
2.247 1.283 2.005 0.792 0.795 0.640
Age squared -0.029*** -0.021 -0.029** -0.021 -0.024 -0.020
-2.7332 -1.5842 -2.4225 -1.3443 -1.0806 -1.1572
Distance to nearest specialist 0.168 0.289 -0.101 -0.170 0.291 -0.347
0.5478 0.2300 -0.2120 -0.3896 0.1441 -0.6301
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.002 -0.011 0.005 0.006 -0.024 0.008
0.4634 -0.7080 0.9511 0.9030 -0.7047 1.1492
F – – 36.7 – – 27.3
N 28,118 28,118 27,529 18,160 18,160 17,774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -7.9 -16.2 -63.3 -15.1 17.1 -129.7
-0.66 -0.67 -0.65 -0.89 0.78 -0.83
Severity 21.5*** 21.9*** 21.1*** 44.3*** 35.5*** 43.4***
3.09 3.35 2.75 3.78 4.08 3.36
Severity squared -1.14** -2.04*** -1.09* -2.59** -3.27*** -2.53**
-2.142 -2.646 -1.798 -2.439 -3.285 -2.211
Male 16.4** 16.2* 17.4** 26.0** 24.3** 26.6**
2.20 1.84 2.29 2.12 2.09 2.12
Age -2.15 -2.59 -2.15 -2.56 2.96 -2.11
-0.609 -0.963 -0.632 -0.484 0.640 -0.408
Age squared 0.018 0.025 0.019 0.011 -0.040 0.007
0.4709 0.8191 0.5015 0.1900 -0.8403 0.1249
Distance to nearest specialist 1.16* 3.33 0.93** 2.39** 0.84 1.88*
1.915 1.383 2.045 2.349 0.753 1.807
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.010 -0.062 -0.008 -0.021* -0.008 -0.018
-1.4217 -1.5568 -1.2949 -1.8249 -0.6372 -1.4619
F – – 56.3 – – 49.8
N 25,268 25,268 24,723 18,070 18,070 17,666
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values. 161
Table 92: Pharmacy cost (hypertension), hospital-affiliated
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 36.2 -50.8 51.7 111.6 232.7 524.2
1.63 -0.85 0.25 1.36 1.02 0.96
Severity 615.3*** 633.0*** 615.1*** 1143.0*** 1168.1*** 1140.2***
17.42 15.60 17.54 15.38 13.18 15.09
Severity squared -37.2*** -40.4*** -37.1*** -62.8*** -65.8*** -62.6***
-7.24 -6.38 -7.23 -9.21 -6.46 -9.04
Male 110.7*** 122.2*** 110.9*** 217.2*** 241.5*** 220.0***
6.49 7.21 6.46 5.38 6.18 5.37
Age 17.6*** 13.1*** 18.4*** 27.5** 10.6 30.4***
4.04 2.69 4.54 2.41 0.63 2.61
Age squared -0.178*** -0.131** -0.188*** -0.260** -0.091 -0.296**
-3.6421 -2.5034 -4.1317 -2.0243 -0.5001 -2.2542
Distance to nearest specialist 0.79 10.21* 1.07 -2.07 11.07 -0.64
0.437 1.713 0.513 -0.584 0.622 -0.137
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.012 -0.094 -0.021 0.012 0.111 -0.015
-0.4814 -1.6095 -0.7703 0.2781 0.2820 -0.2849
F – – 36.7 – – 27.3
N 28,118 28,118 27,529 18,160 18,160 17,774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 93: Total cost, hospital-affiliated
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 23.6 -42.9 75.2 104.3 284.4 637.7
1.05 -0.75 0.38 1.30 1.26 1.24
Severity 623.3*** 638.5*** 623.0*** 1155.5*** 1184.9*** 1153.1***
17.79 16.40 17.97 15.41 13.53 15.13
Severity squared -37.1*** -39.9*** -37.0*** -63.2*** -66.2*** -63.0***
-7.53 -6.86 -7.54 -9.25 -6.82 -9.07
Male 102.8*** 114.7*** 102.7*** 207.6*** 232.8*** 211.0***
5.79 6.40 5.76 5.01 6.29 5.06
Age 20.0*** 13.1** 21.2*** 32.5*** 13.3 35.7***
3.78 2.38 4.23 2.75 0.75 2.94
Age squared -0.217*** -0.142** -0.230*** -0.326** -0.128 -0.366***
-3.6606 -2.3876 -4.0939 -2.4308 -0.6734 -2.6427
Distance to nearest specialist 0.297 10.510* 0.785 -3.24 14.68 -1.17
0.1571 1.8025 0.3522 -0.939 0.823 -0.261
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.002 -0.118** -0.012 0.029 0.023 -0.004
-0.0651 -1.9771 -0.4015 0.6988 0.0599 -0.0703
F – – 36.7 – – 27.3
N 28,118 28,118 27,529 18,160 18,160 17,774
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 15.4 -68.8* 33.5 31.6 -68.2 108.4
1.22 -1.90 0.30 1.47 -1.52 0.56
Severity 54.4*** 53.2*** 55.1*** 117.6*** 107.0*** 120.2***
5.34 6.62 5.14 7.55 8.43 7.10
Severity squared -3.11*** -4.00*** -3.15*** -7.07*** -7.84*** -7.25***
-4.087 -3.411 -3.964 -5.112 -5.878 -4.923
Male 28.8*** 25.3** 29.5*** 48.8*** 48.4*** 49.8***
2.90 2.18 2.95 3.28 3.67 3.30
Age -12.6** -13.7*** -13.0*** -11.7 -14.9* -11.4
-2.52 -2.70 -2.61 -1.40 -1.67 -1.34
Age squared 0.096* 0.112** 0.100* 0.051 0.092 0.047
1.8605 2.1843 1.9432 0.5663 0.9807 0.5167
Distance to nearest specialist -0.198 5.069* 0.057 -0.318 3.446 0.396
-0.2680 1.6985 0.0872 -0.2399 0.6756 0.3020
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.094** -0.001 -0.004 -0.033 -0.008
0.0484 -2.1742 -0.1214 -0.2579 -0.6055 -0.4741
F – – 56.3 – – 49.8
N 25,268 25,268 24,723 18,070 18,070 17,666
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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APPENDIX E : Not hospital-affiliated sample estimates
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Table 94: Primary specialist visit, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.010 -0.000 0.089 -0.009 0.019 0.039
-1.1160 -0.0217 1.2158 -0.6883 1.0656 0.3984
Severity 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.033***
6.4647 5.7783 6.5443 7.9754 7.7451 8.1223
Severity squared -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
-1.2459 -2.0575 -1.0287 -2.8504 -4.0317 -2.7719
Male -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.006 0.000
-0.5968 1.2268 -0.5261 -0.0804 1.5350 0.0309
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
-0.9199 -0.8260 -0.9369 1.5392 1.4852 1.5961
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
1.3552 1.3907 1.3430 -0.7069 -0.7078 -0.7836
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
-0.5993 0.9144 0.2853 -0.7477 0.2705 -0.2494
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
-0.4627 -0.6647 -0.8285 -0.3103 -1.5220 -0.4028
F – – 33.4 – – 31.3
N 155,522 155,522 153,185 96,484 96,484 95,029
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.049*** -0.021** 0.642*** -0.046*** -0.036* 0.604**
-2.9671 -2.1483 2.8675 -2.6052 -1.8674 2.3716
Severity 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046***
10.3883 9.2993 10.0613 10.1884 8.9895 9.6825
Severity squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
-5.4014 -5.7493 -5.2510 -5.7095 -5.6368 -5.6185
Male -0.004* -0.001 -0.003 -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012***
-1.6551 -0.3843 -1.0806 -3.4852 -2.6332 -3.2600
Age -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003** -0.003* -0.003**
-4.4029 -3.6678 -4.6528 -2.2631 -1.8815 -2.4940
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.6978 2.2151 2.5977 0.6403 0.6865 0.8264
Distance to nearest specialist -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.002 -0.001**
-6.4333 -0.3476 -0.7453 -7.0512 -1.2947 -2.0441
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
2.4738 1.1467 0.1012 3.3636 1.5492 1.5259
F – – 13.9 – – 13.2
N 188,681 163,413 160,974 112,147 112,147 110,355
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 95: Primary specialist RVUs, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.262 -0.922*** 1.224 0.354** -0.764 2.796**
1.4575 -2.8038 0.7717 2.1743 -1.1092 2.0662
Severity 0.456*** 0.464*** 0.435*** 0.578*** 0.498*** 0.532***
5.5922 3.6090 5.2697 5.9783 3.2637 5.3481
Severity squared -0.027*** -0.034*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.025 -0.027***
-3.9017 -2.8155 -3.3273 -3.6701 -1.4040 -2.9594
Male 0.212*** 0.239** 0.219*** 0.297*** 0.379*** 0.307***
3.0325 2.0933 3.1830 5.1010 4.3983 5.2365
Age -0.098*** -0.033 -0.093*** -0.082** -0.069 -0.079**
-4.0003 -0.8158 -4.0152 -2.5481 -1.4055 -2.5079
Age squared 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001***
4.2306 0.8548 4.3022 2.7992 1.5980 2.7419
Distance to nearest specialist -0.019** -0.063* -0.015 -0.027*** -0.010 -0.017**
-1.9634 -1.6838 -1.2622 -2.7554 -0.2866 -2.1477
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** 0.002* 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*
2.5786 1.8195 2.0526 2.8097 0.4226 1.9276
F – – 54.7 – – 53.9
N 25,696 25,696 25,363 21,971 21,971 21,680
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.667*** -0.329 5.923 0.969*** 0.004 10.908
2.9642 -0.7157 1.0477 2.7093 0.0066 1.0926
Severity 0.763*** 0.547*** 0.756*** 1.34*** 1.20*** 1.33***
8.6145 6.2840 8.5505 12.728 10.051 12.454
Severity squared -0.014 0.001 -0.014 -0.047*** -0.038*** -0.047***
-0.9080 0.0503 -0.8656 -3.9429 -2.9353 -3.9794
Male -0.048 -0.112 -0.030 -0.132 -0.289* -0.133
-0.7540 -1.4874 -0.4572 -1.0576 -1.7779 -1.0060
Age -0.247*** -0.149*** -0.251*** -0.365*** -0.344*** -0.395***
-8.9262 -2.6822 -8.3445 -7.8237 -4.0218 -6.6702
Age squared 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
7.9832 2.3066 7.5291 6.7795 3.5194 5.8468
Distance to nearest specialist -0.025*** -0.014 -0.020*** -0.037*** -0.068 -0.025*
-4.3754 -0.4015 -2.7034 -5.0457 -1.0632 -1.6691
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*
3.5068 0.1607 2.9433 3.3750 1.2532 1.7724
F – – 9.8 – – 13.3
N 44,136 44,136 43,635 39,797 39,797 39,274
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 96: Generalist RVUs, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.542*** 0.081 1.490*** -0.675*** 0.181 1.804***
-7.0501 1.0459 2.8300 -6.1656 1.0029 2.7891
Severity 0.070*** 0.005 0.064*** 0.100*** 0.055* 0.094***
3.4668 0.2449 2.6594 3.2751 1.7737 2.6259
Severity squared -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005
-1.1617 0.9589 -0.5080 -1.6173 -0.4209 -1.0979
Male 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.074** 0.091*** 0.070**
0.0881 0.9744 0.0700 2.2296 2.9771 1.9992
Age -0.007 0.006 -0.009 0.017 0.032** 0.012
-1.1758 0.7180 -1.5340 1.2986 2.3498 1.0077
Age squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
0.8286 -0.3501 1.1813 -0.6343 -1.3347 -0.3094
Distance to nearest specialist -0.027*** -0.006 -0.019*** -0.029*** -0.014 -0.018***
-8.6998 -0.6487 -4.9549 -6.8115 -0.8210 -3.8889
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000
4.7794 0.7144 3.0295 2.6674 -0.1065 1.0839
F – – 33.3 – – 31.2
N 155,361 155,361 153,027 96,392 96,392 94,939
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.642*** -0.060 1.200 -0.808*** 0.177 -1.135
-8.6154 -0.7323 1.3389 -6.0571 0.9191 -0.4742
Severity 0.188*** 0.145*** 0.185*** 0.321*** 0.252*** 0.322***
9.3093 8.9128 8.9582 9.1590 9.8431 8.9418
Severity squared -0.006* -0.005* -0.006* -0.011** -0.007** -0.011**
-1.8047 -1.7393 -1.6785 -2.4732 -2.0671 -2.3723
Male 0.102*** 0.118*** 0.098*** 0.192*** 0.207*** 0.186***
3.7342 4.4313 3.5596 4.5738 7.1148 4.5746
Age 0.005 0.013 0.005 0.054** 0.075*** 0.056**
0.3933 1.0200 0.4111 2.3070 2.8134 2.2710
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.001** -0.000**
-0.5581 -0.8304 -0.5986 -1.9668 -2.3236 -1.9757
Distance to nearest specialist -0.012*** -0.012* -0.008** -0.013*** -0.035** -0.013
-4.6126 -1.8528 -2.3868 -2.6545 -2.1941 -1.5018
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000
2.1298 1.8145 1.1930 0.9281 1.9053 0.5236
F – – 13.9 – – 13.2
N 163,386 163,386 160,947 112,131 112,131 110,339
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 97: Any outpatient visit, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.006** -0.005 -0.092*** -0.007** -0.009 -0.134***
-2.4571 -0.8582 -4.2131 -2.1526 -0.9870 -4.5665
Severity 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
1.9049 2.2645 2.1360 3.6707 4.5722 4.2634
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
0.9524 0.5677 0.8001 0.3682 -1.1412 0.0367
Male -0.001** -0.000 -0.002** -0.001 0.000 -0.001
-2.0572 -0.4909 -2.3066 -1.0729 0.1443 -1.2130
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
-1.3203 0.0158 -1.0023 -0.4534 0.9348 -0.1896
Age squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
1.1162 -0.2311 0.8242 0.3684 -1.0468 0.1314
Distance to nearest specialist 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.000
2.5372 1.5893 0.6030 2.1336 -0.3486 0.5234
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000
0.4427 -0.0110 1.1232 0.2715 2.0179 0.8010
F – – 33.4 – – 31.3
N 155,522 155,522 153,185 96,484 96,484 95,029
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.002 -0.002 -0.342*** -0.003 -0.012 -0.513***
-0.3277 -0.2061 -3.2371 -0.3920 -0.9980 -3.8307
Severity 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015***
5.9141 5.9133 4.8117 8.0258 8.8063 6.6137
Severity squared -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
-1.8356 -2.1239 -1.5417 -3.4758 -4.1155 -2.6755
Male -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.004**
-3.0340 -0.2946 -2.8703 -2.9027 -0.6848 -2.5164
Age -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001
-1.7539 -0.5363 -0.9801 -1.5228 -1.7917 -0.9801
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.3486 0.0559 0.7597 1.2760 1.2946 0.8640
Distance to nearest specialist 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.001
5.3210 1.0696 1.2738 5.2098 0.7142 1.1906
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
-3.3057 -1.0967 -1.1246 -2.9948 -0.3956 -1.0444
F – – 13.9 – – 13.2
N 163,413 163,413 160,974 112,147 112,147 110,355
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 98: Outpatient RVUs, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.53** 8.53 4.20* -0.816*** 0.335 3.588*
-2.297 1.536 1.776 -2.9468 0.1921 1.7667
Severity 0.480** -0.287 0.300 0.442** -0.628 0.290
2.4505 -0.4277 1.5642 1.9938 -0.6694 1.3982
Severity squared -0.002 0.144 0.029 0.005 0.188 0.033
-0.0537 1.0079 1.1297 0.1612 0.9707 1.1547
Male 0.017 0.022 0.018 0.136 0.130 0.134
0.0935 0.0635 0.0936 0.6559 0.4397 0.6703
Age -0.026 -0.069 -0.033 -0.019 -0.013 -0.049
-0.3770 -0.5833 -0.4775 -0.2704 -0.0629 -0.6757
Age squared -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.0254 0.6266 -0.0120 -0.1193 0.0983 0.2095
Distance to nearest specialist -0.024 -0.147 -0.006 -0.024 0.369 -0.004
-1.0990 -0.8409 -0.2230 -1.0162 1.2734 -0.1221
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.000
-0.4550 0.5265 -1.2245 -0.3730 -1.3158 -1.1207
F – – 21.3 – – 20.9
N 4,070 4,070 3,956 3,750 3,750 3,642
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.98** -1.59 19.47** -0.75** 1.96 5.94
-2.569 -1.498 2.044 -2.324 1.097 0.536
Severity 1.06*** 0.10 1.19*** 0.899*** -0.604 0.937***
4.753 0.548 4.991 4.0812 -1.0710 4.2584
Severity squared -0.051*** -0.003 -0.054*** -0.008 0.096 -0.007
-3.5911 -0.1936 -2.8723 -0.3427 1.5704 -0.3213
Male 0.668** 0.547 0.678** 0.591** 0.678 0.592**
2.2735 1.2934 2.4526 2.0070 1.5999 2.0526
Age 0.061 0.053 0.059 0.109 0.459 0.119
0.6146 0.1853 0.5336 1.2423 1.5482 1.2404
Age squared -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
-0.6909 -0.0047 -0.6606 -1.2524 -1.3926 -1.2403
Distance to nearest specialist -0.036* -0.057 0.003 -0.034** 0.044 -0.019
-1.7386 -0.2539 0.1451 -2.1464 0.3498 -0.8427
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000
0.9422 0.0977 0.1426 1.1805 -0.5323 0.6987
F – – 9.9 – – 15.4
N 7,848 7,848 7,680 7,749 7,749 7,562
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
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Table 99: Any new cardiovascular prescription, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Generalists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.002 0.010 0.208* -0.002 0.012 0.140
-0.2756 0.7877 1.8414 -0.2879 0.6624 1.0481
Severity 0.252*** 0.268*** 0.252*** 0.267*** 0.289*** 0.267***
23.2964 21.3594 22.8108 29.9365 31.1344 29.4768
Severity squared -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.024***
-12.7921 -11.8648 -12.4141 -16.7084 -17.5233 -16.0604
Male 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037***
7.9011 6.3004 7.5730 6.5018 4.9824 6.2941
Age 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
6.8637 5.5570 6.7279 4.0037 4.1421 3.7876
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-8.5976 -7.1467 -8.5555 -6.0877 -6.1104 -5.8764
Distance to nearest specialist 0.000 0.004*** 0.001** -0.000 0.001 0.001
0.2972 2.7832 2.1053 -0.0364 0.4691 1.0172
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000**
-1.8264 -2.8762 -2.6710 -1.3308 0.0960 -2.1317
F – – 33.4 – – 31.3
N 155,522 155,522 153,185 96,484 96,484 95,029
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Cardiologists
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 0.012 0.007 0.060 0.011* 0.036 -0.022
1.4841 0.3483 0.8834 1.8368 1.2788 -0.2754
Severity 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.062***
7.4413 4.6298 7.2651 9.1239 13.6119 9.2593
Severity squared -0.003*** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004***
-3.1151 -2.0348 -2.9886 -4.6680 -8.3963 -4.7067
Male 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.019***
4.8552 3.3828 5.0090 4.2299 2.5563 4.3233
Age 0.002** -0.001 0.002** 0.001 -0.001 0.001
2.1300 -0.3725 2.3360 0.5911 -0.4502 0.6015
Age squared -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000
-2.1097 0.3917 -2.3434 -0.4809 0.6215 -0.4904
Distance to nearest specialist -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* -0.001
-1.4410 0.2511 -1.1766 -1.4180 -1.6488 -1.2583
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2355 0.4877 1.1815 1.3970 1.4054 0.9352
F – – 5.8 – – 15.6
N 26,324 26,324 25,984 22,493 22,493 22,195
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 100: Inpatient admission, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.002** -0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.005* 0.023*
-2.0028 -0.0124 0.4762 -1.5803 1.8367 1.7279
Severity 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007***
5.1241 5.3554 4.8947 6.2219 3.5641 5.9955
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.6017 0.4224 0.7064 1.4391 1.0198 1.5768
Male 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***
4.2107 4.1557 4.1425 4.3014 3.5314 4.2058
Age -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001**
-1.1698 -1.9653 -1.0723 -2.5060 -3.2193 -2.4840
Age squared 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
2.2149 2.8544 2.0828 3.6173 4.3209 3.5233
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
-1.5128 0.2888 -0.9800 -1.4645 -1.3459 -0.1776
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
0.9972 -0.8139 0.8562 0.4140 1.1672 -0.2773
F – – 33.4 – – 31.3
N 155,522 155,522 153,185 96,484 96,484 95,029
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -0.003** -0.005 -0.068*** -0.004 0.006 -0.002
-2.1844 -0.9958 -2.6646 -1.5708 0.8281 -0.0471
Severity 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.020***
13.6843 12.1997 13.1364 14.3077 10.1496 14.6206
Severity squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.3898 0.9921 1.2810 0.5425 1.0152 0.4502
Male 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010***
9.4714 8.5359 9.2784 12.8126 6.0598 13.1024
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002***
-6.7716 -6.2770 -6.4056 -4.6038 -2.7803 -4.6331
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
6.8089 6.3365 6.4258 4.7134 3.0226 4.7382
Distance to nearest specialist -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.001* -0.000
-1.8536 -0.3081 -3.1705 -2.1502 -1.7966 -1.5293
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000
0.8875 -0.2166 1.6597 2.1709 1.8238 1.5249
F – – 13.9 – – 13.2
N 163,413 163,413 160,974 112,147 112,147 110,355
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 101: Physician cost, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 6.96* 6.22 71.48 12.4** 24.2* 91.7
1.833 1.316 1.332 2.43 1.94 1.60
Severity 7.07*** 5.36*** 6.82*** 11.2*** 10.3*** 10.9***
5.860 4.209 5.755 6.59 5.15 6.22
Severity squared -0.323** -0.309* -0.273** -0.510** -0.364 -0.450*
-2.5612 -1.7674 -2.1014 -2.1225 -1.3466 -1.7698
Male 2.66** 3.57** 2.65** 8.98*** 11.04*** 8.78***
2.309 2.453 2.312 3.750 3.685 3.617
Age 0.597** 1.296*** 0.537** 3.41*** 3.84*** 3.27***
2.2843 3.4683 2.0720 4.088 4.576 4.007
Age squared -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.034***
-3.8607 -4.0843 -3.6898 -4.0681 -4.2664 -3.9872
Distance to nearest specialist -1.23*** -1.18* -0.98*** -1.53*** -0.95 -1.22***
-4.916 -1.651 -3.661 -4.850 -0.759 -3.663
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.013*** 0.024 0.011*** 0.017*** -0.003 0.014**
3.9307 1.3675 2.9888 2.7803 -0.2153 2.4149
F – – 33.4 – – 31.3
N 155,522 155,522 153,185 96,484 96,484 95,029
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 10.9 -13.9 355.1** 22.0 -32.7 378.3
1.48 -1.30 2.34 1.60 -0.99 1.55
Severity 39.6*** 36.2*** 39.7*** 77.5*** 72.3*** 78.3***
12.01 9.91 11.90 9.99 8.45 9.80
Severity squared -1.54*** -1.46*** -1.54*** -3.41*** -3.01*** -3.46***
-4.081 -4.605 -4.022 -7.686 -5.220 -7.502
Male 4.31 1.49 4.07 2.11 -7.72 1.29
1.580 0.463 1.512 0.465 -1.233 0.284
Age -8.08*** -6.79*** -8.41*** -13.3*** -12.0*** -13.8***
-4.973 -3.022 -5.251 -5.36 -3.50 -5.74
Age squared 0.056*** 0.045** 0.059*** 0.089*** 0.079** 0.094***
3.4966 2.0886 3.7461 3.7160 2.4986 4.0239
Distance to nearest specialist -0.814*** -1.140 -0.141 -1.63*** -2.61 -0.90*
-3.8551 -1.6130 -0.4154 -3.135 -1.595 -1.705
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.005 0.015** 0.044** 0.012**
2.9966 2.7033 1.5831 2.4754 2.2799 2.3299
F – – 13.9 – – 13.2
N 163,413 163,413 160,974 112,147 112,147 110,355
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 102: Outpatient cost, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -5.57** 1.44 -47.74*** -8.91** -2.19 -73.55***
-1.989 0.369 -2.776 -1.966 -0.378 -3.006
Severity -1.36 3.73** -1.57 -3.57 7.36* -3.89
-0.301 2.116 -0.356 -0.472 1.805 -0.530
Severity squared 1.34 0.17 1.35 2.41* 0.24 2.43*
1.581 0.587 1.620 1.706 0.393 1.755
Male -0.969 -0.696 -1.501 0.205 1.916 -0.705
-0.7136 -0.5923 -1.1608 0.1106 0.8382 -0.4043
Age 0.174 0.659 0.312 0.483 1.145* 0.641
0.3492 1.1877 0.7034 0.6967 1.7203 1.0457
Age squared -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.012* -0.008
-0.5790 -1.2824 -1.0203 -0.8134 -1.8306 -1.2937
Distance to nearest specialist 0.363* 1.090 0.173 0.281 0.258 -0.005
1.9165 0.7562 0.9367 0.8604 0.1244 -0.0172
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.001 0.025 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.003
0.1408 0.5590 0.0416 0.5263 0.3477 0.6662
F – – 33.4 – – 31.3
N 155,522 155,522 153,185 96,484 96,484 95,029
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated -4.15 3.88 -52.21 0.78 -7.25 -279.73
-0.580 0.493 -0.404 0.071 -0.792 -0.996
Severity 11.3*** 9.1** 11.4*** 8.47 3.68 8.35
3.99 2.22 4.02 0.766 0.256 0.742
Severity squared 0.092 0.407 0.096 2.60 3.05 2.67
0.2139 0.6745 0.2238 1.265 1.173 1.285
Male 9.06*** 8.99*** 9.11*** 8.80** 5.87 9.16**
2.773 2.711 2.735 1.964 1.477 1.962
Age 0.570 0.784 0.638 -1.59 -0.55 -1.37
0.5663 0.4823 0.6252 -1.551 -0.334 -1.346
Age squared -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 0.012 0.004 0.010
-1.0337 -0.6359 -1.0792 1.1150 0.2509 0.9241
Distance to nearest specialist 0.214 -0.319 0.120 0.697** -0.573 0.123
0.6539 -0.3710 0.2808 2.3671 -0.4095 0.1842
Distance to nearest specialist squared -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007** -0.002 -0.004
-0.5626 -0.0437 -0.3405 -2.1456 -0.0781 -0.6442
F – – 13.9 – – 13.2
N 163,413 163,413 160,974 112,147 112,147 110,355
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values. 173
Table 103: Pharmacy cost (hypertension), not-affiliated sample
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 17.3 37.8 299.0** 20.0 49.9 408.2
1.41 1.27 2.34 0.79 0.56 1.29
Severity 617.1*** 638.0*** 616.1*** 1150.2*** 1193.1*** 1151.6***
23.63 24.40 23.48 28.31 40.37 27.93
Severity squared -41.5*** -44.3*** -41.2*** -79.7*** -87.0*** -79.3***
-12.37 -11.90 -12.21 -13.68 -19.79 -13.22
Male 141.9*** 140.8*** 142.8*** 252.7*** 236.2*** 252.1***
17.13 14.62 18.13 13.19 9.76 13.35
Age 12.9*** 13.6*** 12.3*** 27.1*** 34.8*** 26.4***
4.40 4.27 4.29 4.47 5.59 4.31
Age squared -0.130*** -0.138*** -0.123*** -0.280*** -0.372*** -0.271***
-3.7549 -3.6592 -3.6114 -4.0589 -5.4263 -3.8678
Distance to nearest specialist -2.18* 5.55** -0.62 -3.63 7.13 -1.04
-1.807 2.163 -0.478 -1.324 1.284 -0.439
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.015 -0.104* 0.002 0.003 -0.173* -0.020
0.6680 -1.9577 0.1006 0.0825 -1.7066 -0.6132
F – – 33.4 – – 31.3
N 155,522 155,522 153,185 96,484 96,484 95,029
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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Table 104: Total cost, not-affiliated sample
Panel A: Hypertension
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 18.7 45.4 322.7** 23.5 71.9 426.3
1.33 1.38 2.07 0.85 0.78 1.24
Severity 622.9*** 647.1*** 621.3*** 1157.8*** 1210.8*** 1158.6***
24.99 25.15 24.72 28.08 40.97 27.59
Severity squared -40.5*** -44.5*** -40.1*** -77.8*** -87.1*** -77.4***
-12.44 -12.12 -12.21 -12.53 -20.28 -12.10
Male 143.6*** 143.7*** 144.0*** 261.8*** 249.2*** 260.2***
18.94 15.23 19.96 13.97 10.42 13.88
Age 13.6*** 15.5*** 13.1*** 31.0*** 39.8*** 30.3***
4.20 4.39 4.14 4.78 6.36 4.60
Age squared -0.144*** -0.161*** -0.138*** -0.322*** -0.421*** -0.314***
-3.7814 -3.8437 -3.6889 -4.4192 -6.1428 -4.2270
Distance to nearest specialist -3.04*** 5.47** -1.42 -4.88* 6.44 -2.27
-2.635 2.128 -1.173 -1.800 0.997 -1.012
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.029 -0.055 0.014 0.024 -0.169 -0.003
1.3821 -0.8890 0.6110 0.6963 -1.6212 -0.0846
F – – 33.4 – – 31.3
N 155,522 155,522 153,185 96,484 96,484 95,029
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
Panel B: Diabetes mellitus
360-day window 720-day window
OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV
Integrated 6.75 -9.98 302.93** 22.8 -40.0 98.6
0.681 -0.693 2.510 1.38 -1.08 0.44
Severity 50.9*** 45.2*** 51.1*** 86.0*** 76.0*** 86.6***
11.14 9.08 11.12 6.97 4.28 7.06
Severity squared -1.44** -1.06 -1.44** -0.807 0.044 -0.780
-2.018 -1.445 -2.006 -0.3913 0.0152 -0.3790
Male 13.4*** 10.5** 13.2*** 10.9* -1.9 10.4*
2.93 2.38 2.93 1.72 -0.28 1.71
Age -7.51*** -6.00* -7.77*** -14.9*** -12.6*** -15.2***
-3.421 -1.940 -3.430 -5.74 -3.30 -5.74
Age squared 0.044** 0.035 0.047** 0.101*** 0.083** 0.104***
1.9657 1.1358 2.0098 3.8544 2.3080 3.9164
Distance to nearest specialist -0.600 -1.459 -0.021 -0.935 -3.181 -0.778
-1.5211 -1.5132 -0.0538 -1.5948 -1.4266 -0.9849
Distance to nearest specialist squared 0.006 0.022 0.003 0.008 0.043 0.008
1.4237 1.4766 0.8359 1.1219 1.3388 1.0320
F – – 13.9 – – 13.2
N 163,413 163,413 160,974 112,147 112,147 110,355
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance stars have their usual meaning (90, 95,
and 99 percent confidence). The F statistic reported for the IV regression is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistic. Low values for this statistic indicate indicate the instrument is weak. I note in the text when values
are dangerously low. State and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm and area regressors
are also included in all regressions, but due to lack of significance across nearly all specifications I do not
report their values.
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APPENDIX F : SK&A imputation
Introduction
Before the SK&A data can be used in my analysis, physician and firm identifiers must be
imputed. I describe my procedure at a high level.
Physician identifier imputation
No single variable identifies physicians across all years in the SK&A Physician List. The List
is compiled annually for marketing purposes and longitudinal identifiers do not have high
value to the data set’s primary users. Unfortunately, longitudinal identifiers are important
for my research.
My strategy was to fill the NPI field for all physicians in my data. In later years of the data
set, NPI is filled at almost a 90 percent rate. In earlier years, missing values are significant,
on the order of 40 percent. However, alternative government identifiers, particularly UPIN,
state license identifiers, and DEA registration numbers are available for most physicians in
the data.
Therefore, to impute NPIs I begin by determining which identifiers are observed coinciden-
tally in any year of the data and link them together. For example, if physician A is observed
with NPI B in 2011 and 2012, UPIN C in 2010 and 2011, and DEA registration number D
in 2009 and 2010, I draw an undirected graph with nodes physician A, NPI B, UPIN C, and
DEA registration number D, and edges between A and B, B and C, and finally C and D.
This clique indicates that NPI B may be associated with any observation with UPIN C or
DEA registration number D. In addition, I exploit physician identifier crosswalks provided
by the NBER that link UPIN and state licenses to NPIs. (These crosswalks in turn were
generated from NPPES files.)
This procedure can be implemented with all rows of the data. However, a large number of
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observations, about 10 percent of rows of the stacked Physician List extracts, are linked to
more than one NPI. This is due in large part to the use of UPINs by multiple providers.
For observations linked with more than one NPI, I search for a name and state match
between the SK&A data and the corresponding NPPES records. If I can find a unique
exact match, I assign an NPI. If I cannot, I assign an NPI if I can match on state and the
fuzzy string match score for name exceeds X. The threshold is arbitrary, set by examining
the distribution of fuzzy match scores, trying different values, and examining the results for
a random sample of observations.
Firm identifier imputation
The variable CODE3 identifies firms in the SK&A data. CODE3 indicates which locations
in the data belong to the same firm. Offices with the same non-empty value belong to the
same firm. Offices without a value might truly be stand-alone locations. The value may
also be empty because the SK&A caller was not able to elicit the relevant information.
Because firm composition is essential to my research, this missing value problem can cause
significant bias.
The Physician List is highly valued by marketers because the contact information is verified
by phone by SK&A. My imputation strategy relies on the high quality of this contact
information. I also observe entity NPIs and contact information in the NPPES. Because
the SK&A data is of high quality, any match on address or phone between entities in the
SK&A and NPPES data files is potentially credible.
Therefore, I build another large undirected graph in which SK&A and NPPES entity NPIs,
addresses, and phone numbers are nodes and links detected between them generate edges.
Offices in the same clique likely belong to the same firm.
Similar to the NPI imputation, there are a significant amount of false positives. By manual
inspection I discovered that unassociated groups with hospital-based locations or phone
numbers were often linked incorrectly. Therefore in my imputation I only drew an edge
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between offices in the NPPES data if they could also be linked on authorized individual, a
relatively severe requirement. When I imposed this condition in my estimation, the false
positives I observed in my random sample disappeared.
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